McCalvin v. Yukins
| Decision Date | 03 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-73447.,02-73447. |
| Citation | 351 F.Supp.2d 665 |
| Parties | Traci Lynette McCALVIN, Petitioner, v. Warden Joan YUKINS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Neil H. Fink, Kimberly W. Stout, Birmingham, MI, for Plaintiff.
Debra M. Gagliardi, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Lansing, MI, for Defendant.
Traci Lynette McCalvin (Petitioner), petitions the Court for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner seeks to vacate her state conviction for second-degree murder following the death of Markecia Branch (Decedent), whom Petitioner ran over with her car. The matter was referred to a magistrate, who filed a Report and Recommendation (R & R), recommending that this Court deny the petition. The Court heard oral argument on April 5, 2004, after which it directed the parties to file supplemental briefs and took the matter under advisement. Having reviewed the supplemental briefs, the Court concludes that Petitioner suffered actual prejudice during the course of the state court adjudication. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS her request for relief.
The incident which led to Petitioner's conviction occurred shortly after midnight on February 14, 1998. Petitioner encountered Decedent at the home of Lidell Smith, who is the father of one of Petitioner's children. Petitioner's car hit Decedent as she stood on Smith's lawn, to the left of the garage.
The police escorted Petitioner to the police station around 1:30 a.m. on February 14, 1998. From approximately 5:00 a.m. until 7:30 a.m., she was interrogated by two police officers, Palmer and Shadwell. Petitioner told the officers that Decedent's death was an accident. She explained that she had intended to back out of Smith's driveway, not realizing that her car was in drive, rather than reverse.
After Palmer and Shadwell completed their interrogation, Officer Christopher Helgert interrogated Petitioner for approximately one and one-half hours. Petitioner initially told Helgert the same story she had told the other officers, but later confessed to him that she had intended to scare Decedent.1 According to Petitioner, Helgert told her that "she would go to prison for first-degree murder and that she would lose her children if she did not change her story and admit that she tried to scare the victim by driving toward her."
Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder, and a jury trial began in September 1998. Helgert testified that he believed Petitioner gave answers "that defied common sense and that he told her they did not match the evidence at the scene of the incident." He denied threatening Petitioner but admitted telling her "that if she planned to kill the victim, she could go to prison for first-degree murder and would have no contact with her children." After cross-examining Helgert, Petitioner's attorney moved in camera to suppress the confession on the ground that it was the product of coercion. The coercion argument was based not only on Helgert's statements regarding visitation but his assurance that the prosecutor would likely be lenient if Petitioner admitted trying to scare Decedent.2
The trial court denied Petitioner's motion on the grounds that (1) it did not want to declare a mistrial; (2) cross-examination by Petitioner's attorney had been thorough; (3) a curative instruction would have been futile; and (4) Petitioner waived the issue by failing to raise it prior to trial. The jury convicted Petitioner of second-degree murder, and the court sentenced her to fifteen to thirty years in prison.
Petitioner appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the statement she made to Helgert; and, if her trial attorney was deemed to have waived the right to file a suppression motion, that waiver amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. On December 26, 2000, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding that Petitioner had failed to preserve her first issue for appellate review and that her trial attorney was not constitutionally ineffective. People v. McCalvin, No. 215150, 2000 WL 33385191 (Mich.App. Dec. 26, 2000) (unpublished). On August 28, 2001, the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's application for leave to appeal, stating, "[W]e are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court." People v. McCalvin, No. 118411, 465 Mich. 863, 634 N.W.2d 354 (2001).
Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court on August 27, 2002. The Court conducted a hearing on April 5, 2004.
Because Petitioner filed the instant petition in 2002, it is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under the AEDPA, relief is available with respect to those claims adjudicated on the merits in state court only if the adjudication:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A habeas petitioner must establish "actual prejudice" resulting from a constitutional error. Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 354 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)).
The issues to be decided by this Court are whether: (1) the confession should have been suppressed; (2) the Michigan Court of Appeals erred in determining that Petitioner procedurally defaulted on that issue; (3) Petitioner's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to timely move to suppress the confession; and (4) admission of the confession was harmless error. The issues of procedural default and ineffective assistance of counsel are inextricably intertwined and will be discussed jointly.
According to Petitioner, Helgert told her that, if she did not change her story and admit that she tried to scare Decedent by driving toward her, she would be convicted of first-degree murder, go to prison, and lose her children. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded:
[I]n the instant case, [Officer] Helgert's testimony showed that he merely informed defendant that if a judge or jury believed that she intended to kill the victim and she went to prison for first-degree murder, she would not have contact with her children. Moreover, the record in this case, in contrast to the record in [United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.1981)], does not reflect that defendant felt great psychological distress during the interview with Helgert. Again, Helgert described defendant as quiet, calm, and unemotional during the interview. The interview in this case simply did not rise to the level of coercion requiring reversal in [Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963)], and Tingle. Helgert's testimony suggests that he merely informed defendant of the consequences of the charges involved in light of the victim's death, should defendant be convicted, and did not make any promises in exchange for cooperation.
McCalvin, 2000 WL 33385191, at *2. Although it discussed the merits of the issue the Court of Appeals ultimately held that Petitioner waived the suppression issue by failing to raise it prior to trial.
As she did in state court, Petitioner relies upon Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963), and United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.1981). In Lynumn, the petitioner confessed after the police told her that, if she did not "cooperate," she would lose state aid for her children, and her children would be taken away. These threats were made while the petitioner was encircled in her apartment by three officers and the person who had purportedly set her up. The petitioner had never been in trouble with the law. The Supreme Court found that the confession was coerced. Lynumn, 372 U.S. at 534, 83 S.Ct. 917.
In Tingle, the investigating agent expressly told the petitioner that she had "a lot at stake" and would not see her child "for a while" if she did not cooperate. He also told her it was in her best interest to cooperate; her cooperation would be communicated to the prosecutor; and, if she failed to cooperate, he would inform the prosecutor that she was "stubborn" or "hard-headed." The court concluded:
We think it clear that the purpose and objective of the interrogation was to cause [petitioner] to fear that, if she failed to cooperate, she would not see her young child for a long time. We think it equally clear that such would be the conclusion which [petitioner] could reasonably be expected to draw from the agent's use of this technique. The relationship between parent and child embodies a primordial and fundamental value of our society. When law enforcement officers deliberately prey upon the maternal instinct and inculcate fear in a mother that she will not see her child in order to elicit "cooperation," they exert... "improper influence".... The warnings that a lengthy prison term could be imposed, that [petitioner] had a lot at stake, that her cooperation would be communicated to the prosecutor, that her failure to cooperate would be similarly communicated, and that she might not see her two-year-old child for a while must be read together, as they were intended to be, and as they would reasonably be understood. Viewed in that light, [the agent's] statements were patently coercive.
Petitioner was in a more vulnerable position than was the petitioner in Lynumn, because she was alone in an unfamiliar surrounding when Helgert made the statements...
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McCalvin v. Yukins, 05-1111.
...petition. In December 2004, the district court granted McCalvin's request for habeas relief on both grounds. McCalvin v. Yukins, 351 F.Supp.2d 665, 674 (E.D.Mich.2005). The court ruled that it could reach the merits of McCalvin's coercion claim because, under the four-factor test set forth ......