McArdle v. Town of Dracut/Dracut Pub. Sch.

• Decision Date: 09 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 13–1044.,13–1044.
• Citation: 732 F.3d 29
• Parties: Raymond C. McARDLE, Plaintiff, Appellant v. TOWN OF DRACUT/DRACUT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Theresa Rogers, W. Spencer Mullin, Dr. Stacy Scott, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

732 F.3d 29

Raymond C. McARDLE, Plaintiff, Appellant

v.TOWN OF DRACUT/DRACUT PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Theresa Rogers, W. Spencer Mullin, Dr. Stacy Scott, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 13–1044.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

Oct. 9, 2013.

Jeffrey R. Mazer, with whom Mazer Law Group, LLC, was on brief, for appellant.

Thomas A. Mullen, for appellees.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.

KAYATTA, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Raymond McArdle (“McArdle”) is a former teacher in the public schools of the town of Dracut, Massachusetts. He claims, among other things, that Dracut improperly handled his request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (“FMLA”) and forced him to resign in retaliation for seeking such leave. The district court granted summary judgment dismissing all of McArdle's claims, ruling that he had not worked enough to be eligible for FMLA leave, and otherwise finding his claims meritless. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

Because the district court dismissed McArdle's claims on summary judgment before any factfinder could evaluate the competing evidence and inferences, we will describe the facts giving rise to this lawsuit in a light as favorable to McArdle as the record will reasonably allow. Colburn v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 327 (1st Cir.2005).

McArdle began working as a middle school English teacher for Dracut in 1997. In 2007, he entered divorce proceedings with his wife and began drinking excessively. Depression, anxiety, foreclosure on his home, and personal bankruptcy followed. Reeling from these personal crises, McArdle began to miss work. He went to work at school only ten of twenty-one school days in September of 2008 and did not appear at all in October, November, or December of 2008. After the winter break, his record improved temporarily. He went to work fifteen out of seventeen days in January, fourteen out of fifteen days in February, twenty out of twenty-one days in March, twelve days out of sixteen in April, and eleven out of twenty days in May. He did not work at school at all in June, the final month of the school year. In total, he came to school for only eighty-two days in the 2008–2009 school year.

These absences exhausted the fifteen days of sick leave and the two days of personal leave to which he was entitled in the 2008–2009 year. He then exercised, after some disagreement with his superintendent, a contractual right to use in the 2008–2009 school year his fifteen days of sick leave for the 2009–2010 year. He also had fifty-two “deduct days” during which school was in session but he did not work and was not paid. Throughout the 2008–2009 school year, McArdle provided cursory explanations for his absences, supplying his principal with two notes that indicated that he had a “medical condition” and was unable to work for “medical reasons.” He was disciplined—over his objection—for not attending faculty meetings when he was absent from work. He was also disciplined for failing to leave lesson plans for a substitute with the vice-principal, even though he had done so.

On September 1st, the day the 2009–2010 school year began, McArdle again did not appear at school. Instead, that day he called his principal, Defendant Theresa Rogers, and informed her that, “at the very last minute,” he had made the decision that it would not be in anyone's interest for him to come back to school. During the same conversation he also stated that he wanted to apply for FMLA leave. Rogers informed him that he would have to contact the Dracut superintendent, Defendant W. Spencer Mullin. When McArdle called Mullin's office, he spoke with Mullin's secretary, RayAnn L'Heureux, who agreed to send him “the appropriate paperwork for the FMLA.” Two weeks later he received a United States Department of Labor fact-sheet about the FMLA and a form to be completed by his doctor. Included with these materials was a note, which McArdle concedes he read, informing him that he had to notify the superintendent in writing of any request for FMLA leave. This requirement was also stated clearly in Dracut's FMLA leave policy, which was posted on its website.

McArdle did not send any notice to the superintendent of his desire to take FMLA leave. Nor did he return a completed medical certification. McArdle testified that after he received the materials from Ms. L'Heureux he decided that he must need some additional form to fill out. He called the superintendent's office and spoke with Ms. Curtis, another of Superintendent Mullins's secretaries. In his first conversation with her, he asked that someone in the superintendent's office “send [him] what [he] need[ed] to fill out.” McArdle called the superintendent's office five to seven more times requesting to speak to Mullins himself, but never received a call back. McArdle decided that submitting the medical certification was “optional” and did not do so. He is correct that the school district's FMLA policies, which he read, state only that the district “may” require a medical certification from an employee seeking FMLA leave, but he does not explain why he did not believe that such a request had been made when L'Heureux sent him the certification form. And he completely ignores the fact that he had previously agreed in writing (as a condition to being allowed to return to work for Dracut in 2008) that he would “provide a physician's statement whenever sick leave prevails for five (5) consecutive school days.”

On September 28, 2009, Rogers sent a letter to McArdle terminating him for abandoning his position “since we have not received any written correspondence from you nor have you called the substitute call-in service to alert the district that your classes would be unattended.” McArdle promptly replied, pointing out that the town was required to first give him notice of intent to terminate his employment before actually firing him. McArdle's reply noted for the first time in writing his desire to take FMLA leave, explained that he believed he had not yet been sent the proper form to submit, and denied that there was any need to call the substitute call-in service because the principal knew he was out and had arranged for a long-term substitute. He still failed to provide any physician's statement as the town had plainly required. Rogers sent a second letter on October 5, this one notifying McArdle of Dracut's intent to terminate (for the same reasons) and giving him ten days to respond. Nine days later, McArdle spoke with Rogers by telephone and resigned his position after Rogers told him that everything relating to his termination would be removed from his record if he did so.

McArdle filed this suit in 2011, alleging in Count I that all defendants violated his rights under the FMLA. Counts II and III alleged Massachusetts state law tort claims of, respectively, intentional infliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with advantageous business relations. Both counts were alleged against individual decision-makers in the Dracut schools (defendants Theresa Rogers, W. Spencer Mullin, who was the superintendent prior to and at the time of McArdle's dismissal, and Stacy Scott, who assumed Mullins's position after McArdle's termination). After discovery, defendants successfully moved for summary judgment on all of McArdle's claims. He now appeals.

II. Standard of Review

“We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.” Ortiz–Bonilla v. Federación de Ajedrez de Puerto Rico, Inc., 734 F.3d 28, 12–1022, 2013 WL 4457427 (1st Cir. Aug. 21, 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate when there is ‘no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Kelley v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 707 F.3d 108, 115 (1st Cir.2013)).

III. Analysis

A. McArdle's FMLA Claims

The FMLA guarantees an eligible employee the right to take twelve weeks of unpaid leave because of, among other things, a serious medical condition that renders the employee unable to do his job. See29 U.S.C. § 2612; ¹Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002). The Act further makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided [by the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).

McArdle claims that Dracut violated the FMLA both by interfering with his attempt to seek permission to take FMLA leave, and by terminating him because he attempted to avail himself of the protections of the FMLA for the leave he took. In this rather unusual case, McArdle has not claimed that Dracut violated the FMLA by refusing to grant him FMLA leave, or by firing him for taking such leave. This departure from the more customary path followed by terminated, leave-taking employees might be explained by McArdle's recognition that, as we explain below, he was not eligible to take FMLA leave. But McArdle does in fact argue that he was eligible for FMLA leave.

Be that as it may, absent exceptional circumstances not present here, we endeavor to assess the claims a party makes, rather than to ponder why he makes those claims and not others. And, in the end, that assessment here will demonstrate that McArdle had no cause for complaint of any type under the FMLA.

1. McArdle Was Not Eligible To Take FMLA Leave

As a foundation on which he largely but not completely erected his claims, McArdle argued below, and now argues on appeal, that he was eligible for FMLA leave, or that the town should be estopped from denying that he was eligible. We therefore begin our analysis of the claims McArdle does make by explaining why the district court correctly ruled, as a matter of law, that McArdle was not eligible to take FMLA leave.

To be eligible for FMLA leave, an employee must have “at least 1,250 hours of service with [the employer]...