McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters

Decision Date24 July 1957
Docket NumberNo. A-6362,A-6362
Citation157 Tex. 475,304 S.W.2d 265
PartiesW. J. McCAULEY, Petitioner, v. CONSOLIDATED UNDERWRITERS, Respondent.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

McDaniel & Hunt, Center, for petitioner.

Ramey, Calhoun, Brelsford, Hull & Flock, Tyler, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

W. J. McCauley, petitioner, attempted to appeal from an order entered by the 123rd District Court of Shelby County on June 23, 1956, setting aside and vacating a default judgment rendered at a previous term in favor of petitioner and against Consolidated Underwriters, respondent. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 301 S.W.2d 181. Since the order of June 23rd is not a final judgment, the Court of Civil Appeals and this Court are without power to review it. Lynn v. Hanna, 116 Tex. 652, 296 S.W. 280. We do have jurisdiction, however, to reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and dismiss the appeal from the trial court. Hubbard v. Tallal, 127 Tex. 242, 92 S.W.2d 1022.

The jurisdiction of the intermediate court was challenged by respondent's brief there, but the point is not raised in this Court. This squarely presents the following questions: (1) Does the action of the Court of Civil Appeals in affirming the judgment of the trial court constitute fundamental error? and (2) Is the Supreme Court authorized to reverse the judgment of a Court of Civil Appeals for an unassigned fundamental error? We have concluded that both questions must be answered in the affirmative.

Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, it was held that while the Courts of Civil Appeals might reverse a trial court judgment for an unassigned error apparent on the face of the record, this Court could not consider even fundamental error when not raised in the application for writ of error. Grayce Oil Co. v. Peterson, 128 Tex. 550, 98 S.W.2d 781. The reasons for these rules are to be found in the legislative enactments then applicable to our appellate courts. Art. 1837 1 expressly authorized the intermediate courts to consider 'an error in law either assigned or apparent upon the face of the record', but there was no statutory provision conferring such power on the Supreme Court. The statutes requiring that grounds of error be specified in the application were accordingly construed as restricting this Court to a consideration of the errors so assigned. George Scalfi & Co. v. State, 96 Tex. 559, 73 S.W. 441, 74 S.W. 754.

With the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Art. 1837 was repealed in its entirety and there is now no provision, statutory or otherwise, expressly authorizing the Courts of Civil Appeals to consider an unassigned error. When the question was presented to us for decision, however, we held that such courts still have the power to reverse the judgment of a trial court for an unassigned error which is truly fundamental. Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979.

Since the Rules make no provision for consideration of errors apparent on the face of the recod, the concept of fundamental error is much narrower than it was under Art. 1837, and many errors formerly treated as fundamental may not be so regarded now. The majority opinion in the Ramsey case does not attempt to give an all-inclusive definition of the term, but holds that an error which directly and adversely affects the interest of the public generally, as that interest is declared by the statutes or Constitution of our State, is fundamental. When the record affirmatively and conclusively shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, the error will also be regarded as fundamental. An appellate court should not be required to approve a county court judgment awarding a divorce simply because the appellant does not raise the question...

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152 cases
  • In re D.M., 10-06-00407-CV.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 15 Agosto 2007
    ...shows that the court rendering the judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter. See McCauley v. Consols Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957). Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 577 The "civil doctrine of fundamental error is a creature of common law." ......
  • Schafer v. Stevens
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 21 Julio 1961
    ...judgment was without jurisdiction of the subject matter, the error will be regarded as fundamental. McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266; Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W. 979; City of Deer Park v. State, 154 Tex. 174, 275 S.W.2d 77, 85. Except in ......
  • Brice v. Denton
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 10 Marzo 2004
    ...no jurisdiction of the subject matter, merely because the litigants have not seen fit to assign error." McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 478, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957). For this reason, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that "on its own initiative after giving t......
  • Hernandez v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 22 Septiembre 2020
    ...fundamental error concerning prosecutorial misconduct and reversing defendant's conviction); McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters , 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (1957) (per curiam) (holding that the supreme court had power to revise a lower-court judgment for unassigned fundamental error a......
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