McClain v. State
Decision Date | 23 April 2021 |
Docket Number | NO. C-200195,C-200195 |
Citation | 171 N.E.3d 1228 |
Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Parties | Anthony MCCLAIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Ohio, Defendant-Appellee. |
Koenig & Owen, LLC, James D. Owen and Charles A. Koenig, Columbus, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Margaret Moore, Assistant Attorney General, for Defendant-Appellee.
{¶1} Anthony McClain appeals the judgment of the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court, following a bench trial, in favor of the state of Ohio on his statutory claim for a determination that he is a wrongfully imprisoned individual. The basis for McClain's appeal is his assertion that he was entitled to a trial by jury. Because McClain had no constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial, we hold that the trial court properly overruled his jury demand and we affirm the court's judgment.
{¶2} In 1995, McClain was indicted for murder and an accompanying firearm specification. After a jury trial, he was convicted of the offenses and was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life for the murder offense, to be served consecutively to a three-year prison term for the firearm specification. This court affirmed McClain's conviction on appeal, and the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to review the matter. State v. McClain , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-950859, 1996 WL 487931 (Aug. 28, 1996), jurisdictional motion overruled , 77 Ohio St.3d 1515, 674 N.E.2d 370 (1997).
{¶3} In 2002, McClain filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. In 2004, the trial court converted the motion for leave into a motion for a new trial and denied the motion. This court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded for a new trial. State v. McClain , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040647 (Aug. 17, 2005).1 In 2006, at a retrial, a jury acquitted McClain of the offenses.
{¶4} McClain filed an action against the state of Ohio to be declared a "wrongfully imprisoned individual," as defined in R.C. 2743.48(A),2 and included a jury demand in his complaint. The trial court overruled McClain's request for a jury trial, and the matter proceeded to a bench trial on the issue of whether McClain satisfied the condition in R.C. 2743.48(A)(5), by showing "either that the offense of which the individual was found guilty, including all lesser-included offenses, was not committed by the individual or that no offense was committed by any person." The court determined that McClain failed to prove that he was actually innocent of the murder offense and declined to declare McClain a wrongfully imprisoned individual. This appeal followed.
{¶5} In a single assignment of error, McClain argues that the trial court erred by denying his constitutional and statutory rights to a jury trial in his wrongful-imprisonment action against the state.
{¶6} Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution states that "[t]he right of trial by jury shall be inviolate[.]" However, the right to a jury trial is not absolute. Arrington v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. , 109 Ohio St.3d 539, 2006-Ohio-3257, 849 N.E.2d 1004, ¶ 22. The Constitution does not guarantee all civil litigants a trial by jury. Id. There is no right to a jury trial unless that right is extended by statute or existed at common law prior to the adoption of the Ohio Constitution. Kneisley v. Lattimer-Stevens Co. , 40 Ohio St.3d 354, 356, 533 N.E.2d 743 (1988).
{¶7} The wrongful-imprisonment statute, R.C. 2743.48, allows a person who satisfies the definition of a wrongfully imprisoned individual to bring an action against the state in the court of claims to recover damages because of the person's wrongful imprisonment. R.C. 2743.48(D) ; Doss v. State , 135 Ohio St.3d 211, 2012-Ohio-5678, 985 N.E.2d 1229, ¶ 10. But first, the person must file a civil action to be declared a "wrongfully imprisoned individual," as defined in R.C. 2743.48(A), in the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated. See R.C. 2743.48(B)(1). That court has exclusive, original jurisdiction to hear and determine the action. R.C. 2305.02. "Only courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to determine whether a person has satisfied the five requirements of R.C. 2743.48(A)." Griffith v. Cleveland , 128 Ohio St.3d 35, 2010-Ohio-4905, 941 N.E.2d 1157, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶8} R.C. 2743.48(A) defines a "wrongfully imprisoned individual" as an individual who satisfies each of the five following conditions:
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2743.48(A).
{¶9} If the common pleas court determines that a person is a wrongfully imprisoned individual, then the person may file a civil action against the state in the court of claims to recover a sum of money because of the wrongful imprisonment. R.C. 2743.48(D). The court of claims has exclusive, original jurisdiction over such a civil action. Id. Upon presentation of the requisite proof to the court of claims, a wrongfully imprisoned individual is entitled to receive a sum of money as set forth in the statute. R.C. 2743.48(E)(2).
{¶10} "Because the legislature created the right to bring a wrongful-imprisonment action under R.C. 2743.48 in 1986, * * *, [such an action is] a special proceeding under R.C. 2505.02(A)(2)." State ex rel. O'Malley v. Russo , 156 Ohio St.3d 548, 2019-Ohio-1698, 130 N.E.3d 256, ¶ 21 ; R.C. 2505.02(A)(2) ( ).
{¶11} The Supreme Court has explained, "when the General Assembly intends that a case may be tried by a jury, it has manifested its intent with appropriate language." State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell , 110 Ohio St.3d 144, 2006-Ohio-3459, 852 N.E.2d 145, ¶ 46 ( ); see Kneisley , 40 Ohio St.3d at 357, 533 N.E.2d 743 ().
{¶12} The language of R.C. 2743.48 indicates that the General Assembly intended that a judge, and not a jury, should determine in the first instance whether a person was wrongfully imprisoned. R.C. 2743.48(B)(2) specifically provides that "the court of common pleas" is to make the determination that a person is a wrongfully imprisoned individual. To be so declared in this case, McClain was required to prove that he satisfied each of the five conditions in R.C. 2743.48(A), including the condition in (A)(5) that:
it was determined by the court of common pleas in the county where the underlying criminal action was initiated either that the...
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