McCauley v. Computer Aid Inc.

• Decision Date: 25 August 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 06-2612.,Civil Action No. 06-1620.
• Parties: John McCAULEY, Plaintiff, v. COMPUTER AID INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

447 F.Supp.2d 469

John McCAULEY, Plaintiff, v. COMPUTER AID INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 06-1620.

Civil Action No. 06-2612.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

August 25, 2006.

John McCauley, Philadelphia, PA, Pro se.

Sean M. Hart, Heimbach Spitko & Heckman, Allentown, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KATZ, Senior District Judge.

I. FACTS

In May 2004, Plaintiff applied for employment as a Help Desk Analyst with Defendant Computer Aid, Inc. ("CAI"), a private information technology company incorporated in Pennsylvania. After submitting to pre-employment interviews and screenings, CAI made an offer of employment to Plaintiff on June 4, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that his employment agreement specifies that he could be fired only for cause. Compl. ¶ 98. CAI requested that Plaintiff fill out the appropriate employment-related forms and provide the required personal information. At that time, Plaintiff balked at providing his social security number and asked the Recruiting Manager if he was required to provide it. The Manager responded that she would check and let him know the answer at a later date. After several days on the job, Defendant CAI requested that Plaintiff redo his initial employment forms and provide his social security number. Plaintiff refused and was terminated by CAI on June 16, 2004.

On April 18, 2006, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant CAI. He later filed suit against CAI's corporate officers. Because both of Plaintiff's Complaints allege essentially the same facts and causes of action, the court consolidated the actions on July 11, 2006.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wronged him both by failing to inform him that the submission of his social security number was voluntary and by wrongfully firing him for failing to provide his social security number on the government 1-9, Employment Eligibility Form, the employer's health enrollment form, and the IRS W-4 form. He alleges that Defendants' behavior discriminated against him on the basis of his national origins, as a natural born American, violated his privacy rights, his due process rights and his freedom of expression, and breached his employment agreement.

Although it is somewhat difficult to discern the types of claims set forth in the Plaintiff's Complaint based on these alleged actions, Plaintiff alleges causes of action through 1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983); 2) a Bivens action 3) 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) ("Section 1985(3)"); 4) 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Section 1986); 5) 18 U.S.C. § 241 and § 242 6) the Federal Privacy Act violation 7)Title VII; and 8) a breach of contract action.

Now before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. For the reason stated below the court will dismiss all Plaintiff's federal claims with prejudice. Furthermore, the court will decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state claims and will dismiss them without prejudice.

II. DISCUSSION

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim a court must accept as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, and grant the dismissal only if it appears certain that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. See Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 279-280 (3d Cir.1992). The court is mindful that, "however inartfully pleaded," the "allegations of [a] pro se complaint [are held] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).

A. Claims Under Section 1983

Plaintiff fails to properly state a claim under Section 1983 for violations of his equal protection rights and his privacy rights. Section 1983 "does not create substantive rights, but provides a remedy for the violation of rights created by federal law." Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.1995). "The Supreme Court has set forth the two essential elements of a § 1983 action: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir.1993).

1. Acting Under the Color of State Law

Defendants cannot be held liable under Section 1983, because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish that Defendants acted under the color of state law. "Although it is possible for a private party to violate an individual's § 1983 rights, the individual alleging such a violation is not relieved of the obligation to establish that the private party acted under color of state law." Kost, 1 F.3d at 184 (holding that the defendant, a private company, was not a state actor because there wasn't a sufficient nexus between the state and the defendant).¹ A private action is not converted into one under color of state law merely by some tenuous connection to state action, but only when the action taken can be fairly attributed to the state itself. Id.

Here, Plaintiff claims Defendants were state actors because:

The Pennsylvania Government created an environment which allowed health care providers, operating within the state, to create a health enrollment form, requiring said form to contain information not legally necessitated, i.e. requiring the worker's Social Security Number. Such requirement was not Pennsylvania's legislative intent and said legislation predates the Employer health enrollment imposed hiring form.

Compl. at ¶ 59.

In essence, Plaintiff argues that Defendants, who are private employers without any significant connection to the state government, acted in a way not intended by the state government. It cannot be fair then to attribute the actions of Defendants to the state. Cf. Brown, 250 F.3d at 801 (3d Cir.2001) (noting that it is difficult to view targeted advertising as federal action by defendants which can serve as the basis for a Bivens action because the alleged wrongdoing—the targeted advertising of mentholated tobacco products to African-Americans—is not required by the Labeling Act). Thus, the Defendants were not acting under the color of state law and all claims under Section 1983 must be dismissed.

2. Deprived of a Right Secured by the Constitution or Laws of the United States

Even if Defendants Were state actors, Plaintiff does not allege facts necessary to establish the second element, that Defendants have engaged in any conduct that deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Plaintiff claims denial of equal protection rights and violation of the constitutional right to privacy.

a. Denial of Equal Protection: Intentional Discrimination Based on National Origins

Plaintiff fails to state a claim that he faced discrimination on the basis of his natural origin as a natural born American which denied him equal protection. To properly state a claim for national origins discrimination under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege that his national origin was the cause of the disparate treatment he received. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1478 (3d Cir.1990); see also See Cassano v. Carb, 436 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that an employee who was fired for refusing to disclose her social security number to her employer for fear of identity theft could not state a claim for discrimination under Section 1983 because the employer's policy of requiring an employee to disclose her social numbers applied to all employees).

Here, despite titling his claim as one for national origins discrimination, Plaintiff actually does not allege any disparate treatment on the basis of his national origin as a natural born American. Rather he asserts that he faced disparate treatment on the basis of his refusal to submit his social security number. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not dispute that the employer's requirement that the employee disclose his social security number applied to all his coworkers. See Compl. ¶ 1(stating that "unconstitutional misconduct is being imposed on all its employees"). Thus, even applying a less stringent standard for his pleadhags, Piaihtiff has failed to properly assert a claim for intentional discrimination.

b. Constitutional Right to Privacy

Nor does Plaintiff allege facts sufficient to establish a constitutional violation of his right to privacy. The Constitution does not provide a right to privacy in one's social security number. See Cassano v. Carb, 436 F.3d 74 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to extend the constitutional right to privacy to collection of social security numbers by an employer); McElrath v. Califano, 615 F.2d 434, 441 (7th Cir.1980) (recognizing that "the contention that disclosure of one's social security account number violates the right to privacy has been consistently rejected ..."); Doyle v. Wilson, 529 F.Supp. 1343, 1348 (D.De.1982) (holding that the "mandatory disclosure of one's social security number does not so threaten the sanctity of individual privacy as to require constitutional protection"); Cantor v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 353 F.Supp. 1307, 1321-22 (E.D.Pa.1973) (holding that requiring lawyers to provide their Social Security numbers annually to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court certainly "does not rise to a breach of any federal constitutional rights."), aff'd without opinion, 487 F.2d 1394 (3d Cir.1973). Therefore, in this case, Plaintiff's claims that his constitutional right to privacy was violated because he was required to provide a social security number fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted and should be dismissed.

B. Bivens Action

Plaintiff also fails to assert properly a Bivens action against Defendants to for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. A Bivens action is the federal equivalent of the Section 1983 cause of action and will lie where the defendant has violated the...