McAllaster v. Bruton, Civ. No. 86-0025-P.

• Decision Date: 19 March 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 86-0025-P.
• Citation: 655 F. Supp. 1371
• Parties: Jamie R. McALLASTER, Plaintiff, v. Victoria BRUTON, Government Employees Insurance Company, and City of Portland, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maine

655 F. Supp. 1371

Jamie R. McALLASTER, Plaintiff, v.Victoria BRUTON, Government Employees Insurance Company, and City of Portland, Defendants.

Civ. No. 86-0025-P.

United States District Court, D. Maine.

March 19, 1987.

John D. McKay, Gerald F. Petruccelli, Frederick C. Moore, Portland, Me., for plaintiff.

Steven R. Smith, Stephen C. Whiting, Portland, Me., for defendant Bruton.

James M. Bowie, Portland, Me., for Government Employees Ins.

John E. Sedgewick, Lewiston, Me., for all defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

GENE CARTER, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Motions for Partial Summary Judgment and Declaratory Relief filed by Plaintiff, Jamie R. McAllaster.Plaintiff seeks Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability against DefendantGovernment Employees Insurance Company(GEICO) with whom Plaintiff has a policy of automobile insurance which includes uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage.Declaratory relief on the issue of policy benefits is sought only if the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied.

The case arises from an automobile accident that occurred on June 3, 1984 in which a car driven by DefendantVictoria Bruton collided with a City of Portland fire truck.Plaintiff, a passenger in the car operated by Bruton, suffered personal injuries for which he seeks to recover from Bruton, GEICO, and the City of Portland.Jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,¹28 U.S.C. § 1332.

Prior to the filing of the present motions, Plaintiff and others had settled with Bruton's liability carrier; Bruton herself has commenced a bankruptcy action.The single limit of Bruton's liability coverage was $50,000; Plaintiff will receive $25,000.The parties have stipulated that Bruton is an underinsured motorist and the operator of an underinsured motor vehicle within the meaning of Plaintiff's policy with GEICO and that no other policies or bonds are available to Bruton and applicable to this accident.Thus, the issues before the Court are limited to whether, when, and how much GEICO must pay Plaintiff under the terms of this policy.In essence, Plaintiff brings the current motions in an effort to reach the proceeds of this policy prior to the litigation of the underlying case.

I.Choice of Law

Before reaching the merits of Plaintiff's motions, the Court first addresses the choice-of-law question advanced by the parties.Plaintiff argues that Connecticut law is the governing substantive law because Plaintiff resided in Connecticut both when the policy was issued and at the time of the collision.GEICO argues that Maine substantive laws apply because the accident occurred in Maine and because Maine heavily regulates underinsured motorist insurance.

In a diversity case, a federal court must apply the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits.Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021, 85 L.Ed.2d 1477(1941).Thus, this Court must apply the choice of law test set forth by the Maine Law Court in Baybutt Constr. Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,455 A.2d 914(Me.1983).This test requires the Court, where the parties have not made an express, effective choice of applicable law, to determine whether Connecticut or Maine "has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties" with respect to the issue before the Court.Id. at 918.Of particular importance to the Baybutt court in making this determination was the location of the insured risk, which that court found to be of greater significance than any other relationship among the states, the parties, or the transaction.Id. at 918-19(relying on the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 193(1971)).

GEICO argues that the location of the insured risk "ultimately turned out to be in Maine" because the accident occurred in Maine.The location of the insured risk under an automobile liability policy, however, is determined by "where the automobile will be garaged at least during most of the period in question."Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 193 comment b, at 611.Neither party has indicated to the Court where Plaintiff's automobile was to be garaged.Plaintiff asserts that he was merely visiting Maine when the accident occurred and was otherwise a citizen and resident of Connecticut.GEICO does not challenge this assertion.Thus, it appears to the Court that the location of the insured risk was Connecticut.

The Court's inquiry cannot end here.Under the Baybutt test, the Court must also determine whether any other state has a more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.All the parties are residents of other states except Defendant City of Portland.The status of this Defendant, however, should not affect the rights created by the insurance contract between GEICO and Plaintiff.Similarly, the location of the accident does not bear a significant factual relationship to GEICO's or Plaintiff's rights under the policy.Finally, Plaintiff argues that there is no conflict between Maine and Connecticut law on any material issue.Although GEICO argues vigorously in favor of the applicability of Maine law, it has offered the Court no other significant relationship between Maine and the parties or the transaction except for Maine's regulation of underinsured motorist insurance.The Court is unpersuaded that Maine's regulation of the activities of its insurance industry outweighs Connecticut's similar interest in a policy issued in Connecticut.Consequently, the Court finds that Connecticut substantive law controls the issue now before the Court.

II.Summary Judgment

Plaintiff has requested partial summary judgment on GEICO's contractual liability to pay him benefits available under the underinsured motorist provisions of the policy.Plaintiff argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding GEICO's liability because Defendant Bruton has admitted that she was partially at fault.²GEICO, on the other hand, argues that there is a substantial factual dispute as to whether Bruton was in fact at fault, and if so, whether this fault constitutes legal fault.The Court analyzes these arguments in light of the insurance policy in question and the controlling Connecticut statute.

Connecticut's Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist statute provides in part:

(a)(1) Every such policy shall provide insurance, herein called uninsured motorist coverage, in accordance with such regulations, with limits for bodily injury or death not less than those specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and underinsured motor vehicles....

Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 38-175c(a)(1)(West Supp.1986)(emphasis added).GEICO's policy language tracks the statutory provision.It provides: "Under the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists Coverage we GEICO will pay damages for bodily injury caused by accident which the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an Uninsured Motor Vehicle, or Underinsured Motor Vehicle...."(emphasis added).

The plain language of both the statute and Plaintiff's policy with GEICO requires legal liability on the part of Bruton as a condition precedent to the payment of benefits.SeeRhault v. Tsagarakos,361 F.Supp. 202, 206(D.Vt.1973)("The plaintiff's carrier simply stands jointly liable with the uninsured motorist, or in his stead, to the extent specified in the statute after responsibility and damages have been determined.")(construing Vermont law);Johnson v. General Motors Corp.,242 F.Supp. 778, 780(E.D.Va.1965)("Uninsured motorist coverage is protection afforded an injured ... insured by reason of a contractual agreement after the liability of the uninsured motorist, known or unknown, has been established by a court of competent jurisdiction.")(emphasis in original).See alsoNationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode,187 Conn. 386, 399, 446 A.2d 1059, 1065(1982)("since claim is made against an insured's uninsured motorist coverage after it is determined that the at-fault party is underinsured")(footnote omitted; emphasis added).But seeA. Widiss, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance§ 7.3 (2d ed. 1985)(questioning whether burden of proof on legal fault should be allocated to claimant).Compare alsoSowell v. Travelers Indemnity Ins. Co.,31 Conn.Supp. 413, 415-16, 332 A.2d 792, 794(1974)("policy contains no condition precedent to arbitration").The statutory and policy language both clearly contemplate that the liability of the carrier providing underinsured motorist coverage does not, over objection, ripen into an obligation to pay under its policy until its insured has obtained a determination by judgment that the tortfeasor was guilty of negligence causing the insured's injury for which recovery is sought against the carrier.

Defendant Bruton's belief regarding her degree of fault does not establish, in and of itself, legal liability for Plaintiff's injuries.The Court finds that there are a great number of factual issues that the jury must resolve before it can be decided whether Bruton is legally liable for Plaintiff's injuries.An adjudication of legal liability may properly encompass a wide variety of factual considerations going to the existence of negligence, proximate cause, and the probative force of the evidence in respect to pleaded defenses to liability.When properly made on all of the evidence, such an adjudication may justifiably conflict with the view of either party to the accident as to the existence of culpable fault, and often does.Summary judgment on the issue of GEICO's liability, contingent as it is on a finding of legal liability on the part of Bruton, is therefore inappropriate.

III.Declaratory Relief

As an alternative to his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff requests a Declaratory...