McBride v. Estis Well Serv., LLC
| Decision Date | 16 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | 6:11-cv-01544 (Member),CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:11-cv-0557 (Lead),6:11-cv-01686 (Member),6:11-cv-01726 (Member) |
| Parties | HALEIGH JANEE McBRIDE, ET AL. v. ESTIS WELL SERVICE, LLC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES
These consolidated cases come before this Court by consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1333 in that the claims are based on the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (a), and general maritime law. No party has sought trial by jury. Pending before the Court is the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1 At issue is whether the remedy of punitive damages is legally cognizable under the Jones Act and/or general maritime law in the context of a wrongful death/survival action, or a personal injury action, for seamen who were killed or injured in Louisianaterritorial waters after the decision of Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. vs. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). For the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED.
On March 9, 2011, the barge Estis Rig 23 was operating in Bayou Sorrell, a navigable waterway in the State of Louisiana. As the barge crew, all of whom were employed by Estis, was attempting to straighten the twisted monkey board in the derrick, the pipe in the derrick shifted, and the derrick and rig fell over. One crew member died, and three more claim that they were injured.
Skye Sonnier died, and in the lead case, Haleigh Janee McBride sued Estis in her capacity as the administratrix of Mr. Sonnier's estate and on behalf of Mr. Sonnier's minor child, I.M.S. Saul C. Touchet claims that he sustained both physical and psychological injuries.2 Brian Joseph Suire3 and Joshua Bourque4 claim that they sustained psychological injuries because they were present when the incident occurred.
All of the plaintiffs seek to recover under the Jones Act for Estis's alleged negligence, and all of them seek to recover under the general maritime law for thealleged unseaworthiness of the vessel.5 All of the plaintiffs have also asserted claims for punitive and/or exemplary damages due to Estis's alleged gross, willful, wanton, and/or reckless conduct that allegedly constituted a callous disregard of, or showed indifference to, the safety of the crew members.6
Estis has indicated that it is willing to stipulate to liability for the incident but states that it cannot do so while the claims for punitive damages exist.7 Estis is specifically not seeking to dismiss any cause of action, nor is it seeking to dismiss any claims for punitive damage arising out of the failure to pay maintenance and cure. The motion is limited solely to the availability, or not, of a punitive damages remedy under the Jones Act and/or general maritime law.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under Rule 12(b)(6), is appropriate when a defendant attacks the complaint because it fails to state a legallycognizable claim.8 The defendant does not challenge the factual allegations of the complaints. Rather, as the issue is postured solely in the context of this motion, the standard is whether "with every doubt resolved in the pleader's behalf, the complaint states any legally cognizable claim for relief."9
Estis contends that the Jones Act only permits recovery of pecuniary losses whether for personal injury or wrongful death. Because punitive damages are not pecuniary in nature, Estis contends that punitive damages cannot be recovered on the Jones Act claims. Estis further contends that, notwithstanding the decision in Townsend, under the reasoning of Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,10 the plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages because their unseaworthiness claims overlap their Jones Act claims.
The plaintiffs contend that Townsend left open the question whether punitive damages are available under the Jones Act, however, even if punitive damages are not available for their Jones Act claims, the plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court'sruling in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker11 suggests that they should be permitted to recover punitive damages by way of their general maritime law claims.12 They also contend that the Supreme Court's ruling in Townsend, which abrogated the en banc decision of Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corporation,13 reinstated the holding of In Re Merry Shipping14 as the controlling precedent in this circuit and permits the recovery of punitive damages.
In 2006, Congress amended the Jones Act,15 to provide that the "[L]aws of the United States regulating recovery for personal injury to, or death of, a railway employee (FELA)16 apply to an action under this section." The Jones Act provides the sole basis upon which a seaman or his beneficiaries may sue the seaman's employer for negligence.17 Neither the Jones Act nor FELA limit damages in anyform.18 When the Seamen's Welfare Act of 1915 was amended in 1920 to what became the Jones Act, it generically referred to "damages" and incorporated "all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees. . ." (Emphasis added)19 However, in 1913, the Supreme Court held in Michigan Central Railroad Co. v. Vreeland that only pecuniary damages were available under FELA.20 This decision was based on the jurisprudential gloss applied to Lord Campbell's Act which also had no pecuniary limitation on damages.21 Nearly seventy-five years later, in Miles v. Apex Marine, the Court stated:
When Congress passed the Jones Act, the Vreeland gloss on FELA, and the hoary tradition behind it, were well established. Incorporating FELA unaltered into the Jones Act, Congress must have intended to incorporate the pecuniary limitation on damages as well.22
Based on this interpretation, the Court stated the Jones Act "limits recovery to pecuniary loss," and held loss of society, as an item of non-pecuniary damages, wasnot available in a wrongful death claim brought under the Jones Act. 23 The jurisprudence is consistent that punitive damages are non-pecuniary, and since the jurisprudence has interpreted the Jones Act to permit only the recovery of pecuniary damages, punitive damages would not be available as a remedy under that statute.24
Townsend does not hold that punitive damages are recoverable under the Jones Act. In response to the dissent's argument, the majority stated in a footnote:
Because we hold that Miles does not render the Jones Act's damages provision determinative of respondent's remedies, we do not address the dissent's argument that the Jones Act, by incorporating the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, see 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a), prohibits the recovery of punitive damages in actions under that statute.25
The "respondent's remed[y]" in Townsend was a seaman's entitlement to punitive damages under the general maritime law cause of action for maintenance and cure. Townsend "does not call into question Miles' holding concerning the damageslimitations applicable to the Jones Act"26 and "does not . . . cast doubt on the [Miles] Court's holding that the Jones Act incorporated FELA's 'pecuniary limitation on damages.'"27 Following this analysis, the district court in Wagner v. Kona Blue Water Farms, LLC concluded that the Ninth Circuit's prohibition on punitive damages under the Jones Act set forth in Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline was consistent with Townsend and remained good law.28 This Court agrees with that conclusion.
Since Miles, the courts of this circuit have consistently followed the rule that punitive damages are non-pecuniary in nature and, therefore, they are not recoverable under the Jones Act.29 Townsend does not create a new rule abrogating those cases or the proposition that punitive damages are non-pecuniary and, therefore, not recoverable under the Jones Act. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to dismissas it applies to the plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages under the Jones Act, whether arising out of wrongful death or personal injury.
Multiple courts who have considered the impact of Townsend on the remedies available to non-seamen arising out of a general maritime cause of action have concluded that non-pecuniary damages, including punitive damages, are available even in contravention of pre-existing appellate court precedent.30 Other courts have allowed claims for non-pecuniary damages, including punitive damages, to proceed given the current uncertainty in the law.31
The plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Shipping v. Baker suggests that punitive damages should be a viable remedy for their cause of action of unseaworthiness under the general maritime law despite the existence of their Jones Act claims. Baker involved claims against Exxon arising from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The claimants were not Jones Act seamen; they were commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and landowners. The Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider whether maritime law allows corporate liability for punitive damages on the basis of the acts of managerial agents. . . ."32 The Ninth Circuit had affirmed the district court's jury instruction on punitive damages based on circuit precedent.33 The Court was equally divided on the issue and, therefore, had to leave the Ninth Circuit opinion undisturbed stating, "[i]t should go without saying that the disposition here is not precedential on the derivative liability question."34
Pertinent to this Court's inquiry are the issues raised in other portions of the opinion where the Court was not equally...
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