McCaffrey v. Knights & Ladies of Columbia

• Decision Date: 22 January 1906
• Docket Number: 149
• Parties: McCaffrey v. Knights and Ladies of Columbia, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

63 A. 189

213 Pa. 609

McCaffrey v. Knights and Ladies of Columbia, Appellant

No. 149

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 22, 1906

Argued October 31, 1905

Appeal, No. 149, Oct. T., 1905, by defendant, from order of C.P. No. 1, Allegheny Co., June T., 1905, No. 116, making absolute rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in case of Patrick F. McCaffrey v. The Knights and Ladies of Columbia. Affirmed.

Assumpsit for death benefits.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Error assigned was order making absolute rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense.

The judgment is affirmed.

Harry Alvan Hall, for appellant. -- There can be no recovery on a policy where there has been a false representation of a material fact, although the death of the insured was not produced by a cause connected with the subject of such representation: Hartman v. Ins. Co., 21 Pa. 466; Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1 Pa. Superior Ct. 572; March v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629; Lutz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 527; Aicher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 6 W.N.C. 332; Meyers v. Woodmen of the World, 193 Pa 470; Mengel v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, 176 Pa. 280; Wall v. Royal Society of Good Fellows, 179 Pa. 355; Life Insurance Company v Judge, 191 Pa. 484; Hermany v. Fidelity Mutual Life Association, 151 Pa. 17.

F. C. McGirr, with him John Marron, for appellee. -- The misstatement was not material to the risk: Clason v. Smith, 3 Wash. C.C. Rep. 156; Vivar v. Supreme Lodge K. of P., 52 N.J.L. 455 (20 A. Repr. 36); Fitch v. Ins. Co., 59 N.Y. 557; Anders v. Supreme Lodge, 51 N.J.L. 175 (17 A. Repr. 119); March v. Ins. Co., 186 Pa. 629; Royal Neighbors v. Wallace (Neb.), 99 N.W. 256; Security Trust Co. v. Tarpey, 182 Ill. 52 (54 N.E. Repr. 1041).

Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE MESTREZAT:

This was assumpsit brought by the plaintiff, Patrick F. McCaffrey, to recover $1,500 which he alleges is due him as the beneficiary of his wife, Mary McCaffrey, to whom was issued a certificate of membership in the Knights and Ladies of Columbia, the defendant in this action. The certificate is dated December 11, 1903, and for the consideration therein named it was agreed that "this Order will, upon satisfactory proof of the death of the above named member and upon the surrender and cancellation of this certificate pay to Patrick F. McCaffrey, bearing relation to her of husband, the sum of one thousand five hundred dollars." Mrs. McCaffrey died August 19, 1904. The defendant filed an affidavit of defense in which it is averred, inter alia, that in the application for membership in the order, Mrs. McCaffrey "made misrepresentations and statements which were untrue in regard to matters material to the risk, in that she replied, 'No,' to question No. 28, which was, 'Is the applicant pregnant?' thereby making a warranty to the defendant company that she, the said Mary McCaffrey at the time of her making such application for beneficial membership in the defendant order, on the 8th day of December, 1903, was not pregnant, when, as a matter of fact, she was pregnant at the time of making such application, and gave birth to a female child on the first day of May, 1904, and thereafter died from the effects of an illness contracted during the time of her confinement." The plaintiff took a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense which, after argument, was made absolute, and judgment was entered against the defendant. The sufficiency of the part of the affidavit of defense above quoted is the only matter requiring consideration here.

The first section of the Act of June 23, 1885, P.L. 134, 1 Purd. 1046, provides: "Whenever the application for a policy of life insurance contains a clause of warranty of the truth of the answers therein contained, no misrepresentation or untrue statement in such application, made in good faith by the applicant, shall effect a forefeiture or be a ground of defense in any suit brought upon any policy of insurance issued upon the faith of such application, unless such misrepresentation or untrue statement relate to some matter material to the risk."

A contract of insurance is to be interpreted by the same rules as is any other contract, and must be so interpreted as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting, so far as such intention is ascertainable: 16 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 927; Yoch v. Home Mutual Insurance Company, 111 Cal. 503. We think it clear that the company in issuing the policy did not regard the pregnancy of Mrs. McCaffrey either at the time of the application or during the life of the policy as material to the risk. A fact is material to the risk when, if known to the underwriter, it would have caused him to refuse the risk, or would have been a reason for his demanding a higher premium: Hartman v. Keystone Insurance Company, 21 Pa. 466. It is not claimed by the defendant company that it does not insure married women. On the contrary, the application and...