McCarty v. Herdman, No. 82-3216

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before KENNEDY, MARTIN and WELLFORD; BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr.; WELLFORD
• Citation: 716 F.2d 361
• Parties: Richard McCARTY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Captain HERDMAN, Respondent-Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 82-3216
• Decision Date: 06 September 1983

Page 361

716 F.2d 361 Richard McCARTY, Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
Captain HERDMAN, Respondent-Appellee. No. 82-3216. United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit. Argued March 31, 1983.
Decided Sept. 6, 1983.

Page 362

R. Williams Meeks (argued), Columbus, Ohio, for petitioner-appellant.

James Kirk (argued), Franklin County Prosecutor, Columbus, Ohio, for respondent-appellee.

Before KENNEDY, MARTIN and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr., Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents the sole issue of whether law enforcement officers must give "Miranda warnings" to individuals in custody for misdemeanor traffic offenses. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

Richard McCarty appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. The petitioner was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs in violation of Ohio Revised Code Sec. 4511.19, a first degree misdemeanor. Evidence supporting his conviction included incriminating statements which he tried unsuccessfully to suppress. He was sentenced to ninety days in jail, eighty of which were suspended. The Franklin County, Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the Ohio Supreme Court refused to accept jurisdiction in this matter. The district court below denied habeas relief because in its judgment, one arrested for a misdemeanor traffic offense is not constitutionally entitled to Miranda warnings. See, e.g., Clay v. Riddle, 542 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1976); and Ohio v. Pyle, 19 Ohio St.2d 64, 249 N.E.2d 826 (1969). McCarty appeals from that decision.

The state trooper's arrest report and the parties' stipulations comprised all the facts before the trial judge. Ohio State Trooper Williams observed McCarty's car weaving in and out of its lane while travelling south on Interstate 270 on the evening of March 31, 1980. Trooper Williams stopped the car and asked McCarty to get out. He noticed that McCarty needed support to keep from falling as he exited the vehicle. "At this time Trooper Williams concluded that the defendant would be charged with a traffic offense and, therefore, his freedom to leave the scene terminated." ¹ (Joint stipulation.)

McCarty had difficulty performing the field sobriety balancing test. While still at the scene of the arrest, he told Trooper Williams that he had recently consumed two beers and several joints of marijuana. McCarty's speech was very slurred and Trooper Williams had difficulty understanding him.

Trooper Williams placed McCarty under formal arrest and took him to the county

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jail for an intoxilyzer test. The test showed no alcohol in McCarty's system. At the jail, McCarty answered Trooper Williams' questions for the State Highway Patrol Alcohol Influence Report. McCarty responded that he was "barely" under the influence of alcohol. At Trooper Williams' request, McCarty wrote on the report that the marijuana he had smoked had not been treated with "PCP" or "angel dust." At no time, either before or after McCarty was taken into custody, did Trooper Williams advise him of his constitutional rights.

Before the trial judge, McCarty moved to exclude his statements to Trooper Williams. His motion was denied. He pleaded nolo contendere and was found guilty of driving while intoxicated.

McCarty argued consistently, at both state and federal levels ² that Miranda v. Arizona requires law enforcement officers to advise all persons taken into custody of their constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. Because he was not so advised when arrested for drunken driving, he maintains that the statements he made while in police custody cannot support his conviction. We agree.

In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that an individual in police custody may not be interrogated until and unless he is first advised that he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says may be used against him; that he had the right to an attorney; and that an attorney will be appointed for him if he cannot retain one. These warnings are an "absolute prerequisite to interrogation," said the court, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. 1624, and without the warnings, the fruits of a custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial.

To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege.... But unless and until such warnings are demonstrated ..., no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

384 U.S. at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630 (footnote omitted).

Miranda, then, creates procedural safeguards to secure the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Although felony offenses were specifically in issue in Miranda and its companion cases, the language of the opinion does not limit the safeguards to individuals suspected of felonies. Similarly, yet more importantly, the language of the fifth amendment does not limit the privilege against self-incrimination to those charged with felonies. It has never been suggested that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor could be compelled to testify against himself. To so argue would be both illogical and inconsistent. "[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth...