McArthur v. Dryden
Decision Date | 27 April 1897 |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Walsh County, Sauter, J.
Action by William McArthur against W. S. Dryden and the Monarch Elevator Company. Dismissed as to the elevator company. On appeal to the District Court, judgment rendered for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
John H Fraine and Cochrane & Feetham, for appellant.
Phelps & Phelps, for respondent.
This action was commenced in justice court. It was originally brought by plaintiff against the defendant Dryden and the Monarch Elevator Company. On trial in justice's court the action was dismissed as to the elevator company. Plaintiff obtained judgment against the defendant Dryden. Dryden appealed to the District Court, where the case was again tried to the court and a jury, resulted in a verdict for plaintiff. Motion for a new trial was overruled, and this appeal is taken from the order of the court denying a new trial. There is a large assignment of errors, of which we shall consider but two: First, that the verdict was contrary to law; and, second, that the testimony was insufficient to sustain the verdict.
The action arose out of the following facts: During the fall of 1895, plaintiff, McArthur, was operating a threshing machine and threshed grain for one William Henry amounting to the sum of $ 286.52. For this sum plaintiff claimed and filed, as he alleges in his complaint, a thresher's lien on the grain so threshed. This lien was perfected on the 22d day of October, 1895. The defendant Dryden was at that time the agent of the Monarch Elevator Company, a corporation, and engaged in operating the elevator of said corporation at the village of Cashel, in Walsh county. That portion of the complaint that seeks to fasten liability upon Dryden is in the following language: It further alleges that Henry thereafter delivered grain to Dryden to the amount of more than 600 bushels, and that the said defendant failed to pay for said grain, or any part thereof, except the sum $ 25. It will be noticed that the action is based upon the alleged promise of Dryden to pay the debt of Henry. Confessedly, this promise was not in writing. In charging the jury, the court said: "Now, gentlemen of the jury, in actions of this kind the statute provides that a promise to answer the obligation of another in any of the following cases is deemed an original obligation of the promisor: First, when the promise is either by one who has received property of another upon an undertaking to apply it pursuant to such promise, or by one who has received a discharge from an obligation in whole or in part in consideration of such promise." The court then gave the jury also the second and third subdivisions of § 4629, Rev. Codes, which need not be quoted here. The court then proceeded: ...
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