McCabe v. State, C-10234
Decision Date | 11 September 1991 |
Docket Number | C-10234 |
Citation | 816 P.2d 1192,108 Or.App. 672 |
Parties | Gaye McCABE, Appellant, v. STATE of Oregon and Charles E. Hayes, Respondents. (89; CA A64336). |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
John Hoag, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Jas. Adams, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause, for respondents. With him on the brief, were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before BUTTLER, P.J., and ROSSMAN and De MUNIZ, JJ.
Plaintiff, a state police officer, alleged in her complaint that the Department of Oregon State Police (OSP) engaged in employment discrimination and subjected her to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Her claims arose from events surrounding her pregnancy, maternity leave and subsequent return to work. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the state on the ground that plaintiff had failed to provide notice of her claim as required under ORS 30.275. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.
ORS 30.275(1) provides, in part, that "[n]o action arising from any act or omission of a public body or an officer, employee or agent of a public body * * * shall be maintained unless notice of claim is given as required by this section." Plaintiff has the burden of proving that either formal or actual notice was provided. ORS 30.275(7). She did not give formal notice, which would have involved communicating in writing to the Director of the Department of General Services. ORS 30.275(5)(a). The only question is whether plaintiff provided actual notice of her intent to assert a claim against the state. ORS 30.275(6) provides, in part:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiff points to two documents that she believes satisfy the "actual notice" requirement of ORS 30.275(6). We need only consider the first, a letter that was sent to the Superintendent of OSP by a law firm on behalf of the Oregon State Police Officers' Association. The letter describes plaintiff's employment situation, characterizes the situation as gender-based discrimination, cites the Oregon Sex Discrimination Act, ORS 659.029--ORS 659.030, cites Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), and concludes:
The state argues that the letter did not provide notice of a tort claim, because it referred only to employment law violations.
For the purposes of the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA), a "tort" is defined as "the breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law, * * * the breach of which results in injury to a specific person or persons for which the law provides a civil right of action for damages or for a protective remedy." ORS 30.260(8). Under ORS 659.030(1), gender discrimination of the type alleged by plaintiff constitutes an unlawful employment practice. Engaging in such a practice is a breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law. Money damages or the enforcement of a conciliation agreement or order are two remedies available to a person injured by an unlawful employment practice. ORS 659.070. Therefore, the act alleged by plaintiff is both a personnel matter and a tort, and it falls within the OTCA. See Brinkley v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 94 Or.App. 531, 536, 766 P.2d 1045 (1988), rev. den. 307 Or. 571, 771 P.2d 1021 (1989).
The "actual notice" requirements of ORS 30.275(6) seek to provide...
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McCabe v. State
...issue of material fact. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. McCabe v. State of Oregon, 108 Or.App. 672, 816 P.2d 1192 (1991). Because the person to whom the actual notice was given was a person responsible for administering claims under ORS 30.......
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McCabe v. State
...1196 822 P.2d 1196 312 Or. 527 McCabe (Gaye) v. State NOS. A64336, S38591 Supreme Court of Oregon Dec 17, 1991 108 Or.App. 672, 816 P.2d 1192 ...