McCain v. Stockton Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 03 October 2011
• Docket Number: No. CIV S-10-3170 JAM CKD PS,CIV S-10-3170 JAM CKD PS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: TERRYLYN McCAIN, Plaintiff, v. STOCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. Defendants.

TERRYLYN McCAIN, Plaintiff,

v.STOCKTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al. Defendants.

No. CIV S-10-3170 JAM CKD PS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: October 3, 2011

ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants Adair, Gonzalez, Hughes, Reynosa, Teague, and Stockton Police Department's ("City Defendants") motion for judgment on the pleadings came on regularly for hearing on September 28, 2011. Plaintiff Terrylyn McCain, who is proceeding pro se, appeared on her own behalf. Marciana Arredondo appeared on behalf of the City Defendants. No appearance was made for the remaining defendant, Evangelina Duran dba Brownies Towing. Also pending before the court is plaintiff's motion for a default judgment against defendant Duran. Upon review of the documents in support and opposition to the motions, upon hearing the arguments of plaintiff and counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

BACKGROUND

This civil rights action arises from a traffic stop resulting in impoundment of plaintiff's vehicle, as well as her subsequent arrest. On November 3, 2010, at approximately 3:45 p.m., plaintiff was driving eastward on "Quail Lakes" in her 2006 White Ford Diesel 4x4 (the "Vehicle"). (See First Amended Complaint For Damages, Dkt. No. 33 ["FAC"] ¶¶ 18-19.) It appears from plaintiff's somewhat confusing allegations that defendant Reynosa pulled plaintiff over by activating his patrol car's emergency lights. (FAC ¶¶ 26-30.) Plaintiff's vehicle had no license plates, and plaintiff admits in her complaint that the Vehicle was not registered. (FAC ¶ 75.) Subsequently, other police officers, defendants Adair, Gonzalez, and Teague, arrived at the scene. (FAC ¶¶ 39-50.) Plaintiff failed to produce a driver's license, which she admits she does not have. (FAC ¶ 74.) Plaintiff's photo and fingerprints were taken, and a tow truck was called. (FAC ¶ 47, 59-62.) When the tow truck from Brownies Towing arrived, the Vehicle was searched, towed away, and impounded. (FAC ¶¶ 63-70.) Plaintiff was apparently not arrested at that time.

On November 16, 2010, at approximately 11:00 a.m., plaintiff went to the Stockton Police Department and presented the bill of sale for the Vehicle in an attempt to get it back. (FAC ¶¶ 76-77.) At that time, defendant Hughes arrested plaintiff pursuant to a bench warrant that had been issued by the San Joaquin County Superior Court. (FAC ¶¶ 78-85; Defendants' Request for Judicial Notice ["RJN"] Ex. B.) Plaintiff was searched, locked in a holding cell for more than an hour, and then handcuffed and transported to the San Joaquin County Jail. (FAC ¶¶ 86-92.) There, plaintiff alleges, she was "tortured" and "suffered excruciating pain" at the hands of three unknown deputies. (FAC ¶ 93.) She was locked in a "freezing cold solitary confinement cell" without her coat, boots, socks, or hat, and was refused a phone call. (FAC ¶¶ 94-96.) After four hours, plaintiff was released without bail. (FAC ¶¶ 97-103.)

On November 23, 2010, plaintiff filed her initial complaint in this action, to which City Defendants filed an answer on December 20, 2010. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 11.) On January 11, 2011, plaintiff filed a motion to amend her complaint along with a first amended complaint, but failed to properly notice the hearing or serve any of the defendants. (Dkt. Nos. 20, 21.) Accordingly, the motion was denied without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 30.)¹ Subsequently, on March 2, 2011, plaintiff again filed a motion to amend her complaint (without noticing it for hearing) along with a proposed first amended complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 32, 33.) After a scheduling conference, during which it was stipulated that the City of Stockton could be added as a defendant, plaintiff's motion was granted and the action proceeded on the operative FAC. (Dkt. No. 38.)² The court made clear that no further joinder of parties or amendment to pleadings would be permitted except with leave of court and upon a showing of good cause. (Dkt. No. 38.)

The FAC contains five causes of action for violation of plaintiff's rights under the (1) First and Fourteenth Amendments³ ; (2) Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (5) Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (FAC ¶¶ 116-120.) In each of these causes of action, plaintiff also alleges that she has been deprived of her "right to travel on the public right of ways." (FAC ¶¶ 116-120.) The court construes these causes of action as being brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, plaintiff generally alleges liability under multiple other statutes, including 42U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, 1988; 18 U.S.C. §§ 4, 241, 242; and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. (FAC ¶ 3.) The parties' filings indicate that a significant amount of written discovery and depositions has already been completed.

DISCUSSION

CITY DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

"After the pleadings are closed - but early enough not to delay trial - a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). "Because the motions are functionally identical, the same standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(b) motion applies to its Rule 12(c) analog." Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir.1989). Dismissal may be granted where there is no cognizable legal theory or lack of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1990). In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). "[A] judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when, even if all allegations in the complaint are true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Westlands Water Dist. v. Firebaugh Canal, 10 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1993).

Request for Judicial Notice

City Defendants filed a request for judicial notice along with their motion. (Dkt. No. 54-3.) Although a court generally is confined to the pleadings on a Rule 12(c) motion, it can also consider facts which may be judicially noticed. Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Ct., 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987). "A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Consideration of these documents outside the complaint will not convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment. United States v.Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, the court takes judicial notice of Exhibit B (a bench warrant), Exhibit D (a printout from the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles) and Exhibits E, F, and G (minute orders from San Joaquin Superior Court), because these are public records whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds, Astoria Fed. Sav. Etc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991). The court will not take judicial notice of Exhibit A, which consists of alleged photos of the Vehicle taken by the Stockton Police Department and is not the proper subject of judicial notice. Furthermore, the court declines to take judicial notice of Exhibit C (a police report). Although administrative reports are usually the proper subject of judicial notice, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that courts should not take judicial notice of police reports. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 909. Based on the FAC and plaintiff's opposition, it is clear that plaintiff disputes some of the statements in the police report, and judicial notice would be improper.

Finally, the court declines to consider the Declaration of Marci A. Arredondo. (Dkt.No. 54-2.) This declaration attempts to establish facts related to counsel's observations at depositions conducted in this matter. Because these proffered facts are wholly extraneous to the FAC and not the proper subject of judicial notice, the court will not consider them for purposes of this motion.

Section 1983 Claims

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) defendant was acting under color of state law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) defendant's conduct deprived plaintiff of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Here, there is no dispute that the individual officers were acting under color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 50 ("generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.") Instead, CityDefendants contend that the FAC fails to allege facts that suggest that the individual officers violated plaintiff's constitutional rights.

In regards to plaintiff's claims against the Stockton Police Department and the City of Stockton, these claims must satisfy the requirements of Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Since there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, counties and municipalities may be sued under § 1983 only upon a showing that an official policy or custom caused the constitutional tort. Id. Plaintiff has alleged in conclusory fashion that the Stockton Police Department and/or City of Stockton "as a policy and custom, neglected to train, supervise, control, correct the abuse of authority, or curtail the outrageous conduct, or discourage the unlawful abuse of authority" by the individual officers. (FAC ¶ 111.) However, because any Monell claim here necessarily rests on underlying constitutional violations by the individual...