McClain v. Bd. of Review
| Citation | 237 N.J. 445,206 A.3d 353 |
| Decision Date | 29 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | 080397,080198,A-52 September Term 2017,A-65 September Term 2017 |
| Parties | Patricia J. MCCLAIN, Appellant-Respondent, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Respondent-Appellant, and Learning Edge Academy, Inc., and Kids Choice Academy, Respondent. Cynthia M. Blake, Appellant-Appellant, v. Board of Review, Department of Labor, Respondent-Respondent, and Laurel Healthcare, LLC, Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for the Department of Labor in both cases (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa Dutton Schaffer, of counsel, and Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney General, and Christopher Weber, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs).
Alan W. Lesso, Vineland, argued the cause for appellant in Blake v. Bd. of Review (South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; Alan W. Lesso, Kenneth M. Goldman, Atlantic City, and Cassandra Stabbert, on the briefs).
Kenneth M. Goldman, Atlantic City, argued the cause for respondent in McClain v. Bd. of Review (South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; Kenneth M. Goldman, Alan W. Lesso, Vineland, and Cassandra Stabbert, on the briefs).
Alan H. Schorr, Cherry Hill, argued the cause for amicus curiae National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey in both cases (Schorr & Associates, attorneys; Alan H. Schorr and Adam L. Schorr, Cherry Hill, on the brief).
Under New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law (UCL or Act), N.J.S.A. 43:21-1 to -71, an employee terminated from employment after working a certain number of weeks is ordinarily entitled to unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. An employee who voluntarily leaves her employment without just cause, however, is not entitled to such benefits. N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Legislature recognized the inequity facing those employees who served a substantial period with one employer and then voluntarily left for an equal or better opportunity with another employer, only to be terminated shortly afterwards. Those employees terminated by the second employer were denied UI benefits because they had not worked the requisite time at the second job, despite long-term service at their previous employment.
To redress that problem, the Legislature in 2015 passed an amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), qualifying an employee to receive UI benefits if she "voluntarily leaves work with one employer to accept from another employer employment which commences not more than seven days after the individual leaves employment with the first employer." See L. 2015, c. 41, § 1 (modifying N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) ) ( ). The amendment ensured that an employee who was qualified for UI benefits during her first employment would not be disqualified from such benefits if terminated shortly after beginning her second employment. Ibid.
In the two consolidated appeals before us, each employee accepted an offer of employment from a second employer only to have the offer rescinded before the start date -- leaving her jobless. The question is whether in such a circumstance, the employee, whose offer is rescinded through no fault of her own, is entitled to UI benefits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).
Two Appellate Division panels have reached diametrically opposite answers to that question based on divergent interpretations of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). One panel concluded that the acceptance of an offer of employment to commence within seven days after leaving the first employer -- not the actual start of new employment -- triggers the UI benefit protections of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). McClain v. Bd. of Review, 451 N.J. Super. 461, 464-65, 168 A.3d 1214 (App. Div. 2017). Another panel concluded that the employee must actually begin working for the second employer within the seven-day period to be entitled to UI benefits. Blake v. Bd. of Review, 452 N.J. Super. 7, 11, 170 A.3d 960 (App. Div. 2017).
Both appellate panels present plausible interpretations of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). However, only the McClain panel's interpretation is consistent with the remedial purposes of the UCL, an Act we have "construed liberally in favor of allowance of benefits." Yardville Supply Co. v. Bd. of Review, 114 N.J. 371, 374, 554 A.2d 1337 (1989). The objective of the Act is to provide some income to an employee out of work through no fault of her own. Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J. 534, 543, 946 A.2d 1039 (2008). Providing UI benefits to an employee who voluntarily leaves her first employment based on an equal or better offer from a second employer, who then rescinds the offer before the start date of her new employment, fulfills the Legislature's objective in amending N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). We therefore determine that the two employees in the cases before us have earned the right to UI benefits.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the McClain panel, reverse the judgment of the Blake panel, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The basic facts, which are undisputed, are discerned from McClain's and Blake's unemployment compensation proceedings before the Department of Labor.
Between January 2013 and October 2015, Patricia McClain worked at Learning Edge Academy, Inc., teaching toddlers. McClain worked forty hours per week earning $ 8.63 per hour. On October 12, 2015, McClain accepted an offer of employment as a preschool teacher at Kids Choice Academy, where she would make $ 9.25 per hour during a forty-hour work week. Her new job was to begin seven days later. McClain resigned her teaching position at Learning Edge the day she accepted Kids Choice's job offer. The next day, however, Kids Choice called McClain and rescinded the job offer because the teacher she was to replace was returning to her former position.
Cynthia Blake worked as a cook at Laurel Healthcare from September 2013 to August 2015. Blake worked forty hours per week earning $ 10.70 per hour. In late July 2015, Blake accepted an offer of employment as a cook at Alaris Healthcare, where she would earn $ 12.96 per hour during a forty-hour work week. Blake resigned her full-time position at Laurel and was set to begin work at Alaris within seven days of leaving Laurel. Two days before Blake's start date, Alaris rescinded the offer to Blake, apparently after deciding to hire someone else.1
McClain and Blake both filed for unemployment insurance benefits with the New Jersey Department of Labor. In both cases, the Deputy Director of Unemployment Insurance denied their claims. In both cases, the Appeal Tribunals affirmed because McClain and Blake did not commence their new employment within seven days of leaving their former employer, thus disqualifying them for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). The Board of Review affirmed the Appeal Tribunal in both cases.
McClain and Blake separately appealed.
In McClain's case, the appellate panel rejected the Board of Review's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) and reversed. McClain, 451 N.J. Super. at 464-65, 168 A.3d 1214. The panel found that "a claimant need not actually start the new employment to be exempt from disqualification under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)." Id. at 465, 168 A.3d 1214. In reaching that conclusion, the panel noted that, before the 2015 amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), an employee who voluntarily left her employment to work for another employer was disqualified from eligibility for UI benefits until she had worked a set number of weeks at the new employment. Id. at 467, 168 A.3d 1214. In the panel's view, after the amendment, so long as the employee seeking an equal or better opportunity "voluntarily leaves work with one employer to accept from another employer employment which commences not more than seven days after the individual leaves employment with the first employer," the employee is entitled to UI benefits whether the new employer rescinds the offer or terminates the new employee after she begins work. Id. at 468-70, 168 A.3d 1214 (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) ).
The panel's plain reading of the statute led it to conclude that so long as the employee accepts the job offer, which is set to begin within seven days of leaving the first employer, she is entitled to UI benefits if the offer is rescinded and she is rendered unemployed. Id. at 469-73, 168 A.3d 1214. The panel determined that the clear language of the statute governs and is supported by the legislative history and the remedial purposes of the UCL. Id. at 470-74, 168 A.3d 1214. Last, the panel stated that "McClain left her employment with Learning Edge for good cause attributable to the work and was entitled to benefits without disqualification." Id. at 474, 168 A.3d 1214.
We granted the Board of Review's petition for certification. 232 N.J. 377, 180 A.3d 702 (2018). We also granted the motion of the National Employment Lawyers Association of New Jersey (NELA) to participate as amicus curiae.
In Blake's case, the appellate panel affirmed the Board of Review's decision to deny Blake UI benefits because Blake voluntarily quit her job with her first employer and never started her second employment due to the rescinded offer. Blake, 452 N.J. Super. at 10-11, 170 A.3d 960. The panel found that the amendment to N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a)"does not apply unless the employee accepts employment with another employer ‘which commences not more than seven days after the individual leaves employment with the first employer.’ " Id. at 11, 170 A.3d 960 (quoting N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) ). The Blake panel, like the McClain panel, relied primarily on the plain language of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), but reached the polar opposite conclusion. Id. at 12, 170 A.3d 960. The panel construed the phrase "employment which commences" to mean that the employee must actually begin work with the second employer to be entitled to UI benefits. Ibid.
The Blake panel also looked to the UCL's legislative history to support its interpretation. I...
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