McCall v. Williams

Decision Date19 May 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 2:97-1798-18.,Civ.A. 2:97-1798-18.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesEddie MCCALL, Plaintiff, v. Lieutenant Dwight WILLIAMS, Sheriff Jack McCrea, and Williamsburg County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.

William Joseph Barr, Kingstree, SC, for plaintiff.

Robert Thomas King, Florence, SC, for defendant.

ORDER

NORTON, District Judge.

This action is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Because this action is before the court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the facts are stated in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

On June 16, 1994, while traveling in a vehicle with a female passenger, Plaintiff was stopped by Lieutenant Dwight Williams, and deputies Randy Grayson and Dennis Parrot. The law enforcement officers instructed Plaintiff to get out of the car. They searched the vehicle with Plaintiff's consent. After the search, one of the officers told Plaintiff that he was free to go. Plaintiff and his passenger left in the vehicle. The passenger then told Plaintiff that she believed that the officers had wanted her to stay. Plaintiff turned his vehicle around and returned to where the officers were still standing. Deputy Parrot pointed his gun at Plaintiff and demanded that he get out of the car. Lieutenant Williams then placed handcuffs on Plaintiff. On at least three occasions, Plaintiff told the officers to take off the handcuffs because they were too tight. He kept on begging them to take the handcuffs off because his wrists were hurting. The handcuffs were on his wrists for fifteen to twenty minutes while the officers questioned the female passenger. The officers then instructed him that he was free to go.

Plaintiff went to the hospital the same day, but he received no medical treatment. Two weeks later, still suffering pain in his wrists, he went to the hospital again. He was later treated by Dr. R. Joseph Healy. Nine months after the incident, Dr. Healy opined that Plaintiff had "10% impairment of his RUE as a result" of the handcuffs being too tight.

On June 13, 1997. Plaintiff filed this action.

II. LAW/ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard

This court must grant a motion for summary judgment when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979). If the moving party carries its burden of showing that there is an absence of evidence to support a claim, then the non-moving party must demonstrate by affidavit, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548. An issue of fact is "genuine" when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of fact is "material" only if establishment of the fact might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing substantive law. See id. When determining whether there is an issue for trial, the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962); Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 438 (4th Cir.1998).

B. State Law Claims for Assault and Battery Against Lieutenant Williams

Plaintiff has alleged pendent state law claims for assault and battery against Lieutenant Dwight Williams in his official and individual capacities. Plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. First, because a deputy sheriff is considered an arm of the State, Plaintiff's suit against Lieutenant Williams in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff is the same as a suit against the State. See Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir.1996); Carroll v. Greenville County Sheriff's Dep't, 871 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D.S.C.1994). As an arm of the State, a deputy sheriff is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil damages suits in federal court, unless the State expressly waived this immunity. See U.S. Const. XI; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). This court may find a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity "only where stated `by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.' "Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171, 29 S.Ct. 458, 53 L.Ed. 742 (1909)). The South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA); which is the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by a government employee1 acting within the scope of his official duties,2 waived immunity in state court for certain tort claims against the state. See S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-40 (Supp.1997). However, the Act expressly reserved the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court. See S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (Supp.1997) ("Nothing in this chapter is [to be] construed as a waiver of the state's or political subdivision's immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States...."). The Eleventh Amendment thus bars Plaintiff's pendent state law claims for assault and battery against Lieutenant Williams in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff. See Huang v. Board of Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir.1990).

Second, Plaintiff's claims against Lieutenant Williams in his individual capacity for assault and battery also fail as a matter of law. The SCTCA does not grant an employee "immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-70(b) (Supp.1997); see also S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-60(17) (Supp.1997). Thus, a government employee can be personally liable for intentional torts such as assault and battery. See Roberts v. City of Forest Acres, 902 F.Supp. 662, 671 (D.S.C.1995) (finding that the governmental entity is not liable under the SCTCA, and the employee is personally liable, when the employee's conduct falls within the exceptions listed in section 15-78-70(b)); Moore v. Berkeley County Sch. Dist., 326 S.C. 584, 486 S.E.2d 9, 11 & n. 3 (1997) (noting that the SCTCA plaintiff did not contest a grant of summary judgment in favor of the state on his assault and battery claims when the intentional torts were committed by the government employee). As a result, the three-year statute of limitations for SCTCA suits initiated after the filing of a verified claim3 is in applicable to Plaintiff's state-law tort claims against Lieutenant Williams in his individual capacity.4 Instead, the two-year statute of limitations for assault and battery applies. See S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-550(1) (Supp.1997). Plaintiff's cause of action arose on June 16, 1994, the date Plaintiff claims Lieutenant Williams placed handcuffs too tightly on his wrists. Because Plaintiff did not file this action until June 13, 1997, more than two years after the date of the incident, Plaintiff's state law claims against Lieutenant Williams in his individual capacity are time barred.5

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim Against Lieutenant Williams

Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Lieutenant Williams fails as a matter of law. First, the Eleventh Amendment bars any § 1983 damages claim in federal court against Lieutenant Williams in his official capacity as a deputy sheriff. See U.S. Const. XI; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir.1996); Carroll v. Greenville County Sheriff's Dep't, 871 F.Supp. 844, 846 (D.S.C.1994); Gulledge v. Smart, 691 F.Supp. 947, 955 & n. 7 (D.S.C.1988).

Second, Lieutenant Williams is entitled to qualified immunity for the § 1983 claim6 against him in his individual capacity. Government officials are qualifiedly immune from civil damages suits so long as their "`conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which [a] reasonable person would have known.' "Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 567 (4th Cir.1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Ruling on Lieutenant Williams's defense of qualified immunity requires (1) identifying the right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation; and (3) if so, then determining whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have known that doing what he did would violate that clearly established right. See Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 269-73 (4th Cir.1998); Vathekan v. Prince George's County, 154 F.3d 173, 179-80 (4th Cir.1998).

The court is aware that a significant number of Fourth Circuit decisions have analyzed the qualified immunity defense to excessive force claims differently. See, e.g., Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 172-74 (4th Cir.1994). In Rowland, the court noted that qualified immunity "shields police officers from civil liability unless the officer reasonably should have known that his actions violated clearly established constitutional rights." Id. at 172. Recognizing that the "reasonableness" inquiry was "an objective one," the Rowland court noted that it gauged ...

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