McCain v. Yost
| Citation | 284 S.W.2d 898,155 Tex. 174 |
| Decision Date | 14 December 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. A-5311,A-5311 |
| Parties | Edith Marie McCAIN, Petitioner, v. Neva YOST, Temporary Administratrix of the Estate of Lilliard Russell McCain, Deceased, Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Texas |
Simon & Simon, Richard U. Simon, Fort Worth, for petitioner.
Cecil Murphy, Gainesville, for respondent.
This suit filed by respondent in her capacity as temporary administratrix of the estate of Lilliard Russell McCain, deceased, against petitioner and others not necessary to mention, evolved into a contest as to whether the respondent-plaintiff or the petitioner-defendant was entitled to the $1,000 proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of Lilliard Russell McCain, deceased. The issue was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury and that court rendered judgment for respondent. The Court of Civil Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas has affirmed. 278 S.W.2d 398.
There is no dispute between the parties as to the following relevant facts:
Petitioner and the deceased were married on March 15, 1940, and continued the relationship of husband and wife until they were legally divorced by formal judgment of the District Court of Tarrant County, Texas, duly entered in cause styled and numbered 33260-D, Edith Stockton McCain v. Lilliard R. McCain, on April 20, 1953. In 1946 McCain took out the policy of life insurance on his life and designated petitioner, his wife at that time, as beneficiary. On March 7, 1954, McCain died without having changed his beneficiary.
Respondent, as executrix of McCain's estate, claims the death benefits of the policy on the theory that petitioner had no insurable interest on his life after the divorce and that the question of insurable interest is governed by the rules of public policy which had been established by the decisions of the courts of this state at the time the divorce decree became effective. Respondent also bases her claim to the death benefits of the policy on the ground that the Legislative Act of 1953, designated as Article 3.49-1, Texas Insurance Code, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, and being the article of the statute upon which petitioner relies to support her claim to the death benefits of the policy, can have no application in this case for the reason that the decree of divorce terminated and nullified the prior designation of petitioner as the beneficiary prior to the enactment of Article 3.49-1, and that it was the intention of the Legislature by the enactment of the Act, and especially Section 2 thereof, that it should operate prospectively rather than retroactively, and that since the insured failed to designate petitioner as the beneficiary in his life insurance policy after August 26, 1953, the effective date of the Act, the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals properly denied petitioner the right of recovery.
Petitioner claims the proceeds of the policy primarily on the theory that she was and is the contractual beneficiary designated in the policy, and that since the deceased failed to exercise his right to change the beneficiary, she had an insurable interest and became entitled to the proceeds of the policy in view of the express provisions of the declaration of public policy by the Texas Legislature as contained in the Act above mentioned regardless of whether the designation was made before or after the effective date of the Act.
Petitioner further contends that in the event this court should hold that the public policy denying recovery on a life insurance policy for want of an insurable interest as announced in the cases of Whitselle v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., Tex.Com.App., 221 S.W. 575; Price v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 68 Tex. 361, 4 S.W. 633; Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Tex. 287, 28 S.W. 274, and other Texas cases of similar holding, was not changed by Article 3.49-1, supra (), then this Court should overrule such cases. It is the petitioner's contention that this jurisdiction by holding it to be contrary to public policy to permit a beneficiary, who had no insurable interest, to recover on an insurance policy, finds itself standing alone and its decisions on the question unsupported by the decided cases on the subject in every other jurisdiction in the United States as...
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Ex parte Abell
...Rights Commission v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 649 (Tex.1971); Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Tex.1966); McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174, 284 S.W.2d 898, 900 (1955); Wilson v. Work, 122 Tex. 545, 62 S.W.2d 490 (1933); Phil Pierce Co. v. Watkins, 114 Tex. 153, 263 S.W. 905, 907 (192......
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City of Tyler v. Likes
...unconstitutional. A statute is retroactive if it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law. See McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174, 284 S.W.2d 898 (1955). This Court has Facts may exist out of which, in the course of time or under given circumstances, a right would become fi......
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State v. Rhine
...public policy, reshape it, or reform it. State v. Dallas, 319 S.W.2d 767, 774 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1958) (citing McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174, 284 S.W.2d 898, 900 (1955)); Reed v. Waco, 223 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1949). It may do this as long as constitutional guarantees are not......
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Satterfield v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.
...when they impair or destroy vested rights. See id.; see also City of Tyler v. Likes, 962 S.W.2d 489, 502 (Tex.1997); McCain v. Yost, 155 Tex. 174, 284 S.W.2d 898, 900 (1955); Mellinger, 3 S.W. at 249. The parties do not dispute that the Statute operates retroactively. Therefore, to determin......