McCallie v. Mayor & Aldermen of Chattanooga

• Decision Date: 30 September 1859
• Citation: McCallie v. Mayor & Aldermen of Chattanooga, 40 Tenn. 317 (Tenn. 1859)
• Parties: THOMAS MCCALLIE v. THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF CHATTANOOGA.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

40 Tenn. 317

THOMAS MCCALLIE

v.THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF CHATTANOOGA.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September Term, 1859.

FROM CHATTANOOGA.

Bill dismissed by Chancellor Van Dyke.The complainant appealed.

Minnis, for the complainant; Welcker & Key, for the defendant.

MCKINNEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an injunction bill to restrain the corporation from proceeding to collect a railroad tax assessed upon the lands of the complainant, situate within the limits of the corporation.

It appears that, on February 28, 1854, an act was passed by the Legislature of Tennessee, by which the “Wills' Valley Railroad Company of Alabama” were “authorized and permitted to extend their road from the southern line of this State, in Lookout Valley, to a connection with the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, at Chattanooga or elsewhere in this State.”It seems that the road, as actually located unites with the Nashville and Chattanooga Road, some six miles west of the town of Chattanooga.

On the 21st of August, 1854, by an ordinance of the board, a subscription of $100,000 of the stock of said “Wills' Valley” Road was made on behalf of the corporation of Chattanooga.The ordinance provides, that the amount thus subscribed should be “applied in preparing for the iron that part of the road lying in Dade county, Georgia, and DeKalb county, Alabama”--that being the porton of the road nearest to the Tennessee line; and the road extending within the limits of this State only about one mile.

It further appears, that prior to the 17th day of February, 1824, the complainant was the owner of a tract of land adjoining the town of Chattanooga, but outside of the corporate limits of the town as then defined, part of which land was then improved and cultivated, and part was woodland.By an act of the Legislature, passed on the day last aforesaid, the corporate limits of the town were extended so as to take in a large quantity of territory not before included; which act contains a proviso to the effect that the lands thus taken in “shall not be subject to a corporation tax while held as woodland, or for farming purposes; but may be taxed whenever laid off and sold, or occupied as town lots less than one acre.”By a subsequent act, passed the 20th of November, 1857, the foregoing proviso was repealed, “so far as to render all lands within the present limits of said corporation liable to railroad tax, should the same be voted and imposed by said corporation.”

The bill alleges that complainant's lands, brought within the limits of the corporation, by the act of 1854, are still held by him, in part “as woodland, and in part for farming purposes”--not laid off, sold, or occupied as town lots.And the object of the bill is to enjoin the collection of the tax assessed upon this portion of his town property.

The charter of incorporation of the town of Chattanooga(act of 1851, ch. 13, sec. 15), provides that “the said corporation shall have power to subscribe for stock in any railroad or turnpike road company, and pay for the same with its bonds or otherwise.”

The complainant resists this tax mainly on two grounds: First, it is insisted that the act of 1857 is void.The argument assumes that the act of 1854, exempting the lands thereby included from “a corporation tax, while held as woodland, or for farming purposes,” having been assented to and accepted by the corporation as an amendment of its charter, was a contract between the corporation and the owners of the land thus included; that upon this condition of exemption from corporation tax, while held as woodland or for farming purposes, the lands were brought within the corporation, and the owners thereby became vested with a right to hold the same, until laid off and sold as town lots, exempt from a corporation tax for any purpose.

We are unable to assent to the correctness of this argument.This case is wholly unlike the case of The State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch, 164.There, in consideration of the surrender by the tribe of Delaware Indians of their claims to a large portion of territory in New Jersey, the government agreed to purchase a tract of land on which they might reside.An act of the Legislature was passed, in 1758, to give effect to this agreement, in which it was provided that the lands to...