McBride v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 May 1970
• Docket Number: No. 17144-4.,17144-4.
• Citation: 312 F. Supp. 731
• Parties: Herschell McBRIDE, Plaintiff, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., and District 142, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

312 F. Supp. 731

Herschell McBRIDE, Plaintiff, v. TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., and District 142, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Defendants.

No. 17144-4.

United States District Court, W. D. Missouri, W. D.

May 8, 1970.

Panethiere & Frick, Henry A. Panethiere, Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff.

D. Brook Bartlett, William A. Jolley, Kansas City, Mo., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS

ELMO B. HUNTER, District Judge.

This is a suit arising under the provisions of 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (The Railway Labor Act) against an employer, Trans World Airlines, and a union, District 142, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, seeking a declaratory judgment, damages, costs and expenses, and attorney fees.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges, inter alia, the following: (1) that between January 24, 1964, and August 25, 1966, plaintiff was a plant maintenance mechanic employed by defendant Trans World Airlines at its "M.C.I." facility in Platte County, Missouri; (2) that defendant District 142 was the exclusive bargaining representative for all mechanics employed by defendant Trans World Airlines under a collective bargaining agreement which was in force during the period stated above; (3) that, in violation of the bargaining agreement, defendant Trans World Airlines promoted another employee to the classification of "lead mechanic" following his transfer from the defendant's "M.I.L.A." facility at Meritt Island, Florida to the "M.C.I." facility in Platte County, Missouri; (4) that this employee did not have the proper seniority nor the specific qualifications for such promotion as required by the bargaining agreement; and (5) that such action by the defendant Trans World Airlines was a wrongful violation of the collective bargaining agreement and in derogation of plaintiff's seniority rights under that agreement.

Additionally, plaintiff alleges that he filed a grievance as provided by the collective bargaining agreement; that he processed the grievance through Steps 1 and 2 of the grievance procedure established by that agreement; that his grievance was rejected by defendant Trans World Airlines; that at Step 3 of the procedure his grievance was handled by the defendant union's System General Chairman by way of a conference with defendant Trans World Airline's Director of Industrial Relations; and that the conference resulted in a rejection of plaintiff's grievance. Plaintiff avers that following this denial he appealed to the Executive Board of defendant District 142, but that the appeal was denied. It was plaintiff's contention that the actions of defendant District 142 "constitutes a breach of its duty of fair representation owed the plaintiff because the same were arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and perfunctory in that it failed to enforce * * * the plain and unambiguous language of the * * * collective bargaining agreement." Plaintiff also alleged that:

"* * * the actions of both defendants were collusive to a degree which would render useless any proceedings before the System Board of Adjustments composed entirely of persons selected by the defendants."

Following the filing of plaintiff's amended complaint, both defendants submitted motions to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies as provided by the collective bargaining agreement and that, in absence of such exhaustion, this Court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter presented.

On August 5, 1969, a hearing was held for oral argument upon defendants' motions to dismiss. At that hearing, counsel for the plaintiff continued to assert the futility of the contractual procedure due to collusion between the defendant employer and the defendant union. It was his contention that such collusion and resultant futility in the processing of plaintiff's individual grievance presented a recognized exception to the well-established doctrine requiring exhaustion of grievance procedures prior to action in a federal district court. Conversely, counsel for the defendants contended that there was no collusion between the union and plaintiff's employer and that, absent such showing of collusion or futility, pursuit and exhaustion of the grievance procedure was an essential jurisdictional requirement lacking in this case. In order to expedite this matter and in view of the preliminary jurisdictional question concerning the requirement of exhaustion of the contractual grievance procedures, the Court advised the parties that a full evidentiary hearing would be set to resolve the isolated issues of the necessity of exhaustion of the grievance procedures and plaintiff's allegation of collusion between the parties. The Court further indicated this full evidentiary hearing would be treated as a trial on these isolated issues.

Accordingly, on October 31, 1969, a full evidentiary hearing was held to consider plaintiff's allegation that "the actions of both defendants were collusive to a degree which would render useless any proceedings before the System Board of Adjustment." At that hearing, counsel for the plaintiff conceded that there was no evidence to support the allegation of collusion between the parties. Rather, plaintiff's counsel stated that "at a certain point in the proceedings of the processing of the grievance, the plaintiff was frustrated from any further proceedings provided him by the contract." This representation as to the lack of collusion was accepted as a stipulation among the parties.

As to plaintiff's attempts to process his specific grievance through the procedures established by the collective bargaining agreement, considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the testimony adduced at the hearing indicated the following: that plaintiff initially prepared a formal grievance with the aid of his union steward and submitted it to plaintiff's general foreman, a company representative; that, at this stage in the grievance proceeding, plaintiff's grievance was denied; that plaintiff then submitted his grievance to the chairman of the union's grievance committee again with the aid of his union steward; that plaintiff and his union steward wrote to the union district representative requesting a written decision in the matter; that plaintiff's attorney also mailed a letter to that representative requesting further processing of plaintiff's grievance; and that shortly thereafter plaintiff was notified that the executive board of the defendant union had reviewed plaintiff's grievance and considered that "the case did not merit further processing." In regard to his failure to further pursue his grievance through the remainder of the established grievance procedure, plaintiff testified that "we figured the company and union, their dealings on the matter, that we wouldn't gain anything by taking it to the System Board." Plaintiff offered no further evidence to show why he did not attempt any further processing of his case through the contractual grievance procedure.

During the earlier stages of this proceeding, plaintiff alleged and relied upon the collective bargaining agreement between defendant Trans World Airlines and defendant District 142 to establish a violation of plaintiff's seniority rights under that contract. In his post-hearing brief, however, plaintiff argues that the provisions of 45 U.S.C. § 184 which establish a statutory grievance procedure do not apply in this case. In support of this contention, plaintiff states that "this action is not one for the interpretation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement * * *, but rather the action of an individual employee and union member against his employer and union for failure to properly represent him and process his grievance." Plaintiff urges that the present action cannot be categorized as a "minor" dispute within the meaning of 45 U.S.C. § 184.

Plaintiff's argument is entirely without merit. Under the...