McCamey v. Epps

Decision Date12 March 2010
Docket NumberNo. 1:06CV294-A-D.,1:06CV294-A-D.
Citation696 F. Supp.2d 667
PartiesBilly Allen McCAMEY, Petitioner v. Christopher EPPS, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

Jim D. Waide, III, Waide & Associates, PA, Tupelo, MS, for Petitioner.

Frances Patterson Croft, Mississippi Attorney General's Office, Jackson, MS, for Respondents.

FINAL JUDGMENT

SHARION AYCOCK, District Judge.

With the assistance of counsel, the Petitioner filed this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state court conviction for possession of methamphetamine precursor chemicals and his thirty-three year sentence. The Magistrate Judge held an evidentiary hearing on September 17, 2008. Following the hearing, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the writ of habeas corpus should issue for McCamey. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that McCamey had been denied a fair trial by impartial jurors; that he was denied the right to be represented by conflict-free counsel; and, that any purported waiver of these rights was invalid.1 The Magistrate Judge has recommended that McCamey receive a new trial within 120 days or be released from custody.

On February 25, 2010, the Respondents filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. The Respondents, however, have not identified any new law or additional arguments which have not already been thoroughly considered by the Magistrate Judge. The basis of the Respondents' objections are that McCamey's attorney was not functioning under an "actual conflict of interest" but, rather, there was only a potential conflict.

This issue was comprehensively addressed in the Report and Recommendation and the Judge found that the attorney suffered under three separate but related conflicts of interest. See Report and Recommendation, pp. 63-69 (Jan. 22, 2010) (identifying the conflicts and discussing the ramifications). The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's findings regarding the existence of actual conflicts of interest. These conflicts rendered McCamey's waiver of rights—right to a fair trial and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim invalid. The court can find no reasonable factual or legal support for the Respondents' "potential conflict" position.

Accordingly, the court finds that the Respondents' arguments are not well-taken and that the Objections should be overruled. The court approves and adopts the Report and Recommendation as its opinion.

THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that

(1) Respondents' Objections to the Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are OVERRULED;

(2) the Report and Recommendation (docket entry 26) is APPROVED and ADOPTED as the opinion of this court;

(3) the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED conditionally;

(4) the conviction of Billy McCamey for possession of precursors is VACATED;

(5) the State of Mississippi must commence a new trial of the Petitioner within 120 days of the date of this final judgment; and

(6) under Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure the court must determine whether McCamey's release, either on bond or personal recognizance is appropriate; the matter is REFERRED to the Magistrate Judge for further determination regarding release.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

JERRY A. DAVIS, United States Magistrate Judge.

Billy McCamey and Charles Hodnett were arrested around in the early morning hours on July 6, 2002, in the parking lot of the Columbus, Mississippi, Wal-Mart and charged with possession of methamphetamine precursors knowing that they were to be used to unlawfully manufacture the drug. Billy McCamey was convicted on that charge in a second trial in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Mississippi. He was represented by Donna Smith, a public defender. His first trial had ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. (See Exhibit G to petition, Smith affidavit).

The second trial was held on December 8th and 9th, 2003. During voir dire the trial judge asked if any of the jurors knew Smith. One of the potential jurors, Martha Hinton, made no response to this question. Hinton had not only made a professional negligence claim against Smith, when Smith missed a statute of limitations in a personal injury action, but she had also filed a bar complaint against Smith in Alabama which resulted in an informal admonition.

After the verdict Smith requested a poll of the jury. When Smith heard the name Martha Hinton called, she recognized the name of her former, disgruntled client. Smith claims that prior to that time she was unaware of Hinton's identity and presence on the venire and later on the jury panel. Smith advised the district attorney of the situation. Both went to the presiding judge to report what had happened. The trial judge became very angry and threw Smith out of his chambers, refusing to listen to her attempted explanation. He accused Smith of deliberately allowing Hinton to sit on the jury. Smith now says her former client's physical appearance had changed dramatically.

Within a matter of minutes of this chambers conference the judge went back into court and sentenced McCamey to thirtythree years in prison. The statutory maximum for possession of precursors under § 41-29-313 Miss.Code Ann. is 30 years. Because McCamey had a prior drug conviction his maximum sentence could be doubled up to 60 years.1

Two days later on December 11, 2003, the judge called McCamey back to the courtroom and advised him about the "`problem with the juror.'" He asked McCamey if he wanted a new attorney. There was an exchange between McCamey and the trial judge during what the parties have referred to as a "waiver hearing." The trial judge recessed the proceedings with instructions that McCamey was to be held at the courthouse until he had reached a decision. At some point during that day, Smith had two other lawyers confer with McCamey. After this recess, McCamey indicated that he did not want Smith replaced as his attorney, and he wished to waive his right to raise the "juror issue" and a possible claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. That same day, on the judge's order, his attorney prepared an affidavit waiving McCamey's rights and had McCamey execute the affidavit.

On December 15, 2003, McCamey prepared and signed a motion for a new trial protesting that the waiver was the result of manipulation by his trial counsel. The trial judge denied the motion for a new trial.

With new counsel representing him, McCamey appealed his conviction asserting that he had been denied a fair trial before an impartial jury and that he had not made a valid and knowing waiver of his rights. He also asserted that his Sixth Amendment right to be represented by conflict-free counsel had been violated and that he had not waived his right to conflictfree counsel. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. Its opinion effectively conceded that McCamey had been denied a fair trial by an impartial jury by the presence of his trial attorney's former client on the jury. The Mississippi court, however, found that McCamey had made a valid waiver of his constitutional rights. That court, without any discussion or explanation, found McCamey had also waived his right to conflict-free counsel. The Mississippi Supreme Court denied certiorari and rebuffed McCamey's application for leave to file for post-conviction relief.

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court McCamey asserts two grounds. McCamey argues that the decision of the Mississippi Court of Appeals that he waived his right to a fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors is contrary to clearly established federal law. He also urges this court to find that the Mississippi court's holding that he waived his right to be represented by conflict free counsel is contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States of America.

I. LIMITATIONS ON REVIEW

Because McCamey has fully complied with all procedural requirements of Mississippi and federal habeas law, this court must consider both claims on the merits. This court's power to upset the judgments of the state courts in criminal matters is appropriately very limited. The federal courts address only issues affecting substantial federal constitutional rights. The federal courts do not function as superappellate courts over the states and hold no supervisory authority over those courts. The federal courts may not correct errors of state law unless they also violate the constitutional rights of an accused.2

Even in matters affecting fundamental constitutional rights, the federal courts have a very limited scope of review. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Furthermore, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The bare-bones language of AEDPA gives limited guidance to the courts of the practical confines of the scope of review. The United States Supreme Court in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) construed the statute, explained its meaning and applied it to the facts in that case...

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1 cases
  • Mccamey v. Epps
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • September 27, 2011
    ...failure to develop the factual basis for the claim is attributable to some decision or omission of the petitioner.”2 McCamey v. Epps, 696 F.Supp.2d 667, 681 (N.D.Miss.2010). But Williams is inapposite. The holding in Williams addressed claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in the s......

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