McCarthy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd.

Decision Date07 February 1961
PartiesHelen E. McCARTHY v. CONTRIBUTORY RETIREMENT APPEAL BOARD.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Edward U. Lee, Boston, for petitioner.

Herbert E. Tucker, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WHITTEMORE, KIRK and SPIEGEL, JJ.

SPALDING, Justice.

This is a petition under G.L. c. 30A, § 14 (the State administrative procedure act), inserted by St.1954, c. 681, § 1, to review a decision of the contributory retirement appeal board (hereinafter called appeal board) established under G.L. c. 32, § 16(4), as appearing in St.1945, c. 658, § 1.

Paul A. McCarthy, the petitioner's late husband and a member of the State contributory retirement system, 'on August 8, 1951, was and for some years had been a Representative in the General Court from the Somerville District.' '[O]n August 8, 1951, while he was speaking on some vital bill * * * in the performance of his duties, he collapsed and fell to the floor as a result of a cerebral spasm or accident.' He had been afflicted with hypertension 'for some years prior to August 8, 1951.' Thereafter he was in and out of hospitals and received treatment from time to time. He died from chronic depressive heart disease in April, 1955, after having been confined to his bed 'for some time.' The foregoing facts were found by the appeal board and are not in dispute.

The question at the hearing before the appeal board was whether the incident on August 8, 1951, was the proximate cause of McCarthy's death. The evidence, discussed below, was conflicting, but the appeal board found that McCarthy 'did not die as the natural and proximate result of a personal injury sustained at a definite time and at a definite place as required by G.L. c. 32, § 9.' It accordingly held that his widow, the petitioner, was not entitled to the death benefits under that section, thus affirming the action of the State board of retirement denying the petitioner's application. On petition for review under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, the judge ruled that '[u]pon a consideration of the entire record * * * the decision of the appeal board is unwarranted by facts found by the court on the record as submitted' and found that the death was within the terms of § 9. 1 The decision of the appeal board was set aside and a decree was entered adjudging that the petitioner was entitled to the benefits provided by § 9. The board appealed. G.L. c. 30A, § 15.

The material portions of G.L. c. 32, § 9(1), are: 'If the board, upon receipt of proper proof, finds that any member [of the contributory retirement system] in service died as the natural and proximate result of a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, his duties at some definite place and at some definite time * * * without serious and wilful misconduct on his part, the payments and allowances hereinafter referred to * * * shall be granted to his beneficiary or beneficiaries * * *.' It has been held that a death under facts somewhat similar to those in the case at bar can be found to be within the terms of § 9. Baruffaldi v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 337 Mass. 495, 150 N.E.2d 269.

In a judicial review under § 14 a decision of an administrative agency can be set aside on any of the grounds set forth in subsection (8), but the only ground here pertinent is (e). Thus, our inquiry is whether the decision of the appeal board was '[u]nsupported by substantial evidence.' 'Substantial evidence' is defined in § 1(6) as 'such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' 2

The evidence supporting the decision of the appeal board was essentially this. One Dr. Skvirsky, who had examined McCarthy after his collapse on August 8, 1951, testified that McCarthy 'had had hypertension for a number of years'; that 'it might have been inevitable that he was doomed to have a cerebral hemorrhage if his blood pressure was as high as 230 over 130 at any one time'; that his hypertension was organic, not emotional; and that he did not have much stress and strain in connection with his service in the House of Representatives. Dr. Skvirsky expressed the opinion that, on the basis of McCarthy's history of sixteen years of hypertension prior to his death, the debate in the House which brought about this cerebral spasm or accident was not an accident which brought about his ultimate death. A letter from a Dr. Sprague, who had examined the McCarthy file, was introduced. It stated, in part, 'I do not consider it a reasonable assumption to consider that service in the Legislature is a hazardous undertaking, particularly to an individual engaged in legislative work for seventeen years. * * * It is my opinion that the medical progress of this case was entirely consistent with the natural progress of his disease and with the unpredictable nature of attacks of heart failure and death in hypertensive coronary artery disease.'

The petitioner contends that the effect of Dr. Skvirsky's testimony was destroyed because he admitted that he had told McCarthy to quit his job. The appeal board, however, need not have inferred that McCarthy's death was caused by the cerebral accident on the House floor, merely because a doctor had advised him to retire. 3

There was, to be sure, evidence tending to show...

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    • United States
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    ...facts. Martin v. Director of the Div. of Employment Security, 347 Mass. 264, 197 N.E.2d 594 (1964). McCarthy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 342 Mass. 45, 172 N.E.2d 120 (1961). There must, however, be substantial evidence in the record to support the findings of the board. While the......
  • Murphy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd. , SJC–11045.
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    ...§ 14, is that of the appeal board, not that of the State, county, or local retirement board. 8 See McCarthy v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 342 Mass. 45, 47, 48, 172 N.E.2d 120 (1961). No purpose is served by a remand to a retirement board. 9 The remand for the crucial but missing fi......
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