McCabe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

Decision Date31 March 2023
Docket NumberCV 22-00192 PHX DLR (CDB)
PartiesTammi R. McCabe, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Arizona

TO THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. RAYES, JUDGE:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Camille D. Bibles, United States Magistrate Judge.

The case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1) and Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the District of Arizona. The matter is fully pled and ready for the Court's review. The primary issue before the Court is whether the ALJ erred in concluding the frequency and severity of McCabe's migraine headaches did not render her “disabled” as that term is defined by the Social Security Administration.

I. Procedural Background

McCabe filed an application for Title II Social Security disability insurance benefits on May 7, 2014. (ECF No. 14-6 at 1; ECF No. 14-7 at 26). In her application McCabe alleged disability beginning April 13, 2013 (ECF No. 14-6 at 1), due to chronic migraine headaches, depression, anxiety, high blood pressure, and hypothyroidism. (ECF No. 14-7 at 28). McCabe's date last insured for benefits was March 31, 2019. (ECF No. 15-16 at 12).

McCabe's claim was denied initially on July 18, 2014 (ECF No. 14-4 at 1-13), and upon reconsideration on September 30, 2014. (ECF No. 14-4 at 14-27). McCabe requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was conducted April 19, 2016. (ECF No. 14-4 at 31). McCabe was represented by a “non-attorney representative” at the hearing. (Id.). At the hearing the ALJ determined McCabe had the following severe impairments: “cervical and lumbar spine disorders; migraine headaches; thyroid disorder; depression; and anxiety.” (ECF No. 14-4 at 33). In an order entered June 2, 2016, the ALJ (Martin) determined McCabe was not disabled. (ECF No. 14-4 at 31-42).

McCabe appealed, and the Social Security Appeals Council remanded the matter to the ALJ on June 2, 2017. (ECF No. 14-4 at 48-51). Noting the ALJ's decision “did not substantively address medical records submitted after the state agency decision,” and noting the subject records “documented] the claimant's ongoing treatment for her migraines and her fibromyalgia through February 2016,” and thus there was “an unadjudicated period of a year and a half,” the Appeals Council remanded for further evaluation of the evidence contained in Exhibit 9F (treatment records from Center for Pain Management dated October 15, 2012 through March 9, 2016) and 11F (treatment records from Cornerstone Family Physicians dated April 24, 2015 through March 24, 2016), as well as consideration of obesity. (ECF No. 14-4 at 48). The Appeals Council ordered the ALJ to give “further consideration to the claimant's maximum residual functional capacity during the entire period at issue and provide appropriate rationale with specific references to evidence of record in support of the assessed limitations.” (ECF No. 14-4 at 49).

On remand, a hearing was conducted on December 5, 2017, at which McCabe testified and was represented by counsel. (ECF No. 14-3 at 140-84). In a written decision issued March 14, 2018, the ALJ (Whitfield) considered the exhibits and newly submitted evidence, and also reviewed McCabe's “apparent obesity with regard to possible functional limitations.” (ECF No. 15-3 at 121). The ALJ found McCabe's severe impairments as migraine headaches, fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, obstructive sleep apnea, obesity, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and anxiety. (ECF No. 15-3 at 11840). The ALJ concluded McCabe was not disabled. (ECF No. 15-3 at 118-40).

McCabe sought review of the ALJ's decision by the Social Security Appeals Council, submitting additional medical records. (ECF No. 15-3 at 3; ECF No. 15-6 at 150-51). The Appeals Council denied relief on July 18, 2018. (ECF No. 15-3 at 2-5).

McCabe sought judicial review of the Commissioner's denial of benefits; her case proceeded in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. After McCabe filing her opening brief in that matter (the brief is not in the record on appeal in this matter and the brief is sealed in PACER), the parties filed a joint motion to remand the matter pursuant to section four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See McCabe v. Saul, No. 18-CV-2879, ECF No. 16 & ECF No. 24.

ALJ Whitfield conducted an in-person hearing on November 9, 2019, at which McCabe was present with her counsel. (ECF No. 15-16 at 66-88). A second hearing was conducted by ALJ Whitfield on February 2, 2021, at which McCabe testified and was represented by counsel.

In a decision issued April 23, 2021, the ALJ concluded McCabe was not disabled. (ECF No. 15-16 at 8-34). McCabe sought review of the ALJ's decision by the Social Security Appeals Council, which denied relief on December 6, 2021 (ECF No. 15-16 at 2-7), making the ALJ's decision the final, appealable decision of the Commissioner.

II. Governing Law

McCabe seeks disability benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. Disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the Social Security program regardless of financial need. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-425. Disability is defined as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a).

To establish eligibility for Social Security benefits based on disability, the claimant must show: (1) she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months; and (2) the impairment renders the claimant incapable of performing the work that the claimant previously performed and incapable of performing any other substantial gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. If a claimant meets both of these requirements, she is by definition “disabled.” See, e.g., Frost v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 365 (9th Cir. 2002). To be entitled to disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II, the claimant must also establish they were either permanently disabled, or subject to a condition which became so severe as to disable them, prior to the date upon which their disability insured status expired, i.e., prior to their “date last insured” for benefits. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998).

A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for disability-based benefits under Title II. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520; Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). First, the claimant must establish she is not gainfully employed at the time of her application. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Next, the claimant must be suffering from a “medically severe” impairment or “combination of impairments.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The third step is to determine whether any of the claimant's impairments meets or equals one of the “listed” impairments included in Appendix 1 to this section of the Code of Federal Regulations. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If any of the claimant's impairments meets or equals one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, the claimant is conclusively “disabled.” See id.

The fourth step of the process requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant, despite her impairments, can perform work similar to work she has performed in the past. This requires the ALJ to make an assessment of the plaintiff's “residual functional capacity” to do work-related tasks on a sustained basis. A claimant whose “residual functional capacity” allows her to perform her “past relevant work,” despite her impairments, is denied benefits. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

The claimant bears the burden of proof throughout the first four steps of the evaluation. See Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012); Valentine v. Social Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work because of her impairments, the Commissioner proceeds to step five. At step five of the evaluation the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work that exists in the national economy, given her residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014). In making this determination the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant's residual functional capacity, the claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational factors such as the claimant's age, education, and past work experience. Id. § 404.1520(g). If the claimant can adjust to other work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of adjusting to other work, the analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is therefore entitled to benefits.

III. Standard of Review

The Court's jurisdiction extends to review of the final decision of the Commissioner denying McCabe's application for Social Security disability-based benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner is based upon the pleadings and the administrative record of the contested decision. See Id. The scope of the Court's...

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