McClain v. Williams

• Decision Date: 18 October 1898
• Citation: 76 N.W. 930,11 S.D. 227
• Parties: JOHN McCLAIN, Plaintiff and respondent, v. A. J. WILLIAMS, Defendant and appellant.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

11 S.D. 227

76 N.W. 930

JOHN McCLAIN, Plaintiff and respondent,

v.

A. J. WILLIAMS, Defendant and appellant. South Dakota Supreme Court Appeal from Circuit Court, Hutchinson County, SD Hon. E. G. Smith, Judge Affirmed W. J. Hooper Attorneys for appellant. Wellington Brown Attorneys for respondent. Opinion filed Oct. 18, 1898

CORSON, P. J.

This was an action in claim and delivery. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. The defendant did not controvert the plaintiff’s ownership of the property, but he claimed the right to the possession by virtue of an hotel keeper’s lien thereon for a balance due him for board of one Kirk, who brought the property to defendant’s hotel. The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiff on all the issues.

Several errors are assigned, but in the view we take of the case, the only question requiring consideration is, did the defendant have an hotel keeper’s lien upon the property of the plaintiff taken by Kirk to his room in the hotel? This question was properly raised by defendant’s motion for the direction of a verdict in his favor, which was denied, and exception taken. The record does not disclose the grounds upon which the motion was made or denied, and hence, if the court’s ruling was correct upon any ground, it must be sustained. From the evidence it appears that Kirk boarded at defendant’s hotel for some weeks, and while so boarding there he leased the gun in controversy from the plaintiff, and took it to his room in the hotel, in which defendant found it after Kirk had left, and took it into his possession, and claims the right to hold it for Kirk’s unpaid board bill. The defendant contends that at common law the innkeeper had a lien, not only upon the property owned by the guest, but upon all property brought with him, and in good faith received by the innkeeper as the property of the guest, and that the Code of this state recognizes and adopts this rule. This seems to have been the rule at common law (Jones, Liens, § 498), but we are of the opinion that under the provisions of the Code of this state the common law has been changed, so far as it affects the property of a third person. The Code of this state provides that “in this state there is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the Codes.” Comp. Laws, § 2505. And by Section 4802 it is provided:

“The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code. The Code establishes the law of this territory respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions, and all proceedings under it are to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects and to promote justice.”

Section 3686, as amended by Chapter 102, Laws 1893, provides

“An inn-keeper or keeper of a boarding house is liable for all losses of or injuries to personal property placed by his guests or boarders under his care … and upon such property the inn-keeper or keeper of a boarding house shall have a lien and right of detention for the payment of such amount as may be due him … . Subd. 3. Baggage and other property and effects belonging to any person who, after obtaining board lodging or other accommodations at any hotel or inn, shall abscond or absent himself or herself, from such hotel or inn without having paid for such board, lodging or other accommodations may at the expiration of thirty (30) days be disposed of by the keeper of such hotel or inn at private or public sale, and the net amount realized from such sale shall be credited to the unpaid account of the absconder.”

The qualification, “belonging” to the guest in the third subdivision is important and shows clearly that the legislature intended to limit the lien to the property of the guest. It is true that the first clause of the section does not contain this qualification or limitation, but the whole section must be construed together. It will not be presumed that the lawmaking power intended that the lien should attach to property the hotel keeper was not authorized to sell in satisfaction of the...