McCarty v. King County Medical Service Corp., 29889.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1946
• Docket Number: 29889.
• Citation: 175 P.2d 653,26 Wn.2d 660
• Parties: McCARTY et al. v. KING COUNTY MEDICAL SERVICE CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

175 P.2d 653

26 Wn.2d 660

McCARTY et al. v. KING COUNTY MEDICAL SERVICE CORPORATION et al.

No. 29889.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

December 17, 1946

Rehearing Denied Jan. 31, 1947.

Action by Rose A. McCarty and E. H. McCarty, a marital community against King County Medical Service Corporation, Seattle General Hospital, a Washington corporation, and another to recover from first-named defendant and another amount paid by plaintiffs for special nurses' services during plaintiff wife's hospitalization and for a declaratory judgment against the hospital absolving plaintiffs from liability for hospital services, wherein the hospital filed a cross-complaint for the amount of the hospital bill. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

Judgment affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Howard M. Findley, judge.

Riddell Riddell & Hemphill and Nelson R. Anderson, all of Seattle for appellants.

Caughlan & Hatten, of Seattle, for respondents.

CONNELLY Justice.

Plaintiffs McCarty and wife instituted the present action naming, as defendants, King County Medical Service Corporation and Dr. Herbert C. Ostrom, as its medical director, and Seattle General Hospital, a corporation.

The first cause of action set forth in plaintiffs' complaint is against the King County Medical Service Corporation and Dr. Ostrom and seeks the recovery of $442.50 which plaintiffs had personally paid for special nurses' service during Mrs. McCarty's period of hospitalization for injuries sustained by her in a fall down an elevator shaft in the Chamber of Commerce building in Seattle, where she was employed as an elevator operator.

The second cause of action seeks a declaratory judgment against Seattle General Hospital absolving plaintiffs from liability for hospital service rendered by that institution to Mrs. McCarty. As to this cause of action, Seattle General Hospital, by cross-complaint, sued McCartys for the amount of the hospital bill in question which was agreed to be in the reasonable sum of $688.20, regardless of where liability therefor might ultimately attach.

For the sake of brevity and convenience, the King County Medical Service Corporation will hereinafter be referred to as the service corporation.

In the first cause of action against the service corporation and Dr. Ostrom, the complaint alleged that on May 1, 1941, plaintiff's employer, the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, entered into a contract with the service corporation for group medical and hospital service, by the terms of which the Seattle Chamber of Commerce agreed to collect from each of its employees the sum of $1.75 per month and to pay the same to the service corporation as prepayment for medical, hospital, and nursing care and service; that, in consideration of such payments, the service corporation represented and warranted that special contracts existed between it and certain hospitals and doctors in King county, including defendant Seattle General Hospital, whereby such institutions agreed to receive and care for, as patients, all persons who should be designated by the service corporation as participants in the prepaid group medical aid plan provided for in the medical service agreement referred to above.

The complaint alleged that the service corporation agreed that employees of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce who might sustain accidental injuries outside of their actual employment would receive care and treatment and that the bills therefor would be paid by the service corporation; that this included medical expense, doctors' fees, nursing care, and hospital charges. The complaint further alleged that plaintiff Rose McCarty, as an employee of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce, is a beneficiary under the group medical aid plan and entitled to all of its benefits; that on October 12, 1942, she sustained accidental injuries, not in the course of her employment, requiring her removal to the Seattle General Hospital and her treatment in the hospital until January 9, 1943; that proper treatment of her injuries and accompanying illness required the employment of three special nurses, and that expense therefor was incurred in the reasonable value of $442.50, and for hospital services in the reasonable value of $688.20.

It is also alleged that the service corporation and its medical director refused to designate plaintiff Rose McCarty as a person entitled to the benefits under the existing agreements and to certify plaintiff to the Seattle General Hospital as a member of, and one entitled to participate in, the service corporation's prepaid group medical aid plan; that plaintiff was compelled to pay special nurses the sum of $442.50 and had sustained, by reason of such payment, damages in that amount which she seeks to recover from the service corporation.

As a second cause of action against the Seattle General Hospital, after setting forth the factual background heretofore outlined herein, plaintiffs alleged that the Seattle General Hospital intended to commence suit against plaintiffs for its hospital bill in the sum of $688.20; that the said hospital services were performed pursuant to the terms of the contract between the Seattle Chamber of Commerce and the service corporation, and between the latter and the Seattle General Hospital, whereby the hospital was required to accept and treat plaintiff as a patient, and that plaintiffs were protected under the terms of those contracts from liability for such hospital expense.

The defendants service corporation and Dr. Ostrom in part admitted and in part denied plaintiffs' allegations as set forth in the first cause of action and, by affirmative defense, alleged that, by the terms of the contract between Seattle Chamber of Commerce and the service corporation, the Seattle General Hospital became obligated to furnish to members of the service corporation group employed by the Seattle Chamber of Commerce such hospital and nursing services as might be authorized by the medical director of the service corporation, and that the medical director, Dr. Ostrom, in good faith, had determined that plaintiff was not entitled to treatment for her injuries; that the plaintiff, Mrs. McCarty, was informed of the decision of the medical director while she was under treatment by one Dr. Smith, who had been employed by her; and that, after notice of nonresponsibility by Dr. Ostrom, acting for the service corporation, she continued to employ Dr. Smith, on her personal volition, and authorized him to procure hospitalization for her and that she received and accepted said hospital services as a private patient, rather than as a member of the participating group.

Defendants particularly alleged that, at the time of the injury, plaintiff was an employee of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce and that the injuries complained of by her were sustained while in the course of her employment, and that defendant Ostrom, in good faith, had so determined. Defendant service corporation denied liability on the added ground that the contracts for medical and nursing services were entered into by the defendant service corporation as an agent for the several persons concerned and that, as such agent, it assumed no responsibility of its own.

The allegations of the defendant Seattle General Hospital are, in substance, the same, with a cross-complaint and prayer for judgment against the plaintiffs in the sum of $688.20, the amount of its hospital bill against Mrs. McCarty. By way of stipulation, it was admitted that the expenses for special nurses were necessary and reasonable, but it was not admitted that such expenses were covered by the said agreements. It was further stipulated that, under these agreements, the reasonable hospital charges would have been $574.50, while for a private patient, not a party to the service contract, such charges were $688.20.

The case was tried to the court without a jury. Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment in favor of plaintiffs were entered against the service corporation, in the sum of $442.50, on the first cause of action for nurses' care, and denying relief to defendant Seattle General Hospital against plaintiffs, on the cross-complaint, for the amount of the hospital bill.

Defendants' motion for a new trial having been denied, defendants appealed, assigning numerous errors, including the denial of their motion for new trial, the entering of certain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs on each cause of action.

The facts leading to respondent's injuries, treatment, and hospitalization may be summarized as follows:

On October 12, 1942, at approximately 7:30 a.m., respondent, an elevator operator in the Chamber of Commerce building at Seattle, employed on a basis of pay by the hour, entered that building with her husband, who was employed as its building superintendent, preparatory to commencing her work. Her husband was to take her in the elevator to the third floor where she was to proceed to the women employees' room, remove her coat and hat, prepare for work, and take over the operation of the elevator at 7:45 a.m., the agreed and designated time of commencement of her work and pay on that day. In the morning darkness, while respondent, her husband, and two other persons, were standing in the lobby of the building near the elevator shaft, her husband opened the door of the elevator shaft. The elevator car was not at the lobby level, but respondent, believing it to be there, stepped forward and fell about six feet to the bottom of the shaft, sustaining serious injuries which form the basis of the controversy herein.

Medical treatment for her injuries was rendered by Dr. Edmund Smith and...