McArthur v. Smallwood

Decision Date27 July 1955
Docket NumberNo. 5-764,5-764
Citation281 S.W.2d 428,225 Ark. 328
PartiesWood McARTHUR, Appellant, v. J. M. SMALLWOOD, C. G. Hall, J. V. Satterfield, Jr., Harry W. Parkin and J. L. Shaver, Members of the Arkansas Justice Building Commission, Appellees.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Williams & Gardner, Russellville, for appellant.

Tom Gentry, Atty. Gen., Mehaffy, Smith & Williams, Little Rock, for appellees.

NED A. STEWART, Special Chief Justice.

The appellant and plaintiff below, Wood McArthur (hereinafter referred to as appellant), proceeding as a taxpayer, filed this case in the Chancery Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, against the appellees and defendants below, J. M. Smallwood, C. G. Hall, J. V. Satterfield, Jr., Harry W. Parkin and J. L. Shaver (hereinafter referred to as appellees), as members of the Arkansas Justice Building Commission, seeking to have Act 375 of 1955 declared unconstitutional and void and in violation of certain constitutional rights of the plaintiff and other taxpayers similarly situated, and seeking to enjoin the appellees from complying with, or in any manner carrying out, the provisions of the Act. The appellees waived service of summons, entered their appearance, and filed a demurrer to the complaint which was sustained by the Pulaski Chancery Court, and after appellant declined to plead further, that Court entered a decree dismissing the complaint.

The appellant duly perfected an appeal to this Court. Thereafter the regular Court disqualified itself and a Special Court (composed of the writer, J. G. Burke, Harry P. Daily, Surrey E. Gilliam, Harry L. Ponder, John Mac Smith and Edward L. Wright) was appointed to decide the case. In the public interest, this Special Court entered an order granting permission to any interested party in the State to file a brief with the Court covering any issue that party desired to raise concerning Act 375 of 1955. These briefs were to be filed by July 11, but none have been forthcoming, and the Court has proceeded to determine the appeal upon the record and briefs filed in Case No. 5-764 and upon its own investigation of the law.

Act 375 of 1955 creates the Arkansas Justice Building Commission and authorizes the Commission to construct a Justice Building on the capitol grounds in Little Rock, Arkansas, and to finance the construction by the issuance of bonds to be payable from and secured solely by a pledge of the funds in the Justice Building Fund, established by the Act. The funds therein will be derived from the rental of space in the building to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the Public Service Commission, and such other persons or agencies as may occupy space therein; from moneys received from various county treasurers from additional costs taxed by the Act; from appropriations on a current basis; and from gifts, bequests, donations or other sources. Authorization is granted for lease agreements between the Commission and the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Public Service Commission, and provision is made for the payment of rentals thereunder from the Workmen's Compensation Commission funds and Public Service Commission funds directly to the Commission without said funds first going into the state treasury. The funds derived from the additional costs taxed by the Act are also paid directly to the Commission and do not go into the state treasury. The bonds to be issued by the Commission shall be general obligations of the Commission only and shall in no event constitute an indebtedness for which the faith and credit of the State of Arkansas, or any of its revenues, are pledged. Appellant makes several attacks upon the constitutionality of the Act which will be hereinafter considered in order.

Delegation of Legislative Power

It is alleged that there is a delegation of legislative power to the Commission contrary to and in violation of Article 5, Section 1, as amended by Amendment No. 7, and Article 4, Sections 1 and 2, of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. It is well settled that legislative bodies have no right to delegate the lawmaking power to commissions and boards established by the legislature, but it is equally well settled that the legislature may delegate the power to determine facts upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend and that general provisions may be set forth with power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to complete the details. See, among other cases, Fort Smith v. Roberts, 177 Ark. 821, 9 S.W.2d 75; Fulkerson v. Refunding Board of Arkansas, 201 Ark. 957, 147 S.W.2d 980; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379, 83 L.Ed. 441. We have carefully examined Act 375 and find no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The Act is complete in itself and when placed into operation the objects accomplished necessarily will be those provided for and intended by the Legislature. The Commission will do no more than find the necessary facts, complete the necessary details, and exercise a discretion, within clearly defined limits, as to the execution of the Act. We have considered the various grounds urged by the appellant as constituting an unlawful delegation of the legislative power and find them to be without merit.

Payment of Rent by the Workmen's Compensation Commission and Public Service Commission and Payment of the Proceeds of the Costs Levied Directly to the Commission.

The Act provides that the rental payments under the lease authorized to be executed between the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Commission shall be paid directly from Workmen's Compensation Commission funds to the Commission prior to the deposit of any of said moneys in the Workmen's Compensation Fund in the state treasury. And, the Act authorizes the sale of the present Workmen's Compensation Commission building and the deposit of the funds derived therefrom directly with the Commission to be applied to the rental payments in the manner provided in the Act. The Act contains a similar provision with reference to the rental payments by the Public Service Commission in that said payments are to be made from Public Service Commission funds prior to the payment of any of said funds into the state treasury. And, the costs collected pursuant to the provisions of the Act are also to be forwarded by the various county treasurers directly to the Commission, and none of the costs go into the state treasury. The appellant contends that these provisions of the Act are contrary to Article 5, Section 29 and Article 16, Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Arkansas. In addition, appellant cites certain cases such as Moore v. Alexander, 85 Ark. 171, 107 S.W. 395; Jobe v. Caldwell, 99 Ark. 20, 136 S.W. 966; Dickinson v. Clibourn, 125 Ark. 101, 187 S.W. 909; and others, for the propositions that one legislature cannot bind future legislatures concerning the expenditure of public funds by making continuing appropriations, that the life of an appropriation is two years, and that appropriations must state distinctly the maximum amount to be drawn in dollars and cents, and the purpose for the authorized expenditure. These cases do not reach the issue raised since they deal with money in the state treasury and it appears to be well settled that such moneys must be disbursed by specific appropriations of not to exceed two years in duration. The real issue is whether these funds must be paid into the state treasury. If there is no such constitutional requirement, then there is no violation of the provisions relied upon by appellant and no conflict with the law of the above cited cases. This Court has held, Gipson v. Ingram, 215 Ark. 812, 223 S.W.2d 595, that there are certain public moneys designated in that case 'cash funds', which may be controlled by the Legislature and in accordance with legislative directive need not be paid into the state treasury and need not be specifically appropriated. Appellant concedes that if the funds involved herein are 'cash funds' within the Gipson v. Ingram case, supra, that decision is controlling. The Court in the Gipson v. Ingram decision, supra, defined 'cash funds' as follows, at pages 816 and 817 of 215 Ark., at page 597 of 223 S.W.2d:

'So, for purposes of this topic 'cash funds' are those received by the state agencies and institutions from sources other than taxes, as that term 'taxes' is ordinarily used.'

Appellant would distinguish the Gipson v. Ingram decision, supra, on the ground that the moneys involved herein are derived from 'taxes' as that term is ordinarily used.

The Legislature has clearly designated the funds involved as 'cash funds' and we find no express constitutional restriction upon the supreme power of the Legislature to deal with public revenues of any type prior to the time such revenues are placed in the state treasury. Therefore, since the Constitution is a restriction upon the otherwise supreme power of the Legislature rather than a grant of power to the Legislature, there would appear to be no sound constitutional reason for nullifying the express legislative action in this particular. Furthermore, these funds clearly qualify as moneys received from sources other than taxes, as that term is ordinarily used.

The Workmen's Compensation Act establishes a special fund in the state treasury known as the Workmen's Compensation fund and into that fund the various premium taxes and fees provided for by the Act are deposited. Original qualification fees are charged insurance carriers at the time of securing the first license to transact business and self-insurers at the time of qualifying as such, which fees are paid directly to the Workmen's Compensation Commission. A premium tax in an amount calculated on the basis of the administration cost of the Act, but not to exceed 3% on all premiums received, is levied against each participating insurance carrier, and these fees are collected by the Insurance...

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