McBryde v. Committee to Rev. Cir. Council Conduct, CIV.A.98-2457 CKK.
| Decision Date | 30 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.98-2457 CKK.,CIV.A.98-2457 CKK. |
| Citation | 83 F.Supp.2d 135 |
| Parties | Hon. John H. McBRYDE, Plaintiff, v. COMMITTEE TO REVIEW CIRCUIT COUNCIL CONDUCT AND DISABILITY ORDERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, Hon. William J. Bauer, the Judicial Council of the Fifth Judicial Circuit, Hon. Henry A. Politz, Defendants, and The United States of America, Intervenor-Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Arnon D. Siegel, Washington, D.C., R. David Broiles, Fort Worth, TX, for Plaintiff.
Robert B. Fiske, Jr., Gordon Harriss, Arthur Burke, Davis, Polk & Wardwell, New York, NY, Dennis G. Linder, Thomas W. Millet, Theodore C. Hirt, Craig M. Blackwell, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Defendant.
This case arises out of an investigation by a Special Committee ("Special Committee") of the Judicial Council of the Fifth Judicial Circuit ("Judicial Council") into the conduct of the Honorable John H. McBryde, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, pursuant to the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 372(c). The Special Committee's investigation spanned two years, culminating in a 159-page Report containing findings of fact and recommendations to the Judicial Council. On December 31, 1997, upon consideration of the Special Committee's Report and various responses thereto, the Judicial Council publicly reprimanded Judge McBryde for "conduct prejudicial to the effective administration of the business of the courts." As a remedial measure, the Judicial Council ordered that no new cases be assigned to Judge McBryde for a period of one year, and disqualified Judge McBryde from participating in any cases involving certain attorneys for a period of three years. Although the disqualification order took effect immediately, the assignment order was stayed while Judge McBryde sought review from the Judicial Conference of the United States. On September 18, 1998, the Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States ("Review Committee") substantially affirmed the Judicial Council's Order. Upon this affirmance, the assignment order took effect immediately, subject to the Review Committee's proviso that it could be lifted if the Judicial Council found that "Judge McBryde's conduct indicates that he has seized the opportunity for self-appraisal and deep reflection in good faith and that he has made substantial progress toward improving his conduct."
In an eight-count complaint filed on October 15, 1998, Judge McBryde challenges the constitutionality of the Act, both facially and as applied to him, on the grounds that the Act violates the separation of powers doctrine (Counts I, II and III), fails to afford due process (Count VI), and violates the First Amendment (Count VIII). In addition, Judge McBryde claims that the proceedings violated the Act and the Fifth Circuit Complaint Rules (Counts IV, V and VII). Judge McBryde names as defendants the Judicial Council of the Fifth Judicial Circuit and its Chairman, the Honorable Henry A. Politz; and the Committee to Review Circuit Conduct and Disability Orders of the Judicial Conference of the United States ("Judicial Conference") and its Chairman, the Honorable William J. Bauer ("Defendants"). This court granted permission for the United States to intervene as a defendant for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the Act.
Before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment and/or to dismiss filed by Judge McBryde, the Defendants, and the United States. For the reasons elaborated below, the Court finds that the Act is constitutional, both on its face and as it has been applied to Judge McBryde, except insofar as its confidentiality clause impermissibly inhibits Judge McBryde's ability to speak openly about the proceedings. In particular, the Court finds that the Act does not usurp or encroach upon the power of impeachment that properly resides with the Legislative Branch. Nor does the Act jeopardize the independence of the judiciary, an invaluable facet of our democracy that stands to be enhanced by judicial self-monitoring. Moreover, because the Act authorizes review not of the merits of a judge's legal decisions, but of a judge's alarming or destructive pattern of conduct, it poses no threat to a federal judge's Article III function.
In response to Defendants' contention that the Act's finality clause bars review of Judge McBryde's claims, the Court determines that it retains jurisdiction to consider these claims to the extent they allege facial violations of the statute or violations of Judge McBryde's constitutional rights, whether facial or as-applied. Thus authorized to conduct such a review, the Court concludes that no facial violations of the statute took place, with respect either to the scope of the investigation or to the nature of the material which the Special Committee and the Judicial Council addressed. After evaluating carefully Judge McBryde's assertion that Defendants impermissibly reviewed the merits of his judicial decisions, the Court finds that they confined their investigation to a pattern of behavior toward attorneys and others, which they found demonstrates intemperance and abusiveness. Further, the Court concludes that the sanctions levied against Judge McBryde did not transgress into the forbidden realm of impeachment, but rather were limited in scope and tailored to the problem that his behavior posed. The Court finds against Judge McBryde on his due process claims, since Defendants provided him with the fundamental requirements of due process, including notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The Court is, however, persuaded by Judge McBryde's contention that the Act's confidentiality clause, as it has been applied to him, operates as an impermissible prior restraint on his speech. Now that the proceedings have concluded and the sanctions against him have been imposed, Judge McBryde must enjoy the opportunity to speak openly and freely about those proceedings, absent some sufficiently compelling interest to justify curtailment of this opportunity. Defendants have demonstrated no interest of that magnitude here.
The Judicial Council's investigation and subsequent discipline of Judge McBryde represents the most significant application of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, 28 U.S.C. § 372, since its enactment in 1980. Congress designed the Act to provide a mechanism whereby the Judicial Branch can systematically investigate and resolve allegations of judicial misconduct or disability. See S.Rep. No. 96-362, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4315, 4315. In an effort to address "the growing public demand for the accountability of public officials," id. at 5, members of Congress and the Judicial Branch worked together to draft legislation that would provide an alternative means of remedying conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and yet does not rise to the level of an impeachable offense, criminal infraction, or reversible error. See H. Rep. No. 101-512, at 10, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6879, 6884 (). The conduct targeted by the Act ranges from such intangibles as a lack of "judicial temperament" to patterns of abusive behavior that threaten to undermine the integrity of the judiciary as a whole, as well as behavior symptomatic of an underlying disability. While recognizing that cases of judicial misconduct were infrequent, Congress found that these "[r]are instances of judicial misconduct that have gone unchecked prompt the establishment of a procedure within the judiciary for the processing of complaints aimed at a federal judge." S.Rep. No. 96-362, at 5. The ultimate question before the Court is whether these procedures violate the Constitution, both on their face and as they were applied to Judge McBryde.
In this section, the Court shall present a brief overview of those statutory provisions at issue in this litigation. Section 372(c)(1) permits any person alleging that a district judge "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts" to file a written complaint with the chief judge of the circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1). In the alternative, § 372(c)(1) allows the chief judge to "identify" a complaint on the basis of information available to him or her. Id. Upon expeditious review of a complaint, the chief judge has three options: he may dismiss the complaint, see id. § 372(c)(3)(A); conclude the proceeding, see id. § 372(c)(3)(B); or initiate an investigation by appointing a special committee, see id. § 372(c)(4)(A).
If the chief judge decides to appoint a special committee to investigate the charge, the committee "shall conduct an investigation as extensive as it considers necessary, and shall expeditiously file a comprehensive written report thereon with the judicial council of the circuit." Id. § 372(c)(5). After the special committee files its report, the Act empowers the judicial council to respond in a number of ways. If it appears necessary, the judicial council may conduct an additional investigation pursuant to § 372(c)(6)(A). Alternatively, the judicial council may dismiss the complaint pursuant to § 372(c)(6)(C). If the judicial council decides to act on the special committee's report, the Act directs that the judicial council
shall take such action as is appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within the circuit, including, but not limited to, any of the following actions:
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(iv) ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further cases be assigned to any judge or...
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