McCabe v. City of Lynn

Decision Date02 February 1995
Docket NumberCiv.A. No. 92-12179-NG.
Citation875 F. Supp. 53
PartiesMary McCABE, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ruchla "Rose" Zinger, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF LYNN, Sergeant Richard Donnelly, a Sergeant in the Lynn Police Department, Individually, Officer Gary Twyman, an officer in the Lynn Police Department, Officer William Alphen, an officer in the Lynn Police Department, Individually, Captain Csuka, a Captain in the Lynn Police Department, Individually, and in his Official Capacity, Yakov Barden, M.D., Tri-City Mental Health Hospital, John Doe, Superintendent, Tri-City Mental Health Hospital, David Rando, Edward Marticio, Life-Line Ambulance Service, Inc., and Kenneth Jackson, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Anthony S. Porcello, Charles M. Campo, Jr., Kassler & Feuer, P.C., Boston, MA, for Mary McCabe, as Administratrix of the Estate of Ruchla "Rose" Zinger.

George S. Markopoulos, Lynn, MA, for City of Lynn.

Michael J. Akerson, Edward P. Reardon, Austin M. Joyce, Reardon & Reardon, Worcester, MA, George S. Markopoulos, Lynn, MA, for Richard Donnelly, Individually and as Sergeant in the Lynn Police Dept., Gary Twyman, Individually and as an officer in the Lynn Police Dept., William Alphen, Individually and as an officer of the Lynn Police Dept., Fnu Csuka, Individually and in his official capacity as Captain in the Lynn Police Dept.

Douglas A. Fecteau, Fecteau & Slingerland, Salem, MA, for Yakov Bardeu, M.D.

Linda Leffert, Gaffin & Krattenmaker, P.C., George C. Deptula, Boston, MA, for Tri-City Mental Health Hosp.

Bruce G. Von Rosenvinge, Paul F. Degnan, Edward L. Kirby, Kirby & Associates, Boston, MA, for David Rando, Edward Marticio, Life-Line Ambulance Service, Inc.

Ronald F. Spagnoli, Torto and Spagnoli, Lynn, MA, for Kenneth Jackson.

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM AND DECISION

GERTNER, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case involves Rose Zinger who survived the Holocaust only to die at the hands of the Lynn Police. At issue is the policy of the Lynn Police to forcibly enter individuals' homes to serve involuntary commitment1 orders, without a warrant, and solely on the authority of the officers on the scene. I find that this policy violates the Fourth Amendment's plain prohibition against the warrantless searches of homes, and seizures of persons.

After obtaining an order of involuntary commitment for Ms. Rose Zinger (a resident of Lynn), the Lynn Police served the order by breaking down her door and forcing her down a flight of stairs. Tragically, during this incident Ms. Zinger suffered a heart attack and died.

On September 4, 1992, the Administratrix of Ms. Zinger's estate (plaintiff Mary McCabe) filed a complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and certain common law claims against the defendants City of Lynn and various individual officers for the death of Ruchla "Rose" Zinger (hereafter "Zinger"). In addition, plaintiff sued Life-Line Ambulance Service, Inc. (hereinafter "Life-Line Ambulance"), two of its emergency medical technicians (hereinafter "EMTs") and a number of other defendants on common law negligence, assault and battery theories.2 The motions for summary judgment concern only the civil rights claims against the City of Lynn and the negligence claims against the two EMTs of Life-Line Ambulance.3

For the reasons described below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED and the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment against the City of Lynn is hereby GRANTED.

II. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

Rose Zinger was a 64 year old woman living on 11 Nichols Avenue in Lynn, Massachusetts. Zinger spoke and understood limited English; she suffered from high blood pressure and was extremely overweight. In addition to her physical maladies, Zinger suffered from psychological problems, which according to the Complaint, were the product of, among other things, her experiences during World War II.4

On September 6, 1989, Dr. Yakov Barden of the Tri-City Mental Health and Retardation Center, signed an application for Zinger's involuntary commitment pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 123 § 12(a). The next day, Captain Joseph Csuka of the Lynn Police Department instructed Sergeant Richard Donnelly, and Officers Gary Twyman and William Alphen (all of the Lynn Police Department) to serve the civil commitment order. Csuka, although in possession of the order since the morning of September 7th, informed Sergeant Donnelly that the commitment would be carried out at 1:00 p.m. According to the affidavit of Sergeant Donnelly, Captain Csuka advised him that Zinger would not cooperate with them and they would have to force their way into her house.

In addition to the involuntary commitment, proceedings had been brought against Zinger resulting in an eviction order. Indeed, the police officers concede that the civil commitment was delayed until 1:00 p.m. in order to accommodate defendant Kenneth Jackson (a State Constable) who would secure the premises following the eviction and commitment.

At the scene, Constable Jackson informed the officers that based on his prior attempts to serve eviction notices, he believed Zinger would not answer the door. He instructed them to go to the rear door for the easiest point of entry into the home. The officers knocked on the door and rang the door-bell. Zinger did not answer. After approximately one minute, Donnelly ordered Alphen to kick down the door. Once through the door all three officers and Constable Jackson proceeded up the stairs to a second door which was also locked. Officer Alphen knocked on this door and said "Hello, Police." When no one answered the knocking, Donnelly ordered Alphen to kick this door down. After kicking through one panel, Zinger came to the door and opened it slightly. Donnelly showed Zinger the commitment order and told her that she needed to see a doctor. Zinger, who spoke and understood little English, yelled "why, why, no doctors" and started to close the door. Donnelly forced his foot between the door preventing it from closing all the way.

At this point, the officers claim that Zinger reached for a small knife on the kitchen table. Upon seeing the knife Officer Alphen pushed Zinger through the door and to the floor.5 Zinger lay face down on the ground, confused and screaming.

With Zinger forced into a prone position, all three officers handcuffed the 64 year old woman who struggled and screamed. During the process, Zinger was so distraught she urinated on herself and one of the officers.

Shortly after arriving at the scene, the officers called defendant Life-Line Ambulance to transport Zinger to the mental health facility. While waiting for the ambulance, the officers claim that they made repeated attempts to calm Zinger down. When defendants Marticio and Rando (the Life-Line emergency medical technicians) arrived, they informed the officers that due to Zinger's obesity and disposition, they could not carry her down the stairs in a chair or stretcher. Upon hearing this, the officers forced Ms. Zinger down the stairs on her buttocks one step at a time.

After bringing her to the bottom of the stairs, the officers placed her face down on a stretcher, where she was strapped in, still handcuffed behind her back. Shortly thereafter, one of the defendants noticed blood coming down the side of Zinger's mouth.

The officers then removed the handcuffs and Marticio examined her. Finding no pulse, Marticio and one of the officers began performing CPR. Zinger was pronounced dead at 2:00 p.m.

III. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment should be granted where all of the relevant pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the non moving party, present no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Alan Corp. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 22 F.3d 339, 342 (1st Cir.1994); Aponte-Santiago v. Lopez-Rivera, 957 F.2d 40, 41 (1st Cir.1992); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990).

IV. THE CITY OF LYNN
A. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a private cause of action for individuals who are subject to a deprivation of their constitutional rights by persons acting under color of state law. In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) the Court determined that municipalities and other local government units were to be included among those "persons" to whom § 1983 applies so long as certain preconditions were met. As Justice Brennan stated:

We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. at 2037-38 (emphasis added).

To establish liability against a municipality under § 1983 after Monell, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the municipality maintained a policy or custom; and (2) the same custom or policy was the cause of and the moving force behind the deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Bordanaro v. Mcleod, 871 F.2d 1151, 1156 (1st Cir.1989) (citations omitted); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 819, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2434, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1984).

The plaintiff contends that the City of Lynn's policy of making warrantless entries into private residences to serve civil commitment process constituted a deprivation of Rose Zinger's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. It was that policy, plaintiff contends, that led to Ms. Zinger's injury and ultimately her death.

B. The Policy of Serving Involuntary...

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