McCabe v. Boston Terminal Co.

Decision Date13 November 1939
PartiesMcCABE v. BOSTON TERMINAL CO.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

See 60 S.Ct. 173, 84 L.Ed. --.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Morton, Judge.

Action by John J. McCabe against the Boston Terminal Company for injuries received by plaintiff by the overturning of a mechanically driven truck which he was operating. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions to the refusal of the trial judge to direct a verdict for defendant and to give certain requests for instructions.

Exceptions sustained and judgment for defendant.L. D. Yont and A. E. Yont, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Joseph Wentworth and J. M. Hall, both of Boston, for defendant.

RONAN, Justice.

The plaintiff, an employee of the Boston Terminal Company, was injured by the overturning of a mechanically driven truck which he was operating in the trial shed of the South Station, in Boston, as he was returning to the mail room after loading three sacks of mail upon a train scheduled to run to Framingham and way stations, all within this Commonwealth. The employer was not insured under the workmen's compensation act. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff upon a count alleging negligence of the defendant in failing to instruct him how to operate the truck properly. The case is here upon exceptions to the refusal of the judge to direct a verdict for the defendant and to give certain requests for instructions.

The defendant contends that the plaintiff had no cause of action at common law, and that, if he had a remedy, it was under the Federal Employers' Liability Act U.S.C. 1934 ed., Title 45, §§ 51-59, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. It is true that, if the plaintiff's cause of action comes within the scope of the Federal act, his rights at common law have been superseded by the act and no recovery can be had at common law. St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Railway v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 33 S.Ct. 651, 57 L.Ed. 1129, Ann.Cas.1914C, 156;North Carolina Railroad v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248, 34 S.Ct. 305, 58 L.Ed. 591, Ann.Cas.1914C, 159;New York Central Railroad v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 37 S.Ct. 546, 61 L.Ed. 1045, L.R.A.1918C, 439, Ann.Cas.1917D, 1139;Lynch v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 227 Mass. 123, 116 N.E. 401, L.R.A.1918D, 419;Tanona v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, Mass., 18 N.E.2d 163.

The Federal act, in so far as material, provides that ‘every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce * * * for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier * * *.’ 35 U.S.Stat., 65, c. 149, § 1, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51. The defendant does not come within the description of employers included in the act unless it appears that it was a common carrier, by means of a railroad, and that it was engaged in interstate commerce. Even if it were such an employer, the case does not come within the statute unless the employee when injured was engaged in interstate transportation. The Supreme Court of the United States is the final arbiter of such questions. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. Bezue, 284 U.S. 415, 52 S.Ct. 205, 76 L.Ed. 370, 77 A.L.R. 1370;United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 56 S.Ct. 421, 80 L.Ed. 567;Great Northern Railway v. Leonidas, 305 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 51, 83 L.Ed. 3.

The defendant was incorporated by St.1896, c. 516, ‘to construct and maintain a union passenger station * * * and to provide and operate adequate terminal facilities [for five designated railroads] and for the accommodation of the public in connection therewith.’ (section 1.) It was authorized to acquire land by eminent domain in accordance with the statutes regulating the exercise of such a right by railroad companies, provided the plans of location were approved by the board of railroad commissioners. Power was conferred to issue bonds in such an amount as might be necessary and as might be approvedby said board. Five railroads were required to use the said station when completed and also the terminal facilities to be supplied by the defendant ‘for all of their terminal passenger business in Boston' section 9, and were obliged to pay certain amounts to the defendant in order to enable it to pay its operating expenses, interest charges and dividends not exceeding a prescribed rate. The defendant upon the completion of the terminal was authorized to make rules and regulations for the use of its property which were to be binding upon all corporations and persons ‘in the use of said station and grounds.’ Section 8. Such rules and regulations were subject to be modified, after a hearing before the board of railroad commissioners upon the application of any railroad using the station or upon the petition of the mayor of Boston. The defendant acquired the land, erected the South Station, and equipped its property for use as a terminal for passenger service. Its property consists of thirty-five acres of land extending about one half mile from the station in a southerly direction. The defendant owns and maintains the station, power plant, express building, yards, towers, all the tracks, switches and signals within this area, It directs and controls the movement of all trains entering or leaving its property or while located thereon. All the employees of the railroads using the terminal are required to pass an examination based upon the defendant's rules before they are permitted to work upon the defendant's premises. The trains are manned by the employees of the railroads using the station, but in the movements of their trains such employees are required to obey the directions of the defendant, which owns and operates all the signals and switches located in the terminal area. It receives all the outgoing mail from the postal department and loads it upon the trains, and it unloads the incoming mail and delivers it to the said department. It maintains a mail room in the station and hires employees to handle the mail. The plaintiff was one of these employees.

The defendant did not own any locomotives or cars but it controlled the movement of all trains including those leaving for or arriving from points outside the Commonwealth. It had charge of all persons, including employees and passengers of the railroads, and of baggage and mail while upon its premises. It was engaged in the performance of an essential part of the work that the railroads had undertaken with their passengers and with the postal department of the government. The railroads, in accordance with their contracts with the defendant, relied upon it to carry out these important functions of the railroads. The defendant maintained a station for the reception and departure of all passengers as incidental to their transportation by one of the railroads which the defendant served. As to such passengers the defendant assumed the duty of exercising reasonable care for their safety while they were on its premises, Ward v. Boston Terminal Co., 286 Mass. 517, 190 N.E. 726, and such persons do not become passengers of the railroad company until ‘standing upon the platform adjacent to the train’ they are about to board. Hunt v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 212 Mass. 102, 105, 98 N.E. 787, 40 L.R.A., N.S., 778. A part of the transportation furnished by the railroads began or ended in the defendant's terminal, and some came to and left the terminal in continuance of a single movement in interstate commerce. The defendant's property is private in ownership but public in use. Its premises are the instrumentality that the railroads are by law required to use in the conduct of their interstate and intrastate transportation of passengers, baggage and mail. The primary activity of the defendant is to facilitate and accomplish such transportation. It was performing services like those ordinarily performed by a common carrier and was in direct charge of all transportation occurring upon its premises. The terminal was a necessary link in the interstate system of every railroad that used it. Batchelder & Snyder Co. v. Union Freight Railroad, 259 Mass. 368, 156 N.E. 698, 54 A.L.R. 616;Cott v. Erie Railroad, 231 N.Y. 67, 72, 131 N.E. 737.

Terminal companies not owning rolling stock but engaged in activities like those of the defendant have been held to be common carriers by railroad under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., and under the Hours of Service Act of March 4, 1907, 34 U.S.Stat. 1415, c. 2939, 45 U.S.C.A. § 61 et seq. (which in so far as the description of the employer is...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT