McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., 05-6011.
Decision Date | 28 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. 05-6011.,05-6011. |
Citation | 413 F.3d 1158 |
Parties | Rodney McCAULEY, Jeri McCauley, Garrison McCauley, Madison McCauley, and Whitney McCauley, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
W. Carl Jordan, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Houston, Texas (Vanessa Griffith, Vinson & Elkins, Dallas, Texas, with him on the motion to stay appeal), for Defendant-Appellant.
Derrick T. DeWitt, Whitten, Nelson, McGuire, Terry & Roselius, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Kent R. McGuire, Whitten, Nelson, McGuire, Terry & Roselius, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma with him on the response to the motion to stay appeal), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before SEYMOUR, McCONNELL and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Rodney McCauley and his former employer, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., are parties to an agreement to arbitrate all claims that fall within the scope of Halliburton's Dispute Resolution Program (DRP). In December 2002, Mr. McCauley was injured while applying foam insulation to the exterior of a bulk tank owned by Halliburton. Based on the injuries he sustained as a result of the accident as well as Halliburton's actions in its decision to terminate him, Mr. McCauley filed claims for negligence, fraud and deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination. Various members of Mr. McCauley's family also brought actions for loss of consortium. The district court granted Halliburton's motion to arbitrate all claims except those related to the negligence and consortium causes of action, which the court held were not subject to arbitration because those claims allegedly arose out of work Mr. McCauley was performing as an independent contractor. Halliburton appealed the partial denial of its motion to compel arbitration, as permitted by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C). Mr. McCauley also filed a motion to stay the litigation in the district court pending appeal of the arbitrability issue, which the district court denied. Halliburton has now moved this court for a stay pending appeal. For the reasons set out below, we grant the motion.
The parties agree that Mr. McCauley's claims alleging fraud and deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination are arbitrable under Halliburton's DRP because they all relate to Mr. McCauley's employment with Halliburton as a Senior Electronics Technician. The parties disagree, however, about whether Mr. McCauley's negligence claim and the derivative consortium claims of his family are subject to arbitration. According to Mr. McCauley, those claims are not within the scope of the DRP agreement because they arose out of services Mr. McCauley was performing for Halliburton after his normal work hours and as an independent contractor in the foam insulation business. The district court sided with Mr. McCauley on this issue. The court also summarily denied Halliburton's motion to stay after it filed its appeal, and ordered the parties to proceed to litigate the non-arbitrable claims.
Halliburton asks this court for a stay of further litigation pending its appeal. It advances two theories to support its contention that litigation should not proceed in the district court until we resolve the underlying arbitration dispute on the merits. The company's primary contention is that its notice of appeal from the denial of the motion to compel arbitration automatically divested the district court of jurisdiction. In the event we conclude the district court has not been divested of jurisdiction, it alternatively contends that a stay of proceedings is warranted under the traditional four-factor stay analysis. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Mainstream Marketing Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir.2003).
The Federal Arbitration Act grants a party the right to file an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C). But the statute does not specify whether a motion to stay proceedings during an appeal should be granted. Moreover, although the Supreme Court has explained that "a federal district court and a federal court of appeals should not attempt to assert jurisdiction over a case simultaneously," Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982), the Court has never explicitly extended this holding to interlocutory § 16(a) appeals.
Whether an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration divests a district court of jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the underlying claim while the appeal is pending is a question of first impression in this circuit. Mr. McCauley contends this court permits a district court to proceed with a case when an appeal is taken from an interlocutory ruling, as opposed to a final order, citing Howard v. Mail-Well Envelope Co., 150 F.3d 1227, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998), and Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir.1990). Halliburton, on the other hand, submits that an appeal from the denial of arbitration inherently involves the merits of the underlying claims, implicating the general rule that filing an appeal "divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58, 103 S.Ct. 400; see also Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985).
Our sister circuits that have addressed whether a § 16(a) appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction are split. The Second and Ninth Circuits have refused to stay proceedings in the district court while an arbitrability issue is pending on appeal. See Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 53-54 (2d Cir.2004); Britton v. Co-Op Banking Group, 916 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir.1990). Conversely, the Eleventh and Seventh Circuits have held that the appeal triggers the general divestiture principle and, so long as the appeal is not frivolous, warrants issuance of a stay. See Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir.2004); Bradford-Scott Data Corp. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir.1997). As explained infra, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the latter circuits that upon the filing of a non-frivolous § 16(a) appeal, the district court is divested of jurisdiction until the appeal is resolved on the merits. Blinco, 366 F.3d at 1253; Bradford-Scott Data Corp., 128 F.3d at 505-06.
In explaining why the terms of the divestiture principle do or do not apply to arbitrability appeals, the courts on each side of the divide have provided legal justifications as well as supporting prudential rationales related to the competing interests and concerns about potential abuse of litigation and appeals. For instance, in declining to apply the divestiture rule, the Ninth Circuit concluded that an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration does not involve the same subject matter as the claim that remains pending in the district court, "[s]ince the issue of arbitrability [i]s the only substantive issue presented in th[e] appeal" and a "dispute over arbitrability is easily severable from [the] merits of [the] underlying dispute." Britton, 916 F.2d at 1412 & n. 7 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1, 21, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)). In addition to this legal rationale, the court expressed concern over potential exploitation of a categorical divestiture rule, which "would allow a defendant to stall a trial simply by bringing a frivolous motion to compel arbitration." Id. at 1412. Addressing the countervailing concern that a defendant not lose the benefit of a meritorious appeal of the denial of a motion to arbitrate by continuation of the case in the district court, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the inherent flexibility of the traditional stay analysis would enable the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis when the arbitrability issue warranted a stay in the proceedings. Id.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with this analysis when it confronted the same issue. As a first point of contention, the court rejected the Ninth Circuit's determination that an arbitrability appeal is legally severable and distinct from the merits of the underlying case. See Bradford-Scott Data Corp., 128 F.3d at 505 (). While the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that potential exploitation of the divestiture rule through dilatory § 16(a) appeals was a "serious concern," it was persuaded this concern was "met by the response that the appellee may ask the court of appeals to dismiss the appeal as frivolous or to affirm summarily." Id. at 506. The court was more solicitous regarding its duty to protect the benefits of arbitration from erosion by the demands of litigation in district court during the pendency of a defendant's non-frivolous appeal from the denial of arbitration. Id. (). It is evident from this case law that the opposing circuit positions have each presented a reasoned response to the other's prudential rationales. The critical question we must answer is which approach provides us with a more persuasive analysis of the jurisdictional divestiture rule.
Our precedent addressing divestiture in the context of an appeal of the denial of qualified immunity is instructive. In Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1990), we held that a...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Belnap v. Iasis Healthcare
...a party the right to file an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration." McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. , 413 F.3d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C) ). On the filing of this appeal, the district court properly stayed the cas......
-
Pueblo of Pojoaque v. State
...litigation and to avoid inconsistent determinations' in multiple fora." Motion to Stay MOO at 10 (quoting McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs. , 413 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005) ). To regain jurisdiction, Pojoaque Pueblo contends, the district court must "take the affirmative step of c......
-
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc.
...until such time as the appeal is fully litigated or determined to be frivolous or forfeited. Compare McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158, 1162-63 (10th Cir.2005) (automatic divestiture of trial court jurisdiction unless appeal is frivolous or forfeited); Blinco v. Gre......
-
Ehleiter v. Grapetree Shores, Inc.
...until such time as the appeal is fully litigated or determined to be frivolous or forfeited. Compare McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158, 1162–63 (10th Cir.2005) (automatic divestiture of trial court jurisdiction unless appeal is frivolous or forfeited); Blinco v. Gre......
-
Divestiture Of Jurisdiction Of District Court Pending Appeal
...Cir. 2011); Bradford-Scott Data v. Physician Computer Network, 128 F.3d 504, 505 (7th Cir. 1997); McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 413 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 2005); Blinco v. Greentree Servicing, 366 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 8 Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505-06 9 Blinco, 3......
-
The FAA's Staying Power: Can A District Court Adjudicate Claims Pending An Appeal From A Denial Of A Motion To Arbitrate?
...Data Corp., Inc. v. Physician Computer Network, Inc., 128 F.3d 504, 505 (7th Cir. 1997); McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 2005); Blinco v. Greentree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.2d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 8 Bradford-Scott, 128 F.3d at 505-06. 9 See, e......
-
Coinbase, Inc. V. Bielski: Interlocutory Appeals On The Question Of Arbitrability Automatically Stay District Court Proceedings
...n.6 (3d Cir. 2007); Levin v. Alms and Assocs., Inc., 634 F.3d 260, 263-266 (4th Cir. 2011); McCauley v. Haliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005); Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1249, 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Bombardier Corp. v. Nat'l R.R. P......
-
Chapter 21 - § 21.2 • ARBITRATION - GENERALLY
...Colo. 2004).[361] Ferla v. Infinity Dev. Assocs., LLC, 107 P.3d 1006 (Colo. App. 2004). See McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005).[362] Mountain Plains Constructors, Inc., 785 P.2d at 931.[363] Gergel, 996 P.2d 233; Ferla, 107 P.3d 1006 (equal protectio......
-
Chapter 20 - § 20.7 • STAY OF LITIGATION OR ARBITRATION PENDING APPEAL OF GRANT OR DENIAL OF MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
...707 (4th Cir. 2001).[85] Apache Bohai Corp. v. Texaco China, B.V., 540 U.S. 880 (2003).[86] McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2005); Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 2006).[87] Blinco v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 366 F.3d 1......
-
Chapter 19 - § 19.8 • JURISDICTION OF TRIAL COURT DURING THE ARBITRATION AND PENDENCY OF APPEAL
...Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d 470, 474 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting McCauley v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 413 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2005)) (citations omitted).[62] Id. at n. 2.[63] See EEOC v. Joslin Dry Goods Co., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7741, 2007 WL 433144 (D. C......