Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 13 May 1997
• Docket Number: No. 15505,15505
• Citation: 695 A.2d 1010,240 Conn. 799
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: William MAZZIOTTI, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Page 1010

695 A.2d 1010

240 Conn. 799

William MAZZIOTTI, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 15505.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 21, 1997.

Decided May 13, 1997.

Linda L. Morkan, with whom, on the brief, were Stephen E. Goldman and Raymond T. DeMeo, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Stephen B. Alderman, West Haven, with whom was Debra S. Groggins, for appellee (plaintiff).

Joram Hirsch, Bridgeport, filed a brief for Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

KATZ, Associate Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether, in an action by the plaintiff insured to recover damages under the uninsured/underinsured motorist provision of his automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant insurance company, the defendant is bound by the judgment obtained by the insured in his prior action against the tortfeasor. The defendant, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), appeals from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, William Mazziotti. Allstate claims that because it was not in privity with the tortfeasor it is not bound by the judgment in the earlier action, and may, therefore, contest the issue of damages in the action brought against it by the plaintiff. We agree.

The following facts are undisputed. On July 15, 1991, the plaintiff, William Mazziotti, while stopped at a red traffic light, was struck by a motor vehicle operated by Bei-Rong Ye. Ye had automobile liability insurance with Patriot General Insurance Company (Patriot General), with a liability limit of $20,000.

On April 8, 1992, the plaintiff filed suit against Ye. In that action, entitled Mazziotti v. Ye, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV920330855S (June 30, 1993), the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The motion was granted as to liability only. Thereafter, the plaintiff sought leave to implead Allstate, with whom he had an automobile insurance policy providing uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage with a limit of $100,000, as a party defendant in that action. The purpose of seeking to implead Allstate was to determine its liability under the underinsured motorist coverage provisions of the policy. Although the plaintiff's motion to implead Allstate was granted, he never actually made Allstate a party to that action. On June 30, 1993, after a hearing in damages in the action against Ye, a judgment of $68,867 was rendered for the plaintiff.

On May 27, 1993, thirty-four days before the hearing in damages in the action against Ye, the plaintiff brought the present action against Allstate, seeking coverage under the underinsured motorist provision of his policy. In his complaint, the plaintiff did not refer to his then pending action against Ye. The plaintiff alleged only that he would exhaust the full amount of the liability insurance available under Ye's automobile insurance policy.

On October 26, 1993, the plaintiff brought a separate action against Patriot General alleging, inter alia, that, as Ye's insurer, it had acted in bad faith in its dealings with him. ¹ Mazziotti v. Patriot General Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV930353278S (withdrawn per release filed February 9, 1995). On February 9, 1995, Patriot General, on behalf of Ye, paid the plaintiff the $20,000 bodily injury liability limit under Ye's policy. On March 14, 1995, the plaintiff filed a satisfaction of the judgment in his action against Ye. ² Patriot General also paid the plaintiff an additional $20,000 to settle the claims asserted in the separate bad faith action.

In the present action, the plaintiff seeks to collect from Allstate, under the terms of his insurance policy, "those damages which [he] is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto...." ³ There are three other provisions of the insurance policy issued by Allstate that are pertinent: the "consent to sue" provision that states that Allstate is not bound by any judgment resulting from an action by its insured against a responsible third party unless Allstate has given its written consent for the action; ⁴ and two separate provisions that allow for a reduction in the insured's recovery for any recovery the insured may obtain from another insurer or responsible party. ⁵

On February 4, 1994, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment as to the issue of Allstate's liability only. The record reflects that Allstate did not object. Following the granting of that motion, the case was scheduled for a hearing in damages pursuant to Practice Book § 365 et seq. Thereafter, when the case came before the trial court for jury selection on the hearing in damages, the plaintiff filed a "motion for judgment." ⁶ Allstate opposed the motion, asserting that: (1) because Allstate lacked privity with Ye, the doctrine of collateral estoppel could not apply in this case; and (2) because the plaintiff had failed to obtain Allstate's written consent to bring the action against Ye pursuant to the terms of the policy, the judgment obtained by the plaintiff against Ye was not binding on Allstate as to the amount of damages the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the policy. On January 22, 1996, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment, determining that Allstate had had sufficient notice of the prior action against Ye to render the judgment in that case binding upon Allstate and, further, that the consent to sue clause upon which Allstate relied was against public policy. Accordingly, the trial court held that Allstate was bound by the $68,867 judgment in the plaintiff's action against Ye, and rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $44,374.29. ⁷ Additionally, the trial court awarded interest on the judgment from the date of the filing of the complaint at a rate of 12 percent per annum, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a.

Thereafter, on February 9, 1996, Allstate, indicating that no new testimony would be required, moved, pursuant to Practice Book §§ 204A and 326, ⁸ to open the judgment, raising, inter alia, the claim that, in light of the satisfaction of judgment that the plaintiff had filed in his action against Ye, the plaintiff was not "legally entitled" to the judgment. Claiming that Allstate had advanced no new or valid reason upon which the trial court should act, the plaintiff objected to the motion. The trial court denied Allstate's motion without opinion. Allstate appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c).

On appeal, Allstate makes the following arguments: (1) in light of the satisfaction of judgment filed by the plaintiff in his action against Ye, the plaintiff was not "legally entitled" to recover further damages from Ye and, consequently, may not recover any underinsured motorist benefits under his automobile insurance policy with Allstate; (2) even if Allstate's underinsured motorist coverage applies in this case, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed because (a) despite the terms of the policy requiring the plaintiff to obtain written consent from Allstate to bring the action against Ye, the plaintiff never obtained such consent, (b) Allstate was not in privity with Ye and thus is not bound by the judgment in the plaintiff's action against Ye, and (c) Allstate had not received notice of the pendency of the plaintiff's action against Ye and, therefore, binding Allstate to the judgment in that action would violate Allstate's rights to due process and to its constitutionally guaranteed right to a trial by jury; (3) even if the plaintiff is entitled to recover under the underinsured motorist coverage, that recovery must, contrary to the trial court's judgment, be reduced by the entire $40,000 the plaintiff received from Ye's insurer; and (4) the trial court improperly awarded interest pursuant to § 52-192a, because that provision applies only when there has been a trial and there was no trial in this case. We conclude that, because Allstate did not have timely notice of the underlying action against Ye, the trial court improperly concluded that Allstate was bound by the judgment in that action.

I

Allstate first claims that the trial court should have granted its motion to open the judgment in the present case. Specifically, Allstate argues that because the plaintiff was not "legally entitled" to recover further damages from Ye, he was not entitled to recover any underinsured motorist benefits under the terms of his policy with Allstate.

The law of judgments and satisfaction of judgments is well settled. The construction of a judgment is a question of law with the determinative factor being the intent of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. 2 E. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure (C. Tait & P. Adomeit 1978) § 351(e). As a general rule, the court should "construe [a] judgment as it would construe any document or written contract in evidence before it. Jordan, Marsh & Co. v. Patterson, 67 Conn. 473, 35 Atl. 521 [1896]; De Santo v. Burkle, 106 Conn. 677, 138 Atl. 788 [1927]." Grasso v. Frattolillo, 111 Conn. 209, 212, 149 A. 838 (1930). " 'Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed.' " Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn. 189, 197, 496 A.2d 491 (1985). As we recently have stated, "[a]lthough ordinarily the question of contractual intent presents a question of fact for the ultimate fact finder, where the language is clear and unambiguous it becomes a question of law for the court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gateway Co. v. DiNoia, 232 Conn. 223, 232, 654 A.2d 342 (1995).

" 'The satisfaction of a judgment refers to compliance with or fulfillment of the mandate thereof.' " 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments § 979 (1969). "There is realistically no substantial...