McCann v. State

• Decision Date: 25 March 2014
• Docket Number: No. 01–13–00325–CR.,01–13–00325–CR.
• Citation: 433 S.W.3d 642
• Parties: Michael Channing McCANN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

433 S.W.3d 642

Michael Channing McCANN, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 01–13–00325–CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

March 25, 2014.

Matthew J. DeLuca, Houston, TX, for Appellant.

Devon Anderson, District Attorney, Abbie Miles, Assistant District Attorney, Harris County, Houston, TX, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices KEYES, BLAND, and BROWN.

OPINION

EVELYN V. KEYES, Justice.

The trial court found appellant, Michael Charming McCann, guilty of driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) ¹ and assessed his punishment at three days' confinement in the Harris County Jail and a $1000 fine. In his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that he operated the vehicle while he was intoxicated.

We affirm.

Background

Officer L. Garcia was dispatched to a commercial building on Bay Area Boulevard on July 27, 2012, at approximately 2:00 a.m., based on a report that a man was wandering in front of the building and that the man “wasn't aware of where he was.” Officer Garcia arrived approximately five to ten minutes after being dispatched, and the person who had made the report pointed Garcia in the direction of the man, whom Garcia identified in court as appellant.

Officer Garcia approached appellant and observed that he appeared intoxicated: appellant had slurred speech and could not stand still. Officer Garcia testified that appellant told him he had been drinking with a family member in League City but had left after arguing with his brother. Appellant told Officer Garcia that he got lost after leaving League City and then drove off the road and hit something. Appellant told Officer Garcia that he was trying to get back to his vehicle.

Officer Garcia testified that, at that point, he placed appellant in the back of his patrol car and went in search of appellant's vehicle, but appellant told Garcia that he was unfamiliar with the area and could not remember where he had left it. Officer Garcia and appellant located the vehicle about five minutes later, approximately 300 to 400 yards from where Officer Garcia first encountered appellant. Appellant acknowledged that the vehicle—located in a median in front of an apartment complex—was his. Officer Garcia did not encounter any pedestrians while he searched for the car with appellant.

Officer T. Berry had also been dispatched to the building on Bay Area Boulevard in reference to the accident. When he arrived at the scene, Officer Berry found Officer Garcia and appellant standing next to a maroon Nissan Altima in a grassy median. The front end of the vehicle was up against a tree in the median, and Officer Berry observed that the vehicle's airbags had deployed and that the vehicle's hood was warm—“warmer than the ambient air temperature.” Appellant told Officer Berry that he had been drinking wine at a family member's home, got into an argument with his brother, attempted to drive the vehicle back to his hotel, and got lost. Officer Berry observed that appellant demonstrated signs of intoxication such as “slurred speech, staggered stance, and red, watery eyes.” Appellant also told Officer Berry that “the air bag had hit him pretty hard.”

Officer Berry testified about the area where officers discovered appellant's wrecked vehicle. Officer Berry did not observe any pedestrian traffic in the area, and the vehicular traffic was light. Officer Berry also testified that it was a “very quiet” area of town. There were no bars nearby, and there were no establishments that sold alcohol in the area. Officer Berry stated that the nearest bar was approximately four to five miles from where appellant's vehicle was found crashed and that the only nearby place that sold alcohol—which was between two and two-and-a-half miles away—closed at 10:30 p.m.

A third officer, Officer N. Slight, arrived on the scene of the accident. He noticed that appellant had red, watery eyes, slurred speech, and “the odor of alcohol coming from his breath and person.” Appellant told Officer Slight that he had drunk a margarita and three glasses of wine. Officer Slight administered standard field sobriety tests to appellant. Officer Slight testified that appellant demonstrated six out of six clues of intoxication on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, four out of eight clues of intoxication on the walk-and-turn test, and four out of four clues on the one-leg stand test. Officer Slight reached the conclusion that appellant demonstrated multiple indicators of intoxication and was too impaired to drive safely. He transported appellant to the county jail, where appellant declined to provide a breath sample. At some point during or after the booking process, appellant complained of chest and wrist pain, so the police called for an ambulance.

The trial court found appellant guilty of DWI, and this appeal followed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his DWI conviction.

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (holding that Jackson standard is only standard to use when determining sufficiency of evidence). Our review of “all of the evidence” includes evidence that was properly and improperly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Furthermore, direct and circumstantial evidence are treated equally, and circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor. Id. Circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Id. The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). We may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); see also Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778 (“When the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination.”).

B. Satisfaction of the Corpus Delicti Rule

Appellant argues in part that the State presented no corroborating evidence to support his extrajudicial statement to the police officers at the scene that he had been drinking and had run off the road and hit something, and, thus, the State had failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. Appellant contends that his extrajudicial statement, standing alone, is legally insufficient to establish his guilt.

In Texas law, “ corpus delicti ” means the “harm brought about by the criminal conduct of some person.” Gribble v. State, 808 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The corpus delicti rule requires some corroboration of a confession with evidence of a harm brought about by the criminal conduct of some person. Gonzales v. State, 190 S.W.3d 125, 130–31 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref'd) (citing Gribble, 808 S.W.2d at 70); see Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex.Crim.App.2002). The purpose of the corroboration requirement is to ensure that a person confessing to a crime is not convicted without independent evidence that the crime actually occurred. Salazar, 86 S.W.3d at 644–45. Therefore, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied if some evidence exists outside of the extrajudicial confession which, considered alone or in connection with the confession, shows that the crime actually occurred. Id. at 645. The corroborating evidence need not prove the underlying offense conclusively; there simply must be some evidence that renders the commission of the offense more probable than it would be without the evidence. Gonzales, 190 S.W.3d at 131 (citing Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)).

The Penal Code provides that a person commits the offense of DWI if he is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (Vernon Supp.2013). Thus, the corpus delicti of DWI is that someone drove or operated a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. Layland v. State, 144 S.W.3d 647, 651 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet.); Zavala v. State, 89 S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (citing Threet v. State, 157 Tex.Crim. 497, 250 S.W.2d 200, 200 (Tex.Crim.App.1952)).

While none of the investigating officers saw appellant driving the vehicle, other evidence corroborated appellant's statement that he had left the place where he had been drinking, got lost, drove off the road, and hit something. See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 522–23 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) (holding that fact finder may draw reasonable inferences from evidence and choose which inference is most reasonable). Police found appellant intoxicated and wandering within 300 to 400 yards of where the crashed vehicle was located. The vehicle was found on a median, crashed into a tree. Appellant acknowledged that the crashed vehicle belonged to him. He complained of chest and wrist pain, which corresponded to his being struck by deploying air bags. Officer Slight testified that the hood of appellant's vehicle was warmer than the ambient air temperature when he arrived at the scene of the accident, indicating that the engine had recently been running, and that appellant demonstrated multiple signs of intoxication. All of the officers testified that there were no other pedestrians in the area. Thus, there was no one else around who could have been the driver of the recently crashed vehicle. And Officer Berry testified that there was no...