McAfee v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 23 September 1891 |
| Docket Number | 15,042 |
| Citation | 28 N.E. 423,130 Ind. 33 |
| Parties | McAfee v. Reynolds |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Petition for a Rehearing Overruled Dec. 8, 1891.
From the White Circuit Court.
Judgment is in part affirmed and in part reversed, with costs.
R. P Davidson, for appellant.
J. H Adams and J. B. Sherwood, for appellee.
On the 19th day of June, 1877, Robert J. Brown was the owner of the real estate involved in this controversy, and on that day Earhart and others obtained judgment against him. This judgment became a lien upon the real estate, and has never been paid or satisfied. Brown died on the 6th day of November, 1877. By proper assignments the appellee became the owner of the judgment. James M. Brown was appointed the administrator of the estate of Robert J. Brown, deceased, on the 3d day of December, 1877, and on the 30th day of July, 1878, petitioned for an order to sell the land to pay the debts of his intestate. Joseph Kious became the successor of James M. Brown, and filed a supplemental petition for an order for the sale of the property, and an order was made as prayed. Neither the appellee nor any other lien-holder was a party to the proceedings, except in so far as the notice given by publication made under the law then in force may have constituted them parties. The real estate was sold pursuant to the order to the appellant on the 1st day of October, 1877, the purchase-money was paid by him, and a deed was executed and approved. Under this deed the grantee entered into possession. The estate of Robert J. Brown was insolvent. The only mention of liens in the proceedings on the petition was made in the decree approving and confirming the deed executed by the administrator, and the mention there made is not of the judgment of the appellee, but of a judgment owned by John P. Carr.
The present action was begun on the 24th day of February, 1888.
The conclusions of law stated by the court read thus:
It is obvious that the right of the plaintiff created by her judgment was not divested by the decree directing the sale of the lands, nor is it contended by appellant's counsel that the lien was extinguished. It is also evident that the time the hands of the judgment creditor were tied by the statutory provision restraining proceedings to enforce a judgment for the period of one year after the death of the debtor can not be justly considered in computing the time during which the lien continues in force. Jones v. Detchon, 91 Ind. 154. This we understand is conceded by appellant's counsel.
The contention of appellant's counsel is, in effect, that the lien of the judgment having expired on the 4th day of July, 1888, after that time no decree could be rendered declaratory of its existence and providing for its enforcement. The appellee's counsel assert that "The question is not whether the lien of a judgment upon real estate may be prolonged beyond the statutory period fixed for such liens, but whether the rights and liens existing and held by the plaintiff at the time of bringing suit shall be adjudged and enforced as of the date of the commencement of the action." This statement of the respective positions of counsel exhibits the principal question in the case.
The land had passed into the hands of a third person, the purchaser at the administrator's sale, and hence the judgment creditor had a right to bring a suit to have his lien declared and freed from the claim asserted by the purchaser under the administrator's deed. Decker v. Gilbert, 80 Ind. 107; Faulkner v. Larrabee, 76 Ind. 154.
The claim of the appellant was an obstruction to the enforcement of the judgment lien, and the creditor had a right to ask that the obstruction be removed so as to enable her to realize the benefit of her judgment. Quarl v. Abbett, 102 Ind. 233, 1 N.E. 476. Under the old procedure scire facias was the appropriate procedure where the rights of a third person intervened. 1 Freeman Executions, 81. But, where such a proceeding would not give adequate relief, the assistance of equity was properly invoked. In such a case as this, it is evident that a mere motion for leave to issue an execution would not secure adequate relief, since a sale upon execution would still leave the claim of the appellant undetermined, so that if it were conceded that the remedy by motion exists where the rights of a third person, based upon a claim of title created by a decree in judicial proceedings, have intervened, and where the judgment has died, still that remedy would not be adequate, inasmuch as the order would not fully remove the obstruction created by the sale under the decree. The rule is that where there is some remedy at law, but not an adequate one,--that is, one that will adjudicate the entire controversy and grant full relief,--equity will assume jurisdiction. Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74, 18 L.Ed. 580; Denny v. Denny, 113 Ind. 22, 14 N.E. 593; Bishop v. Moorman, 98 Ind. 1, and authorities cited. Whatever view is taken of the case, the result is that the conclusion must be that the suit is an appropriate one, and there was no mistake in electing the remedy.
What we have said establishes the initial proposition involved, inasmuch as it proves that the plaintiff stated a cause of action when she began her suit. If she is to be entirely defeated, it must be for the reason that the efflux of time has destroyed her right.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff will succeed if at the time he sues a complete cause of action exists in him. This is a general rule to which there are few exceptions. The cases wherein the plaintiff by his own act divests himself of a right of action constitute the most numerous class of exceptions, but there is here no element which makes that class of cases even remotely analogous, since no act was done by the plaintiff after suit which released or impaired her rights. If the right of action which existed in the plaintiff when she began her action has been destroyed, it must be because the law so operates as to take it from her. There is no express enactment divesting the cause of action, and no event has occurred changing the position of the parties. The only thing that can be said to have affected the case in any way is the lapse of time. If this can be assigned a retrospective effect, then there is plausibility in the contention that the right of action was wholly swept away; if not, then the contention is foundationless.
If the lapse of time, without any fault of a plaintiff, or any act of his, can destroy a cause of action, then it is in the power of a defendant, by prolonging litigation, to destroy a meritorious cause of action, and this is a result not to be reached without strong and cogent reasons. If a cause of action exists when a suit is begun, the plaintiff has a substantive right, and where there is a right there is a remedy. Where there is a right and a corresponding remedy and steps have been taken to vindicate the right, a plaintiff has done all that the law requires of him, and he can not be turned out of court, because delay, attributable to no fault of his, renders the right asserted by him ineffective. It seems clear to us on principle that the appellee did not lose her cause of action because of the lapse of time, and that the time which intervened between the bringing of the suit and the decision can not so operate as to defeat her suit. What its effect is upon the measure of relief is quite another question, and one that will be considered further on. It may, however, be here said appropriately that the right to...
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