McCaleb v. Brown

• Decision Date: 25 February 1977
• Citation: 344 So.2d 485
• Parties: Helen A. McCALEB et al. v. Mary Lou McCaleb BROWN. SC 2019.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 485

344 So.2d 485

Helen A. McCALEB et al. v. Mary Lou McCaleb BROWN.

SC 2019.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 25, 1977.

Rehearing Denied April 22, 1977.

Louis Salmon, for Watts, Salmon, Roberts, Manning & Noojin, Huntsville, for appellants.

M. H. Lanier, Harold F. Herring and E. Cutter Hughes, Jr., for Lanier, Shaver & Herring, Huntsville, for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

Omitting only the introductory paragraph and the formal order, we set forth in Haec verba the trial Court's Final Decree:

(Facts)

'Virginia E. McCaleb was the mother of six children: Robert Leon McCaleb, Sallie McCaleb Drake, Josephine McCaleb Balch, Joseph Edmond McCaleb, John William McCaleb and Shelby Blaine McCaleb. On May 21, 1942, Mrs. McCaleb executed six (6) deeds conveying to each of her children a life interest in specified separate parcels of property.

'The operative language in each of the deeds was virtually identical, the only variation being in reference to the sex of the named grantee. This controversy centers upon the interpretation of the habendum clause in these deeds, and in particular, the effect of the habendum in the deed to Robert Leon McCaleb which reads as follows:

"To Have and To Hold unto the said Robert Leon McCaleb, together with all and singular, the rights, privileges, tenements, appurtenances and improvements thereunto belonging, for and during the term of his natural life, with remainder after his death in fee simple to his surviving descendants per stirpes. Provided, however, if at the time of the death of my said son, Robert Leon McCaleb, he shall not leave surviving any descendants, the remainder estate in and to said lands shall rest in equal shares in such of my children as may be living at such time, and the legal descendants per stirpes of such of my children who may have previously died, leaving surviving legal descendants.'

'In June of 1943, Mrs. McCaleb died, and later on April 5, 1946, Robert Leon McCaleb legally adopted the plaintiff in this case, Mary Lou McCaleb Brown. R. L. McCaleb died on March 25, 1974, and the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment regarding her rights in the property conveyed to her adoptive father by Virginia E. McCaleb. Joseph Edmond McCaleb, a son of Virginia McCaleb and an original defendant, died on February 23, 1975, without descendants, and the plaintiff amended her complaint to seek declaration of her rights in property similarly conveyed to Joseph Edmond McCaleb as well. Defendants answered and counter-claimed alleging that only the named defendants came within the terms of the remainder provision in the deeds at issue and sought a declaratory judgment in their favor.

(Issue)

'The present posture of this case sets forth a single issue for resolution by this Court. Is Mary Lou McCaleb Brown, adopted daughter of Robert Leon McCaleb, within the class of persons described in the McCaleb deeds as 'his surviving descendants' and as 'the legal descendants' of one of Virginia McCaleb's children?

'In order to decide the question posed here, the Court is faced with the problem of framing a legal definition of the term 'descendants' as used in the deeds involved. Counsel for the parties have provided the Court with able and helpful briefs, but neither the briefs nor the Court's own research has disclosed a case in which any Alabama appellate court has undertaken to define the term 'descendant' as it applies to an adopted child. Therefore it appears that this Court must formulate its own definition of the key term in accordance with its understanding of Alabama law.

(Decision)

'As an aid to this decision, counsel have discussed in brief and in argument the statutory and case law in Alabama and in other jurisdictions with regard to an adopted child's ability to inherit property from adoptive parents and adoptive collateral relatives. On the subject of inheritance from adoptive collateral relatives, the Alabama Supreme Court has clearly stated that such a result is not to be reached, Gamble v. Cloud, 263 Ala. 336, 82 So.2d 526 (1956) (1955). Although Gamble v. Cloud did help to produce certain amendatory legislation, that legislation did not affect the ruling in regard to inheritance from adoptive collaterals.

'Alabama case law dealing with the rights of inheritance of adopted children shows a consistent pattern of restrictive interpretation of the Alabama adoption statutes as they relate to inheritance. Since those provisions are in derogation of the common law, see, Peck v. Green, 266 Ala. 321, 96 So.2d 169 (1956); Hamilton v. Smith, 264 Ala. 199, 86 So.2d 283 (1956), Gamble v. Cloud, 263 Ala. 336, 82 So.2d 526 (1955); Franklin v. White, 263 Ala. 223, 82 So.2d 247 (1955). But it is undisputed that a child who has been adopted in a valid legal procedure is entitled to inherit from its adoptive parents, Ala.Code Tit. 27, § 5.

'If the Court were faced here with a problem of whether an adopted child takes by intestacy or under the will of a collateral who died prior to the adoption or even by intestacy or under the will of an adoptive parent, the question presented by this case would perhaps be less difficult to resolve. However, the instruments with which the Court must deal in this instance are deeds rather than wills. The legal device employed here was an inter vivos conveyance of a life estate with a contingent remainder in the 'descendants' of Virginia McCaleb's children who had died prior to the vesting of the fee simple estate.

'In other words, the short time span between the execution of the series of deeds and the death of Virginia McCaleb naturally tends to suggest an 'inheritance' by collateral kin from Virginia McCaleb. But in fact, in legal contemplation, no inheritance has or will occur as a result of these transactions. There is no inheritance from Virginia McCaleb since all her interest in the real property involved here was conveyed away before her death, and there is no inheritance from any of the six McCaleb children since none of them owned, by virtue of the deeds, any estate in land which would have been transmissible at death.

'Although the resolution of the instant controversy does not rest directly upon the question of whether plaintiff, Mary Lou McCaleb Brown, could have inherited property from Robert Leon McCaleb, the decisive factor is the legal relationship between plaintiff and Robert Leon McCaleb. There is no dispute about the validity of plaintiff's adoption although counsel disagree as to whether the Court should look to the 1931 statute or the present statute as amended in 1957 and 1959. The Court is of the opinion that the same result will obtain regardless of which statute is used.

'Ala.Code, Tit. 27, § 5, outlines among other things the rights of inheritance of an adopted child. As noted above, the Court has concluded that this case turns on the interpretation of a class description found in a deed rather than on an application of the laws of inheritance, and nowhere in either of the variations on the adoption statute has the Legislature declared that an adopted child shall or shall not be included within the legal definition of the 'descendants' of the adoptive parents. It is, however, instructive that the Alabama Legislature has stated:

"For the purposes of inheritance of property under the laws of descent and distribution an adopted child, whether now or hereafter adopted under the laws of Alabama or some other jurisdiction, shall bear the same relation to his adopting parents and their natural and adopted children as if he were the natural child of such parents."

Ala.Code of 1940, Tit. 27, § 5 (1958 Recomp. and 1973 Supp.).

'The terms 'descendant' and 'legal descendant' are not one of precise legal definition; they are apparently undefined in Alabama case law. Other jurisdictions, however, have arrived at...