McBride v. Pizza Hut, Inc.

Decision Date15 May 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-CV-642.,94-CV-642.
PartiesRaiford C. McBRIDE, Appellant, v. PIZZA HUT, INC., Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Inez Smith Reid, Washington, DC, was on the brief for appellant.

Randall M. Starrett II and James F. Bromley, Washington, DC, were on the brief for appellee.

Before FERREN and STEADMAN, Associate Judges, and NEWMAN, Senior Judge.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

Appellant, Raiford C. McBride, challenges the trial court's grant of summary judgment for appellee, Pizza Hut, Inc., contending the trial judge erred in holding that appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Concluding that the communications on which appellant based his defamation and injurious falsehood claims were absolutely privileged, we affirm.


Pizza Hut hired appellant as a dishwasher in April 1987, and, soon thereafter, he became a waiter. In late August 1992, while appellant was busy with other customers, one of his customers walked out without paying a $12 bill. Appellant offered to pay this bill himself, but the manager discharged him.

Sometime around January 1993, appellant applied for unemployment compensation based on his employment at Pizza Hut. On February 25, 1993, the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (DOES) sent appellant a "Determination by a Claims Examiner" stating that he was ineligible for unemployment compensation because he had been discharged from his job for theft, which constituted "willful misconduct."

On May 6, 1993, appellant, through counsel, wrote to Pizza Hut asking for a retraction of the "unfounded accusation of theft" and "a letter of reference regarding his past employment at Pizza Hut." Appellant's letter stated that "failure to respond positively to these requests will leave us with no alternative but to pursue relief for defamation." On September 1, 1993, Pizza Hut's counsel wrote to appellant's counsel, replying that Pizza Hut had investigated the circumstances surrounding appellant's termination and that it would, accordingly, change appellant's termination form to reflect that he had been terminated for "failure to follow cash control policies."

Appellant filed suit on February 25, 1994, alleging defamation and injurious falsehood.1 Pizza Hut moved for dismissal of appellant's complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) appellant's defamation action was time-barred because it was "based on events and communications that occurred more than a year before this action was originally commenced,"2 and (2) its communication with DOES could not form a basis for a libel action because it was absolutely privileged.

Appellant opposed Pizza Hut's motion, arguing that the September 1, 1993 letter from Pizza Hut's counsel to appellant's counsel contained defamatory statements that were not privileged and were within the one-year period of limitations.3 In reply, Pizza Hut stated that (1) the September 1, 1993 letter did not constitute publication to a third party because it had been sent to appellant's counsel (his agent) in response to counsel's May 6, 1993 letter, and that (2) in any case, the September 1, 1993 letter was protected by an absolute privilege because it was matter published "preliminary to a judicial proceeding."

By an order dated April 29, 1994, the trial judge granted appellee's summary judgment motion. The judge also noted that "even without consideration of the exhibits accompanying appellee's motion, the Court would grant the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on privilege and statute of limitations grounds." Appellant challenges this decision.


A motion for summary judgment is properly granted where "(1) taking all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, (2) a reasonable juror, acting reasonably, could not find for the nonmoving party, (3) under the appropriate burden of proof." Nader v. de Toledano, 408 A.2d 31, 42 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078, 100 S.Ct. 1028, 62 L.Ed.2d 761 (1980). In addition, summary judgment is an appropriate remedy when "there are no material facts in issue and when it is clear that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Willis v. Cheek, 387 A.2d 716, 719 (D.C.1978). Any doubt as to the existence of such issues must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. See Malcolm Price, Inc. v. Sloan, 308 A.2d 779, 780 (D.C. 1973), aff'd., 339 A.2d 43 (D.C.1975).

In his complaint, appellant alleged defamation and injurious falsehood on the basis of Pizza Hut's statement to DOES that appellant had been discharged for theft. This communication, however, cannot support either a defamation action or an injurious falsehood claim because it is absolutely privileged. Elliot v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C.1993) ("As a matter of law, a report to the Unemployment Compensation Board `is absolutely privileged.'") (citing Goggins v. Hoddes, 265 A.2d 302, 303 (D.C. 1970)).

In his opposition to Pizza Hut's summary judgment motion, however, appellant also maintained that his complaint incorporated the September 1, 1993 letter from Pizza Hut's counsel to appellant's counsel advising that Pizza Hut would change appellant's records to reflect that appellant had been discharged for "failing to follow cash flow policies."4 According to appellant, this letter was defamatory, was not privileged, had been published to a third party, and was not time-barred.

As Pizza Hut has contended, an attorney's publication of defamatory matter in "communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding" is absolutely privileged under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586:

An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course of and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding. Emphasis added.

For example, Conservative Club of Washington v. Finkelstein, 738 F.Supp. 6, 14 (D.D.C. 1990), concerned a slander of title claim based upon an attorney's statements to a prospective purchaser that there was a problem with the title to property sought to be subdivided, and that unless his clients (adjoining landowners whose consent was needed for a resubdivision application) received $100,000, a lawsuit would be filed which could tie up the property for two to three years. The district court held the statements were absolutely privileged.

The fact that the allegedly slanderous statements were made prior to the filing of an action ... does not ... defeat the privilege.... The statements were made in contemplation of litigation to the very individuals who would have an interest in the outcome of such litigation.... There is a strong public policy in favor of individuals privately resolving their disputes without resort to the judicial process.


In this case, the September 1, 1993 letter was written in reply to appellant's May 6, 1993 letter that demanded a retraction of all charges against appellant and added that, if Pizza Hut failed to comply, appellant would "have no alternative but to pursue relief for defamation"—a clear, unequivocal threat of a lawsuit. Thus, although the September 1, 1993 letter was written before institution of legal proceedings, we...

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    ...House aides and the President's attorney were made prior to possible litigation for purposes of the privilege. Cf. McBride v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 658 A.2d 205 (D.C.1995) (concluding that the plaintiff's threat of suit constituted a proposed judicial proceeding under § 586 of Restatement and th......
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    ...a potential plaintiff intent on filing a lawsuit, or a potential defendant contemplating imminent litigation. (McBride v. Pizza Hut, Inc. (D.C.App.1995) 658 A.2d 205, 207-208; General Elec. Co. v. Sargent & Lundy (6th Cir.1990) 916 F.2d 1119, 1125-1129; Johnston v. Cartwright (8th Cir.1966)......
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    ...The Court agrees. Under District of Columbia law, a report required by law cannot support a defamation claim. See McBride v. Pizza Hut, Inc. , 658 A.2d 205, 207 (D.C. 1995) (holding that defamation claim based on statements to the Department of Employment Services that the plaintiff had bee......
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