McCahan v. Brennan
| Decision Date | 20 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 142765. |
| Citation | 492 Mich. 730,822 N.W.2d 747 |
| Parties | McCAHAN v. BRENNAN. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Allan Falk, P.C., Okemos (by Allan Falk), and Moss & Colella, P.C., Southfield (by Christian P. Collis), for Christina McCahan.
Karl V. Fink, Special Assistant Attorney General, for the University of Michigan Regents.
Speaker Law Firm, PLLC (by Steven A. Hicks), for the Michigan Association for Justice.
In Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission,1 this Court held that, it being the sole province of the Legislature to determine whether and on what terms the state may be sued, the judiciary has no authority to restrict or amend those terms. We take this opportunity to reaffirm and apply this fundamental principle articulated in Rowland to the interpretation of MCL 600.6431, the notice provision of the Court of Claims Act at issue in this case.
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that when the Legislature conditions the ability to pursue a claim against the state on a plaintiff's having filed specific statutory notice, the courts may not engraft an “actual prejudice” component onto the statute as a preconditionto enforcing the legislative prohibition. We reiterate the core holding of Rowland that such statutory notice requirements must be interpreted and enforced as plainly written and that no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate. We further clarify that Rowland applies to all such statutory notice or filing provisions, including the one at issue in this case.
Plaintiff, Christina McCahan, was injured in an automobile accident on December 12, 2007. The collision involved a student who was driving a car owned by the University of Michigan. Plaintiff sought to recover damages from the university for her injuries. MCL 600.6431 requires any person who wishes to bring an action against state entities for personal injury or property damage to file with the Clerk of the Court of Claims either a specific statutory notice of intent to pursue a claim or the claim itself within six months of the incident giving rise to the cause of action. MCL 600.6431 provides:
(1) No claim may be maintained against the state unless the claimant, within 1 year after such claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies, stating the time when and the place where such claim arose and in detail the nature of the same and of the items of damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained, which claim or notice shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.
* * *
(3) In all actions for property damage or personal injuries, claimant shall file with the clerk of the court of claims a notice of intention to file a claim or the claim itself within 6 months following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.2
Plaintiff did not file a verified notice of intent to file a claim with the Clerk of the Court of Claims within six months after the accident. However, plaintiff and her counsel undertook numerous efforts to inform the university's legal office of her intent to seek recovery against the university. These actions included plaintiff's counsel's sending a letter to the university's legal office, plaintiff and her counsel meeting with and providing all then available documentation relating to the accident to the university's senior claims representative by the six-month deadline of June 12, 2008, and plaintiff's continuing to provide further information to the representative thereafter. On October 31, 2008, more than 10 months after the accident, plaintiff filed with the Clerk of the Court of Claims a notice of intent to bring suit against the university. Plaintiff filed her action against the university in the Court of Claims on December 5, 2008.
The university subsequently moved for summary disposition, contending that plaintiff's failure to file notice of intent to file a claim or the claim itself within the six-month deadline required dismissal of her claim. The Court of Claims agreed, ruling that the six-month deadline of MCL 600.6431(3) is a modification of the requirements provided in MCL 600.6431(1) and thus the prohibition against maintaining a claim from subsection (1) applied because plaintiff had not filed her claim or notice of her intent to file a claim within six months. The court further ruled that plaintiff's arguments that she had substantially complied with the statute and that defendant suffered no prejudice as a result of any defects in notice failed in light of the specific language of the statute requiring the filing within six months after the accident in order to maintain the claim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision.3 The Court of Appeals majority held that the filing of notice with the Court of Claims is a mandatory statutory requirement. Then, relying on the principles articulated in Rowland, the majority rejected plaintiff's argument that substantial compliance or the absence of prejudice to defendant could save plaintiff's claim.4 The Court of Appeals dissent would have held that the university's actual knowledge of plaintiff's intent to file a claim sufficed to satisfy the statutory notice requirement of MCL 600.6431. 5
We ordered argument on plaintiff's application for leave to appeal 6 and now affirm.
This Court reviews de novo a lower court's decision to grant summary disposition to a party.7 Further, whether MCL 600.6431 requires dismissal of a plaintiff's claim for failure to provide the designated notice raises questions of statutory interpretation, which we likewise review de novo.8 Our primary objective when interpreting a statute is to discern the Legislature's intent. 9 When the Legislature has clearly expressed its intent in the language of the statute, no further construction is required or permitted.10
Generally, governmental agencies in Michigan are statutorily immune from tort liability.11 However, because the government may voluntarily subject itself to liability, it may also place conditions or limitations on the liability imposed.12 One such condition on the right to sue the state is the notice provision of the Court of Claims Act, MCL 600.6431, which provides in full:
(1) No claim may be maintained against the state unless the claimant, within 1 year after such claim has accrued, files in the office of the clerk of the court of claims either a written claim or a written notice of intention to file a claim against the state or any of its departments, commissions, boards, institutions, arms or agencies, stating the time when and the place where such claim arose and in detail the nature of the same and of the items of damage alleged or claimed to have been sustained, which claim or notice shall be signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.
(2) Such claim or notice shall designate any department, commission, board, institution, arm or agency of the state involved in connection with such claim, and a copy of such claim or notice shall be furnished to the clerk at the time of the filing of the original for transmittal to the attorney general and to each of the departments, commissions,boards, institutions, arms or agencies designated.
(3) In all actions for property damage or personal injuries, claimant shall file with the clerk of the court of claims a notice of intention to file a claim or the claim itself within 6 months following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.
Thus, MCL 600.6431 sets forth several requirements that must be met in order to bring suit against a governmental entity in derogation of governmental immunity. Pursuant to subsection (1), “[n]o claim may be maintained against the state” unless the claimant files “in the office of the clerk of the court of claims” either a written claim or a written notice of intent to file a claim within one year. The claim or notice must contain certain information, including the time and place that the claim arose, the nature of the claim, and the damages alleged and must be “signed and verified by the claimant before an officer authorized to administer oaths.” Pursuant to subsection (2), “[s]uch claim or notice shall designate any ... agency of the state involved in connection with such claim....” And “a copy of such claim” shall be provided upon filing for the clerk to transmit to the Attorney General and the appropriate governmental agency. Finally, pursuant to subsection (3), if the claim against the state is one for “property damage or personal injuries,” the claimant must file with “the clerk of the court of claims” a notice or claim “within 6 months” of the incident—not one year, as is otherwise applicable to claims pursuant to subsection (1).
Plaintiff's appeal before this Court essentially raises two questions. First, what is the relationship between subsection (3), to which plaintiff's personal injury claim applies, and subsection (1)? In particular, does the bar-to-claims language of subsection (1) () apply to personal injury claims covered by subsection (3)? Second, what effect must be given to a failure to file either a claim or notice of intent to file a claim pursuant to subsection (3), particularly when a state entity otherwise received actual notice of plaintiff's injury?
We believe that a contextual understanding of MCL 600.6431 readily resolves the first question and that this Court's decision...
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