McAdory v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

• Citation: 94 Ala. 272,10 So. 507
• Parties: MCADORY v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.
• Decision Date: 27 January 1892
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

10 So. 507

94 Ala. 272

MCADORY v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 27, 1892

Appeal from city court of Birmingham; H. A. SHARPE, Judge.

Action by M. J. McAdory, administrator of William E. Beavers against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, for the negligent killing of plaintiff's intestate. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. New trial granted. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Plaintiff's intestate was a switchman in the service of the defendant at the time of the accident which resulted in his death. The court granted a new trial on the ground that the verdict, as assessed by the jury, was excessive. The evidence bearing on the measure of damages was undisputed, and it was substantially as follows: About two years before he was killed, plaintiff's intestate, then between 18 and 19 years of age, left his father's farm in Georgia, with a scanty supply of clothing, to go out into the world for himself. Prior to that time he was healthy, strong, sober industrious, and economical. He went first to his uncle's in Atlanta. There we have no account of him. Sixteen months before his death he came to Birmingham, where his cousin was at work for one of the railroads. He did not secure employment for about three months, during which time his cousin paid his board, at $20 per month, and advanced him money for expenses, making in all $71. At the expiration of that time intestate secured employment with defendant for watching a street crossing, at $30 per month. He was subsequently promoted to watch another crossing, at $45 per month, and a short time before his death was again promoted to be a switchman, at a salary of $66 2/3 per month. During the time he worked as switchman he lost no time from any cause, and during the whole time of his employment he was absent from work only two days. His foreman and several other witnesses testified that he was able and willing to work, and performed all his duties well. He was of rather slight physique, though he was strong and healthy. He was never known to drink intoxicating liquor, and spent neither time nor money foolishly. His landlady testified of him in the highest terms, saying he was not like other young men, but when off duty, spent his time reading and improving himself. During his life in Birmingham he corresponded with his father and sister. Before intestate had begun receiving his increased salary he had repaid to his cousin the $71 borrowed, then he sent his sister $10, and at the time of his death had an abundant supply of good clothes, including one nice new suit that cost $22.50. He had a bank deposit of $25. His employer owed him $43.45, and his landlady found on his person, and turned over to his father, $1.90 in cash. He owed nothing whatever. He was paying, at the time of his death $18 for board and lodging. American tables of mortality showed expectation of life to be about 40 years. From these facts the court below undertook to calculate the gross amount that intestate would probably have left at the end of his expectancy of life, and discounted that sum for 39 years at 8 per cent., arriving at the sum of $3,800.

Bowman & Harsh, for appellant.

Hewitt, Walker & Porter, for appellee.

CLOPTON J.

Under the statute, which entitles the personal representative of an employe, whose death is caused by the negligence of the employer, to maintain an action, the measure of recoverable damages, established by this court, is the money value of the life. The recovery is limited to actual compensation for the pecuniary loss suffered by those entitled to inherit his estate according to the statute of distribution, allowing nothing for the pain which the deceased may be supposed to have suffered, or as solace to the grief of surviving relations. James v. Railroad Co., 92 Ala. 231, 9 South. Rep. 335. The courts have encountered great difficulty in establishing a clear and definite rule by which the pecuniary loss may be calculated with appropriate accuracy especially when there is no status of dependency. In Railroad Co. v. Orr, 91 Ala. 548, 8 South. Rep. 360, it is said: "That the jury may have proper data from which a pecuniary compensation may be fixed, it is proper to admit evidence of the age, probable duration of life, habits of industry, means, business, earnings, health, skill of the deceased, reasonable future expectations; and perhaps there are other facts which should exert a just influence in determining the pecuniary damage sustained." And in James v. Railroad Co., supra, referring to this enumeration of the proper data, the court says: "All this we reaffirm, and add that net income and habits of economy should enter into the account as factors-important factors-in the ascertainment of accumulating capacity. This, at least, seems to be the proper standard by which to measure the damages." These are mentioned as circumstances and considerations to be taken into the account in ascertaining the accumulations of the deceased during the probable continuance of his life had he not been untimely cut off, as elements of the value of the life destroyed, not the value itself. In Railroad Co. v. Butter, 57 Pa. St. 335, after stating that the proper measure of damages is the pecuniary loss suffered by the parties entitled to the sum recovered, it is observed: "And that loss is what the deceased would have probably earned by his intellectual or bodily labor in his business or profession during the residue of his life-time, and which would have gone for the benefit of his children, taking into consideration his age, ability, and disposition to labor, and his habits of living and expenditure." True, this language is susceptible of the construction that the sum of the probable future accumulations is the measure of the pecuniary loss suffered by the surviving next of kin; but we do not suppose that the learned justice who rendered the opinion intended to be understood as laying down the rule that the net earnings during the period of the expectancy of life constitute the absolute...