McCarthy v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 2021
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1892
• Citation: 176 N.E.3d 562
• Parties: Jameson D. MCCARTHY, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

176 N.E.3d 562

Jameson D. MCCARTHY, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-CR-1892

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED September 1, 2021

Attorney for Appellant: John B. Norris, Franklin, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Megan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana

Bradford, Chief Judge.

Case Summary

[1] On June 22, 2017, Jameson McCarthy is alleged to have robbed a Discount Tobacco Store in Johnson County, beating the store clerk in the process, among other things. Due to injuries that McCarthy sustained during his apprehension, he was transported to Eskenazi Hospital in Marion County by an officer from the Greenwood Police Department ("GPD"). While at Eskenazi, an Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") officer took McCarthy into custody due to an active warrant out of Marion County. The following day, Johnson County charged McCarthy with Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, Level 3 felony armed robbery, Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. The trial court also issued a warrant for McCarthy's arrest. The Johnson County warrant was served on McCarthy on December 14, 2018. Following multiple continuances granted to McCarthy and one granted to the State, McCarthy filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court held a hearing on McCarthy's motion for discharge on September 3, 2020, and denied the motion five days later.

[2] McCarthy filed a motion for certification of interlocutory appeal, which was granted. McCarthy argues on appeal that his right to a speedy trial was violated because he claims his arrest and charge occurred in the Johnson County case in June 2017, beginning the one-year timeline in which Johnson County was required to bring him to trial and that his rights had been violated due to the delay between his arrest, charging, and trial. Because we believe that McCarthy is partially responsible for the delay in his trial and that his speedy trial rights were not violated, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On June 22, 2017, it is alleged that McCarthy robbed a Discount Tobacco Store in Johnson County, beat a store clerk, and stole a customer's vehicle. McCarthy was apprehended by GPD officers shortly after the alleged crimes and, because of the injuries McCarthy sustained during his apprehension, he was transported from Johnson County to Eskenazi accompanied by an officer from the GPD. While at the hospital, McCarthy was taken into custody and arrested by an IMPD officer for an active warrant out of Marion County. The following day, Johnson County charged McCarthy with Level 2 felony robbery resulting in serious bodily injury, Level 3 felony armed robbery, Level 3 felony criminal confinement, Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement. The trial court also issued a warrant for McCarthy's arrest. On August 1, 2017, McCarthy's private counsel entered an appearance in the Johnson County case. That attorney filed a motion to withdraw on October 15, 2018, indicating on record that McCarthy's last known location was the Marion County Jail.

[4] The Johnson County warrant was not served on McCarthy until December 14, 2018. On December 17, 2018, McCarthy requested, and was granted, a continuance. At the initial hearing on February 14, 2019, McCarthy requested a speedy trial and that he be allowed to proceed pro se. The trial court held a pre-trial conference on March 14, 2019, where McCarthy requested that the trial date be continued. The trial court held a pre-trial conference on June 24, 2019, where McCarthy requested that he be appointed counsel and that the trial be continued, which requests were granted. At a pre-trial conference on August 1, 2019, McCarthy requested the trial date be continued. At a pre-trial conference on October 28, 2019, McCarthy requested the trial date be continued, the State objected to the continuance, and the trial court denied the continuance and set an additional pre-trial conference. On December 5, 2019, McCarthy's appointed counsel withdrew from the case due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and McCarthy moved to continue pro se. On March 16, 2020, McCarthy requested the trial be continued again.

[5] On July 27, 2020, with a trial date set for September 22, 2020, McCarthy filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court held a hearing on McCarthy's motion for discharge on September 3, 2020, denying the motion on September 8, 2020. Three days later, McCarthy filed a motion for certification of interlocutory appeal, which was granted.

Discussion and Decision

I. Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C)

[6] When reviewing claims under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C), "we review factual findings for clear error and questions of law de novo." Watson v. State , 155 N.E.3d 608, 614 (Ind. 2020) (citing Austin v. State , 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1040 n.10 (Ind. 2013) ). Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) states, in pertinent part,

No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was not sufficient time to try him during such period because of congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this rule. [....] Any defendant so held shall, on motion, be discharged.

"The rule places an affirmative duty on the State to bring a defendant to trial within one year of being charged or arrested but allows for extensions of that time for various reasons." Cook v. State , 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). " Rule 4(C) is triggered automatically at the beginning of a criminal prosecution: the one-year clock runs from the later of charges being filed or arrest." Watson , 155 N.E.3d at 616 (emphasis omitted).

[7] McCarthy argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discharge because his right to a speedy trial was violated due to the initial delays in beginning the prosecution of his case and delays subsequent to Johnson County beginning proceedings. Specifically, McCarthy asserts that because

1) the State's filing of charges against McCarthy in Johnson County following his arrest happened to occur the same day IMPD executed the outstanding Marion County arrest warrant, and 2) the State of Indiana had specific knowledge of McCarthy's whereabouts at all relevant times because of the information it provided to the trial court in its sworn PCA, thus compelling it to bring McCarthy to trial.

Appellant's Br. p. 15.

[8] McCarthy has not satisfied us that Johnson County was under an obligation to bring McCarthy to trial until he had been transferred from Marion County. In State ex rel. Johnson v. Kohlmeyer , the Indiana Supreme Court determined that Johnson was not entitled to Rule 4 discharge in a Marion County case after having spent six months incarcerated in Johnson County while the Marion County case was pending. 261 Ind. 244, 301 N.E.2d 518 (1973), aff'd on reh'g , 261 Ind. 244, 303 N.E.2d 661 (1973). On rehearing, the Indiana Supreme Court stated:

The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that where a person is charged with more than one crime he cannot be tried for all at the same time. His rights to a speedy trial must be considered with regard to the practical administration of justice. Beavers v. Haubert (1905), 198 U.S. 77, 86, 25 S.Ct. 573, 49 L.Ed. 950, 954.

The authorities of Johnson County were entitled to carry out their duties pursuant to the warrant issued in that county before surrendering the relator to Marion County.

Id. at 247, 303 N.E.2d at 663.

[9] While another panel of this court in Rust v. State determined that a Marion County court had surpassed the 4(C) speedy trial limit while Rust was incarcerated in Hancock County, this case is distinguishable. 792 N.E.2d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In Rust , the defendant was arrested and charged in Hancock County, released on bond, arrested and charged in Marion County, appeared for an initial hearing in the Marion County case, then failed to appear for subsequent hearings in both counties before being arrested by Hancock County and incarcerated there for the remainder of his prosecution by Hancock County, which took almost a full year. Id. at 617. The Rust court held that Rust's motion for discharge should have been granted because the Marion County court had already commenced proceedings with Rust at the initial hearing and because Rust had notified¹ the Marion County court of his presence in Hancock County via a notice of surrender, so the 4(C) speedy trial clock had been running during his incarceration in Hancock County. Id. at 619–20. Here, when McCarthy was taken to the Marion County jail, he had not been charged in Johnson County or appeared in person before the Johnson County court, so proceedings had not commenced as they had in Rust . Because McCarthy's case was not already underway, we see no reason to stray from the precedent set by the Indiana Supreme Court in Kohlmeyer , i.e. , that the 4(C) clock did not begin until McCarthy was transferred to Johnson County.²

II. Speedy Trial Right

[10] Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana...