McCarty v. Green-Smith
| Decision Date | 01 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:19-CV-43 JD |
| Parties | BELINDA MCCARTY, Plaintiff, v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY THE TRUSTEES OF, MARY KATHRYN GREEN-SMITH, RICK RODRIGUEZ, JULIE KERCHER-UPDIKE, GERRY MCCARTNEY, GARY DESAI, DAN RHINE, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This is an employment discrimination case arising out of Plaintiff Belinda McCarty's employment with and termination from Purdue University. Ms. McCarty has sued the Trustees of Purdue University (“Purdue”), and her former superiors, Mary Kathryn Green-Smith, Rick Rodriguez, Julie Kercher-Updike, Gerry McCartney, Gary Desai, and Dan Rhine (“Individual Defendants”), in their individual capacities (collectively “Defendants”). Ms McCarty alleges that Purdue violated Title VII and the Indiana Minimum Wage Statute and that the Defendants violated the Equal Pay Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. [DE 19]. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 45], Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 50], and Defendants' Motion to Strike Inadmissible Evidence [DE 60]. Each motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.
Ms. McCarty began working in the IT department at Purdue in November 2006. [DE 522 at 7]. She maintained the title of “Learning Spaces Initiatives Manager” from the time she was hired until early 2019 when her title changed to Process Manager. As Learning Spaces Initiatives Manager from 2006 through mid-2010, Ms. McCarty's role included managing a computer laptop program for students, managing the print quota program for students, staff, faculty, and departments at the West Lafayette Purdue campus. In mid-2010, she began managing Purdue's software licensing for Microsoft and effectively became a software licensing administrator. In early 2011, she began managing Purdue's licenses with Adobe and Endnote, and eventually took on additional software licensing products. Id. at 10-13.
Jim Myers[1] began working at Purdue in November 1997. [DE 52-4 at 5]. Between 1997 to 2005, he worked as a site operator managing multiple computer labs. In 2005, he was promoted to operator supervisor for computer labs and was promoted again in 2010 to manager for student lab employees. In December 2012, Mr. Myers started working as a software licensing administrator, working alongside Ms. McCarty. Id. at 5- 6, 22. It is undisputed that Ms. McCarty and Mr. Myers worked together for just over six years, reported to the same supervisors between 2012 and 2019, performed the same job, and that their salaries during that time were as follows:
Salaries
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Myers
$56, 998
$58, 138
$60, 027
$63, 028
$64, 919
$66, 542
$68, 705
$71, 453
McCarty
$55, 022
$55, 022
$55, 022
$55, 022
$55, 847
$55, 847
$55, 847
$55, 847
[DE 52-6 at 2].
Julie Kercher-Updike was the Associate Vice President of Customer Relations in Information Technology (“ITaP”) during Ms. McCarty's tenure at Purdue for the time period in question. Id. In this role, she had the ultimate decision-making authority regarding merit raises given to approximately 125 employees, including Ms. McCarty and Mr. Myers. Id. Beginning in 2013, the salary disparity between Ms. McCarty and Mr. Myers began to grow due to differences in how Mr. Myers and Ms. McCarty were ranked in the ITaP Customer Relations ranking system, which Ms. Kercher-Updike created and oversaw. Id. at 3. In this merit-based system, Ms. Kercher-Updike, in consultation with her direct reports, ranked the approximately 125 ITaP Customer Relations employees in order of their performance from highest to lowest. If any employee ranked in the bottom 10% in any given year, they did not receive a merit pay increase. Ms. McCarty ranked in the bottom 10% in 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, and 2019, and therefore did not receive merit raises in any of those years. Mr. Myers never ranked in the bottom 10% and therefore received a merit raise each year and ranked in the top 25% in 2013, 2014 and 2019. Id. The only year that Ms. McCarty did not rank in the bottom 10% was 2016, and she received a merit raise that year. The difference in the size of Ms. McCarty's and Mr. Myers' 2016 merit raise-1.5% of base and 3% of base, respectively-was directly attributable to merit rankings. Mr. Myers' performance rating in 2016 was 3.8 out of 5.0 and Ms. McCarty's was 2.5 out of 5.0. Id. at 4.
In the review period between March 2012 through February 2013, Ms. McCarty's overall performance was noted as “Does Not Meet Expectations.” [DE 52-2 at 35; 52-3 at 14]. Throughout her time at Purdue, Ms. McCarty was placed on two “Performance Improvement Plans” (“PIP”). The first PIP was initiated by Bryon Reed and began on July 12, 2013 and was extended through November 22, 2013. The second PIP was initiated in 2018 by her then-supervisor Dan Rhine, before her supervisor changed to Kate Green-Smith. [DE 52-2 at 25-26, 33]. In September 2018, Ms. Green-Smith met with her and outlined Ms. McCarty's ongoing deficiencies in her performance and behavior. Ms. Green-Smith wrote a summary of the deficiencies discussed, which Ms. McCarty signed. [DE 55-6 at 5]. Ms. McCarty and Ms. GreenSmith met again for a performance review, which was also outlined in a letter to Ms. McCarty dated November 2, 20218. [DE 52-3 at 2]. The November 2 letter advised McCarty that this was her final warning and failure to improve performance within 30 days would result in her termination from employment. [DE 52-7 at 18]. According to Ms. Green-Smith, she did not see any significant improvement in Ms. McCarty's performance after this review. Id. at 3. Ms. Green-Smith discussed terminating Ms. McCarty with her supervisor, Rick Rodriguez. Id. Mr. Rodriguez consulted his boss, Ms. Kercher-Updike, who concurred with their decision that Ms. McCarty should be terminated for poor performance after having been given several chances over many years to improve. [DE 52-6 at 4]. Ms. Green-Smith terminated Ms. McCarty on February 6, 2019.[2] The termination letter cites “continued poor performance[, ] [d]espite repeated feedback and performance coaching” resulting in “loss of operational credibility and negative customer impact” as the reason for her termination. [DE 55-6 at 23]. On April 26, 2019, Ms. McCarty filed this action and amended her complaint in October 2019. [DE 19].
On summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). That means that the Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, making every legitimate inference and resolving every doubt in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is not a tool to decide legitimately contested issues, and it may not be granted unless no reasonable jury could decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying” the evidence which “demonstrate[s] the absence of [a] genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323. Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988). The disputed facts must be material, which means that they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Brown v. City of Lafayette, 2010 WL 1570805, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010). “If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party.” Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996). Finally, in a case involving cross-motions for summary judgment, each party receives the benefit of all reasonable inferences when considering the opposing party's motion. Tegtmeier v. Midwest Operating Eng'rs Pension Tr. Fund, 390 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2004).
Ms. McCarty's Amended Complaint alleges that the Defendants violated her rights under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”) when they paid her less money than a male counterpart, Mr. Myers, doing substantially equal work under similar working conditions. Both parties move for summary judgment on this claim. The EPA prohibits employers from paying employees different wages based on gender. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516 F.3d 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2008). To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the EPA, a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “(1) higher wages were paid to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring substantially similar skill, effort and responsibilities, and (3) the work was performed under similar working conditions.” Id. No proof of discriminatory intent is required. Id.; Cullen v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 338 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2003).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish one of four statutory defenses, “which kick in if the...
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