McCarthy v. Bronson

• Decision Date: 22 June 1990
• Docket Number: D,No. 651,651
• Citation: 906 F.2d 835
• Parties: John J. McCARTHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George BRONSON, Warden, Lt. Steve T. Ozier, Officer Paul Lusa, and Officer Michiewicz, Individually and in their official capacities as Officers of the Connecticut Department of Correction, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 89-2389.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 835

906 F.2d 835

16 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1361

John J. McCARTHY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George BRONSON, Warden, Lt. Steve T. Ozier, Officer Paul Lusa, and Officer Michiewicz, Individually and in their official capacities as Officers of the Connecticut Department of Correction, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 651, Docket 89-2389.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Submitted March 1, 1990.

Decided June 22, 1990.

John J. McCarthy, Leavenworth, Kan., pro se.

Clarine Nardi Riddle, Atty. Gen., Steven R. Strom, Asst. Atty. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendants-appellees.

Before OAKES, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

John J. McCarthy, a state prisoner, appeals pro se from the June 19, 1989, judgment of the District Court for the District of Connecticut (Jose A. Cabranes, Judge) in favor of the defendant state prison officials. McCarthy sued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982), alleging unlawful removal from his cell and use of excessive force. The judgment was entered after a hearing conducted by Magistrate F. Owen Eagan. The case is complicated by some uncertainty as to the authority of the Magistrate in recommending proposed findings to the District Judge and the authority of the District Judge in approving those recommended findings. The appeal challenges procedural irregularities concerning the reference to the Magistrate, the lack of a jury trial, the denial of a free copy of a hearing transcript, and the merits of the fact-finding. We affirm.

Before setting forth the procedural facts, it will be helpful to outline pertinent provisions of the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 631-39 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Four types of reference from a district judge to a magistrate are implicated in this case. First, subsection 636(b)(1) permits a judge to designate a magistrate to handle pretrial matters, with the Magistrate authorized by subsection 636(b)(1)(A) to rule on most pretrial motions and authorized by subsection 636(b)(1)(B) to recommend rulings on motions excepted from subsection 636(b)(1)(A). Second, subsection 636(b)(1)(B) also permits a judge to designate a magistrate "to conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the court ... of prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement." Third, subsection 636(b)(2) permits a judge to designate a magistrate "to serve as a special master pursuant to the applicable provisions of [Title 28] and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." This subsection also permits a judge to designate a magistrate to serve as a special master in any civil case, upon consent of the parties, without regard to Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b), which limits use of a master to exceptional cases. Fourth, subsection 636(c) permits a magistrate, upon consent of the parties, to try any civil case and render a judgment.

Background

Plaintiff's original complaint, filed in April, 1983, alleged that various officials at the Connecticut Correctional Institution at Somers had ordered or carried out his forcible removal from his prison cell by means of tear gas and excessive force, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint named only Warden Robinson as a defendant and made no demand for a jury trial. Shortly after the complaint was filed, Judge Cabranes referred the case to Magistrate Eagan for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(A), a reference that was soon broadened. On February 28, 1985, in open court the plaintiff and defendant's counsel executed a standard consent form, agreeing to have the case tried by a magistrate, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c), and electing to take any appeal from the magistrate's judgment to the district judge, pursuant to Sec. 636(c)(4). At that time, the Magistrate explained to McCarthy that the trial would be held by the Magistrate at Somers Prison without a jury. McCarthy did not object. Conducting non-jury trials at the prison frequently benefits a prisoner-claimant, since witnesses and documents, needed unexpectedly, are more accessible. On March 5, 1985, Judge Cabranes entered an order referring the case to Magistrate Eagan "for all further proceedings and the entry of judgment in accordance with Title 28, Sec. 636(c)."

On April 12, 1985, McCarthy filed an amended complaint. This complaint added several defendants but did not alter the substantive allegations. It made no jury demand. On July 2, 1985, he filed a second amended complaint, again adding parties but not altering his substantive allegations. This complaint contained a jury demand. Defendants filed their answer to the second amended complaint on August 26, 1985. No answer had been filed to the prior complaints.

On October 23, 1986, defendants filed papers opposing plaintiff's jury demand, contending, among other things, that McCarthy had agreed to a non-jury trial before the Magistrate on February 28, 1985. On December 22, 1986, Judge Cabranes ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial; he relied on the absence of a timely jury demand, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), (d), and noted that the right to a jury trial, once waived, is not revived by an amended complaint that raises no new issues, see Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1310-11 (2d Cir.1973) (in banc). On October 22, 1987, McCarthy moved for a jury trial; the Magistrate recommended denial based on the District Judge's 1986 ruling, and Judge Cabranes adopted this recommendation on January 29, 1988.

On March 24, 1988, plaintiff appeared before the Magistrate for a bench trial at Somers Prison. At the start of the trial, the Magistrate sought a second written consent to proceed under subsection 636(c), even though a first consent had been executed on February 28, 1985. McCarthy refused. Apparently, the Magistrate construed McCarthy's refusal to sign the second consent form as a motion to withdraw the original consent and granted the motion. Magistrate Eagan then conducted an eight-day trial at the conclusion of which he issued a decision entitled "Recommended Findings of Fact and Memorandum of Decision." He recommended detailed findings of fact and ultimate conclusions that excessive force had not been used and that no unlawful action had occurred. When the matter reached the District Court, Judge Cabranes accepted the recommended findings and ordered judgment for the defendants. His endorsement of the Magistrate's proposed findings reflected the Judge's understanding that the matter had been referred under subsection 636(b)(1), i.e., referred for recommended findings. However, in ruling on post-judgment motions, Judge Cabranes amended the citation to subsection 636(b)(1) and stated that after allowing the plaintiff to withdraw his consent, Magistrate Eagan had "essentially act[ed] as a special master pursuant to his powers under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(2) and Rule 1(C)(5) of the Local Rules." Judge Cabranes then adopted the Magistrate's recommended findings, acting under Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(e)(2), which requires a district judge to accept a special master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. Finally, the District Judge added, "Even upon a de novo determination I would reach the same conclusions as the Magistrate." All motions for post-judgment relief were denied.

Discussion

The tangled sequence of events has created some problems, but none that impairs the validity of the judgment rejecting plaintiff's claims on their merits.

1. The Authority of the Magistrate. The parties' February 28, 1985, consent to have the matter tried by the Magistrate pursuant to subsection 636(c) was entirely valid. Once given, that consent may be withdrawn on the Court's own motion "for good cause shown" or on request of a party who shows "extraordinary circumstances" warranting such relief. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c)(6); see Fellman v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 735 F.2d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir.1984). No such circumstances existed in this case. The Magistrate therefore could have proceeded under the original 636(c) reference, made findings, and entered judgment. However, he elected not to do so, preferring instead to permit McCarthy to withdraw consent to the 636(c) reference.

Having vacated the 636(c) reference, the Magistrate then used the authority of subsection 636(b)(1)(B) to conduct a hearing and recommend proposed findings of fact concerning "prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement." Whether he acted permissibly is our initial inquiry. The matter had originally been referred to the Magistrate for pretrial purposes, under the authority of subsections 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Arguably, vacating the 636(c) reference left the Magistrate with only the pretrial assignment he had originally been given, but we do not think he was required to take such a narrow view of his authority. With complete propriety, he could have declined to vacate the 636(c) consent and adjudicated the merits definitively. He was surely entitled to take the lesser step of hearing the evidence and submitting recommended findings to the District Judge. The parties' consent is not required for using that procedure, and it is obvious, from the District Judge's subsequent approval of the Magistrate's findings, that the Judge welcomed the Magistrate's help. It would be a needless ritual now to require the District Judge formally to refer the matter under the "prisoner petition" clause of subsection 636(b)(1)(B). The Judge's adoption of the recommended findings demonstrates that the Magistrate was acting entirely in conformity with authority the Judge wished him to exercise.

A more substantial question is whether McCarthy's lawsuit is a petition "challenging the conditions of confinement" within the meaning of subsection 636(b)(1)(B). Subsection 636(b)(1)(B) was added in 1976 as part of a broadening of the authority of magistrates. Act of Oct. 21, 1976, ...