McCarthy v. De Armit
| Decision Date | 21 November 1881 |
| Citation | 99 Pa. 63 |
| Parties | McCarthy <I>versus</I> De Armit. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ. PAXSON, J., absent
ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1881, No. 7.
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D. T. Watson and M. Swartzwelder, for the plaintiffs in error.—The mayor, acting as such, is a quasi judicial officer, who is not responsible in a civil action for his errors of judgment, and if the arrest was ordered by him with the honest belief on his part that De Armit was concerned in the commission of the felony, he would not be liable in this action. To maintain an action against the mayor in such a case the plaintiff must prove malice.
The proof in this case did fully establish the commission of a felony, and, taking into consideration all the surroundings, the mayor had reasonable ground to suspect or believe that De Armit was engaged in firing upon and killing some of the Philadelphia troops, and was justified in making the arrest on such well founded suspicion, without a warrant previously issued. The mayor was vested by Act of May, 1857, with all the powers and authority possessed by aldermen and justices of the peace, so far as regards the detection and punishment of felonies and misdemeanors, and to that extent was acting as judge.
Our third point, that probable cause does not depend on the actual state of the case in point of fact, but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the mayor at the time of the arrest, should have been affirmed: Smith v. Ege, 2 P. F. Smith 421. The Court erred in their instructions as to damages: Little Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Richards, 7 P. F. Smith 142.
West McMurray, and S. Schoyer, Jr., for the defendant in error.
Prosecutions are presumed to have been properly instituted; and hence, to sustain an action for malicious prosecution, malice and want of probable cause must both concur and be proved by the plaintiff: Walter v. Sample, 1 Cas. 275; Dietz v. Langfitt, 13 P. F. S. 234.
Probable cause does not depend on the state of the case in point of fact, but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party prosecuting. Among the numerous attempts to define it are, "A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant a cautious man in believing that the party is guilty of the offence;" and, "A deceptive appearance of guilt arising from facts and circumstances misapprehended, or misunderstood, so far as to produce belief." The substance of all the definitions is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Representations of others may be an adequate foundation for it, especially if made by those who have had opportunities for knowledge, or who have made investigation: Smith v. Ege, 2 P. F. S. 419. He who has probable cause, or in other words, reasonable grounds for belief of guilt, stands acquitted of liability: Travis v. Smith, 1 Barr, 234. This question must be judged by the circumstances existing at the time of the arrest for the offence charged; and it is immaterial that the prosecutor subsequently learned his mistake: Swain v. Stafford, 4 Ired. 392. The belief must be that of a reasonable and prudent man, else the most baseless prosecutions would be safe. But some allowance will be made where the prosecutor is so personally injured by the offence that he could not likely draw his conclusions with the same impartiality and absence of prejudice that a person entirely disinterested would deliberately do. And all that can be required of him is that he shall act as a reasonable and prudent man would be likely to act under like circumstances: Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 182. In Fisher v. Forrester, 9 Cas. 501, WOODWARD, J., said of the defendant who had commenced a prosecution which failed, doubtless he was greatly excited and not wholly without cause; and it is not strange that he was mistaken, in some particulars, in recounting the events of the moment. And he was not condemned for his mistakes.
What facts and circumstances amount to probable cause is a question of law. Whether they exist in any particular case is a question of fact. Where the facts are in controversy the subject must be submitted to the jury, in which event it is the duty of the court to instruct them what facts will constitute probable cause, and submit to them only the question of such facts. This principle is well settled. If all the evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause the court shall so instruct the jury, for they are not at liberty to find a fact without evidence; and if the admitted facts amount to probable cause, the court should direct a verdict for the defendant, even if his malice were clearly proved.
Malice in law exists where an act is done wrongfully and designedly by one person to the injury of another. Prosecutions may be instituted and pursued with pure motives, but so regardless of the forms of law and judicial proceedings as to render the transactions illegal and malicious: Page v. Cushing, 38 Me. 523. Yet something more than mere legal or theoretical malice is requisite to sustain an action for malicious prosecution, for it must be proved as a fact. It may be inferred from the want of probable cause, and generally is, but its existence is a fact for the jury. Where it is a just and proper inference from all the facts and circumstances of the case, upon all the evidence in the cause, that the defendant was not actuated by any improper motives, but only form an honest desire to bring a supposed offender to justice, the action will not lie, because such facts and circumstances disprove that which is of the essence of the action, namely, the malice of the defendant in pressing the charge: Vanderbilt v. Mathis, 5 Duer 304. When the prosecutor submits the facts to an attorney at law, who advises they are sufficient, and he acts thereon in good faith, such advice is often called probable cause and is a defence to an action for malicious prosecution; but in strictness, the taking of the advice of counsel and acting thereon rebuts the inference of malice arising from the want of probable cause. The law favors honest efforts to bring the guilty to justice, and where a citizen proceeds by complaint before a magistrate, though the prosecution be unwarranted in fact, if his motives were pure he will be protected.
The foregoing principles have been brought into view because most of them apply in the pending case. This action is against the mayor and his officers for false imprisonment, and in some respects it is by no means analogous to an action for malicious prosecution. In that the presumption is that the defendant is not guilty. In this, the act in itself is wrongful, and the burden is upon the defendants to prove that the imprisonment was by authority of law. The question of probable cause in trespass for false imprisonment is one of law, and upon principle there is no ground for diversity on this point. It was so treated in Burns v. Erben, 40 N. Y. (Hand) 463, and in Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316; and is sustained by the weight of authority in this country and in England.
The fact of felony, and reason for suspecting a particular person, justify his arrest by a private person. But a peace officer, who arrests one upon reasonable suspicion of felony, will be excused, even though it appear afterwards that in fact no felony had been committed. It may be expected that a felon will flee from justice, if an opportunity is afforded him, and that if he knows he is suspected he will do what may be in his power to obliterate the evidences of his crime. In these circumstances are found forcible reasons for prompt action in his arrest. The public safety, and due apprehension of criminals charged with heinous crimes, imperiously require that such arrests should be made without warrant by officers of the law. "Many...
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