McClafferty v. Portage Count Bd. of Elections

• Decision Date: 30 September 2009
• Docket Number: Case No. 5:09CV2210.
• Parties: Brett McCLAFFERTY, Plaintiff, v. PORTAGE COUNT BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

661 F.Supp.2d 826

Brett McCLAFFERTY, Plaintiff, v. PORTAGE COUNT BOARD OF ELECTIONS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 5:09CV2210.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

September 30, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Avery S. Friedman, Friedman & Associates, Cleveland, OH, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SARA LIOI, District Judge.

On September 24, 2009, Plaintiff Brett McClafferty (Plaintiff or McClafferty) filed a complaint (Doc. No. 1) against Defendants Portage County Board of Elections (Board) and City of Streetsboro (City) (collectively Defendants), along with a motion seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 2). The Court conducted a telephonic status conference with counsel for the parties shortly after the lawsuit was filed. At the conclusion of the conference, the Court scheduled a hearing for September 29, 2009.¹ In light of the expedited schedule for the hearing, Plaintiff withdrew his motion for a temporary restraining order. (See Doc. No. 4.)

The court conducted the preliminary injunction hearing, as scheduled, on September 29, 2009, during which counsel offered oral argument and made proffers as to witness testimony. The parties also entered into various factual stipulations, and these stipulations were read into the record. After considering the issues raised in the motion, the Court hereby finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden necessary to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. For the reasons explained in this Memorandum Opinion, the motion is hereby DENIED.

I. Background

Plaintiff is a 21 year old resident of the City of Streetsboro.² In May 2007, when Plaintiff was 19 years of age, he ran for the office of Mayor of Streetsboro.³ The primary race was close (Stipulations at ¶ 8), and McClafferty came within one vote of advancing to the general election. (Compl. at ¶ 8.) In the general election that followed in November 2007, Thomas Wagner was elected Mayor. (Stipulations at ¶ 9.) It is undisputed that Mr. Wagner's term was to have expired in 2011. (Stipulations at ¶ 10.)

According to Plaintiff, the support he received in the 2007 primary and his "popularity sent shockwaves through the Streetsboro political establishment." (Mot. at 3.) Plaintiff believes that City officials immediately dedicated City resources to finding a way to prohibit him seeking political office in the future.

In 2007, a "Charter Review Commission" was constituted to serve from March 26, 2007 through June 26, 2007.⁴ (Stipulations at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff maintains that "[o]lder citizens were appointed by [City] officials [to the charter review commission], which had the intent of looking for [a] way to restrict McClafferty from future eligibility to run for public office." (Compl. at ¶ 9.)

While Plaintiff suggests that political leaders in Streetsboro "immediately scrambled to throw together [the charter review commission]," (Mot. at 3), the undisputed facts reveal that the charter review commission was actually established in 1977, and that every five years the Mayor is required to appoint qualified electors, who do not hold public office, to the commission. (Doc. No. 6, Ex. 4, Streetsboro City Charter art. XVII, § 17.01.) It is undisputed that the commission was scheduled to convene in 2007. (See Stipulations at ¶ 11.) Once convened, the commission is required to submit to the board of elections by August 1st of the same year its proposed amendments, alterations and revisions to the City Charter. (Id. at § 17.03; Stipulations at ¶ 12.)

On June 27, 2007, the charter review commission issued its recommendations to amend the City Charter by revising the qualifications for the office of mayor. Specifically, the proposed amendment to Section 3.02 added three new requirements: (1) "that the Mayor shall have been for at least two (2) years prior to the date of his or her election [...] a continuous resident and qualified elector of [the City]"; (2) he or she "shall have attained the age of 23 years prior to the date of his or her election;" and (3) that all candidates for this office "shall complete and file with the Council clerk a criminal conviction disclosure form."⁵ (Charter art. III, § 3.02.) The Commission proposed the same amended qualifications for applicants seeking a position on the City Council. (Id., art. IV, § 4.03.)

At the time the charter review commission issued its 2007 recommendations, the next mayoral election was not due to take place until 2011, when Mayor Wagner would have completed his term. (Stipulations at ¶ 10.) The record shows that, even under the commission's proposed amendments, Plaintiff would have been eligible to run for mayor in 2011.⁶

Plaintiff alleges that in June 2007, the charter review commission sought guidance from the City's then law director, Chad Murdock, on the propriety of the new amendments. (Compl. at ¶ 14.) The law director purportedly informed the charter review commission that the 23 age restriction was "arbitrary" and that it would be "tough to make the argument that age was directly related to qualifications, i.e., they could have an eligible 23 year old drop out but an ineligible 22 year old college graduate of public administration." (Id. at ¶ 15.)

Notwithstanding the law director's concern, the Streetsboro City Council approved and adopted Ordinance No. 2007-88, which contained the new restrictions on mayoral qualifications in Section 3.02, and the city council qualifications in Section 4.03. (Compl. at ¶ 17, Ex. B, Ordinance No. 2007-88; Stipulations at ¶ 18.) The Portage County Board of Elections reviewed the City's proposed ballot for the 2007 Charter amendments and forwarded same to the Ohio Secretary of State for review. (Stipulations at ¶ 19.) "Prior to November 2007, the Ohio Secretary of State did review and approve the City's ballot language for the 2007 Charter amendments." (Id. at ¶ 20.)

The proposed amendment appeared on the ballot as follows:

21 PROPOSED CHARTER AMENDMENT CITY OF STREETSBORO

A Majority Affirmative Vote is Necessary for Passage.

SHALL THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF STREETSBORO AS PROPOSED BY ORDINANCE NO. 2007-88 WHICH WOULD REVISE AND ADD TO SECTIONS 3.02, QUALIFICATIONS (MAYOR), AND 4.03, QUALIFICATIONS (COUNCIL), TO REQUIRE COMPLETION OF A CRIMINAL CONVICTION DISCLOSURE FORM FOR ALL CANDIDATES, TO REDUCE THE CITY RESIDENCY AND QUALIFIED ELECTOR REQUIREMENTS TO TWO (2) YEARS, AND TO ESTABLISH A MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENT OF TWENTY-THREE (23) YEARS, BE ADOPTED?

(Doc. No. 1, Ex. 3, 2007 Ballot.) Plaintiff represents that it is significant to the present motion that, despite the fact that the criminal conviction disclosure appeared last in the recommendations made by the charter review commission, it was listed as the first proposed qualification on the ballot. Issue 21, the amendments to Section 3.02 and 4.03, passed by a majority vote, and the amended language was incorporated into the City Charter, effective immediately after passage.

In April, 2009, Mayor Wagner resigned his office, less than half-way through his four-year term. (Stipulations at ¶¶ 4, 24.) The Streetsboro City Council "appointed an interim Mayor to preside over the Office until a special election could be held in November 2009 [...]." (Id. at ¶ 25.)

In February 2009, Plaintiff initiated a petition drive in preparation for his bid to, once again, run for mayor; this time, in the special election occasioned by Mayor Wagner's resignation. (Compl. at ¶ 31.) After securing the required signatures, Plaintiff submitted his petition for certification to the Board. (Id. at ¶ 33.) On August 27, 2009, the Board refused to certify Plaintiffs candidacy because he failed to meet the new age requirement for mayor, as set forth in the revised version of Section 3.02. (Id. at ¶ 34; Stipulations at ¶ 27.)

Plaintiff lodged a formal objection, and the Board granted him a hearing, which took place on September 3, 2009. (Stipulations at ¶ 28.) During the hearing, Plaintiff argued that Section 3.02 was unconstitutional, and urged the Board to reconsider its refusal to certify his candidacy. (Compl. at ¶ 36.) The Board determined that it lacked the authority to pass on the constitutionality of Section 3.02, (Id. at ¶ 37), and affirmed its decision to reject Plaintiffs request to have his candidacy certified. (Stipulations at ¶ 29.)

On September 24, 2009, Plaintiff commenced the instant lawsuit, alleging civil rights infringements under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief in the form of a determination that Section 3.02 is unconstitutional, attorneys' fees, and costs. Simultaneous with the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff withdrew his request for a TRO, and proceeded with his request for preliminary injunctive relief.⁷ In his motion, Plaintiff maintains that the age restriction contained in Section 3.02 violates his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. He also argues that the Board, acting under color of law, intentionally "distorted the legislative wording of Ordinance No. 2007-88" by "flipping" the new requirements for mayor for the sole purpose of ensuring that Plaintiff would be unable to run for office. Having afforded the parties an opportunity to brief the issues, and having conducted a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court is ready to issue its decision.

II. Standard of Review

The burden is on Plaintiff to demonstrate entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief, and it is a heavy one. Preliminary relief is "an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it." Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002). "[T]he proof required for the plaintiff to...