McCabe v. Individually, Case No. 1:13-cv-00435-CWD
| Decision Date | 25 September 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:13-cv-00435-CWD |
| Parties | MELVIN A. MCCABE, Plaintiff, v. JANEECE GONZALES individually and in her official capacity as a Jerome City Police patrol officer, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Two motions are pending before the Court in this civil rights action filed by pro se Plaintiff Melvin McCabe. First, Defendant Janeece Gonzales filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted against her in McCabe's Amended Complaint.1 (Dkt. 36.) Second, McCabe filed a Motion for Order Holding Parties in Contempt of This Court's Subpoena, which contends the Jerome City Police Department and the Jerome City Police Dispatch failed to adequately respond to a subpoena duces tecum served on March 5, 2015. (Dkt. 41.)
All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 23.) In the interest of avoiding delay, and because the Court conclusively finds the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the pending motions will be decided on the record without oral argument. Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.1(d). For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that Gonzales is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court enters the following disposition and will grant Gonzales's motion and deny McCabe's motion as more fully explained below.
On December 31, 2011, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Defendant, Officer Janeece Gonzales, observed a Dodge Dakota pickup truck travelling southbound on South Lincoln in Jerome, Idaho.3 Gonzales noticed the vehicle's rear license plate was obstructed by a trailer ball hitch and stopped the vehicle. Gonzales believed the trailer ball hitch's obstruction of the license plate was a violation of I.C. § 49-428(2), which provides in relevant part: "every license plate shall at all times . . . be in a place and position to be clearly visible." Although McCabe concedes the rear license plate was not clearly visible from Gonzales's vantage point, he alleges a slight change of view wouldhave enabled Gonzales to read the license plate in its entirety. See Response to Summary Judgment (Dkt. 40. at 8) ("From the perspective of the still shot from the video footage of the patrol vehicles dash cam, it becomes obvious that the license plate was not clearly visible from a standing-still position.").
McCabe was a passenger in the vehicle; his friend, Wesley Roehl, was the driver. Once Gonzales approached the vehicle, she noticed that Roehl was acting nervous and he admitted that he did not have a valid driver's license. Roehl was trembling, blurting out profanities, and unable to sit still. When asked by Gonzales if he was okay, Roehl replied that he did not like law enforcement because every time he encountered them they arrest him, and that he was or had been on probation for a controlled substance offense. Based on his unusual behavior, Gonzales asked Roehl whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle; he responded "no," and offered for Gonzales to search the vehicle. Roehl also told Gonzales that McCabe had a valid driver's license and offered to let McCabe drive the car. Gonzales asked for McCabe's driver's license to confirm its validity.
Gonzales retreated to her patrol car and confirmed through dispatch that Roehl's driver's license was suspended and McCabe's was valid. She also confirmed Roehl was the registered owner of the pickup. See Hall Aff. (Dkt. 36-17); see also See Idaho Dept. Transportation Records Search (Dkt. 36-17).4 Gonzales called for a backup officer to assist her with a consent search of the vehicle.
When Gonzales returned to the vehicle, McCabe asserts Gonzales asked him if he would be willing to drive the vehicle, to which he responded, "yes." Gonzales reminded Roehl he provided permission for Gonzales to search the vehicle. Roehl again consented. Gonzales requested that both Roehl and McCabe exit the vehicle so she could search it. The backup officer who arrived on scene asked for McCabe's permission before patting him down for weapons; McCabe consented to the pat down. At that time, no weapons were found and no property was seized.
Gonzales conducted the search of the vehicle and located a sunglasses case with several Ziploc baggies adorned with black spade symbols, which contained Q-tips, inside the case. The case was located directly behind the passenger seat. Gonzales noticed a white powdery residue in one of the baggies, which she believed to be methamphetamine. Both McCabe and Roehl denied ownership of the sunglasses case. At that time, Gonzales informed McCabe and Roehl that they were no longer free to leave because she had located what she believed to be an illegal substance. She then tested the substance with a field drug test and the results showed a presumptive positive for the presence of methamphetamine or ecstasy. Gonzales arrested both McCabe and Roehl for possession of a controlled substance. Prior to placing McCabe in the police vehicle, Gonzales searched and seized $680.00 cash from his outer left pocket. The Dodge Dakota pickup truck was later towed and impounded. See Hall Aff. (Dkt. 36-8.)
As McCabe's criminal case was pending at the local county court regarding the events above, the prosecuting attorney assigned to McCabe's case learned in February 2012, a judge in Twin Falls County, ruled a trailer ball hitch was not an obstructionunder Idaho Code § 49-428(2). See State v. Johnson, Twin Falls County Case No. CR-2011-5605 ,slip op. at ___ (5th D. Idaho Feb. 21, 2012). The prosecutor in McCabe's case then consented to the entry of a suppression order and dismissal of the criminal prosecution against McCabe. See Motion to Suppress (Dkt. 40-5.)
Based on the above facts, McCabe's Amended Complaint alleges five constitutional violations of the Fourth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (); one violation of search exceeding the scope of consent to search the vehicle pursuant to Idaho Const. Art. I, § 17 and Idaho Code §§ 18-703 and 18-711; and two violations of unlawful seizure of property without compensation pursuant to Idaho Const. Art. I, §§ 17, 14, 18. Gonzales seeks summary judgment on all of McCabe's claims.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 directs the court to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Critically, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "A dispute about a material fact is genuine 'if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" FreecycleSunnyvale v.Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
"The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial." Id. "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
In his Amended Complaint, McCabe alleges a slew of Fourth Amendment violations pursuant to Section 1983, challenging the reasonable suspicion of the traffic stop, the consent search of the vehicle, the probable cause for his arrest, false arrest, and the seizure of his property. In her motion for summary judgment, Gonzales challenges each claim and contends that no constitutional violations occurred or she is otherwise protected from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
To state a valid claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law violated his rights protected by the Constitution or created by a federal statute. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir.1991). In Section1983 actions, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects state officials from personal liability for on-the-job conduct so long as the conduct is objectively reasonable and does not violate clearly-established federal rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court analyzes: (1) whether the facts alleged by plaintiff establish a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established given the state of the law at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 (2001)). Courts may "exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand." Id. at 236.
As to the first prong, the court considers whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged show the [defendant's] conduct violated a constitutional right[.]" Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
As to the second...
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