McClanahan`s Adm`r v. Norfolk & W. R. Co.

Decision Date24 January 1918
Citation122 Va. 705,96 S.E. 453
PartiesMcClanahan's Administrator v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Randolph Harrison, R. E. Scott, Samuel A. Anderson, H. T. Hall, T. W. Miller, C. S. McNulty, M. M. Caldwell, Jackson & Henson, and H. M. Moomaw, for the appellants.

Roy B. Smith, Everett Perkins, S. Hamilton Graves, L. H. Cocke, Staples & Cocke, R. I. Roop, and Woods, Chitwood & Coxe, for the appellees.

Kelly, J. Whittle, P. and Prentis, J., concur in the opinion of Kelly, J. Burks, J. Sims, J. (concurring in the result of the opinion of the majority of the court on all points involved in the case).

OPINION

[96 S.E. 470contd] [EDITOR'S NOTE: The page numbers of this document may appear to be out of sequence; however, this pagination accurately reflects the pagination of the original published document.]

Assuming that the record does not show that the whole of the purchase price of the school property was paid before the appellants' judgments were recovered, we fully concur in the views expressed and the conclusions reached by Judge Burks in regard to the liability of that property. We think further, however, that the record does sufficiently show that the purchase money was all paid before the rendition of the judgments, and, hence, that under the doctrine of Floyd v. Harding, the school property is not liable.

As to the property of the Norfolk and Western Railway Company, we are of opinion that the defense based upon adverse possession is good.

The claim of the railway company to title by adverse possession is decisively supported by all the essential elements of such a title. Its predecessors entered into possession in 1883 under a color and claim distinctly adverse to, and in no wise in privity with, the Rorer title, and this possession, in most emphatic manner, had continued exclusively, uninterruptedly, visibly, notoriously, and in hostility to all other titles, for more than twenty-three years before this suit was brought, and for nearly thirty years before the appellants asserted any claim of lien upon the property, or attempted by amended pleadings to make the railway company a party. During these decades, the adverse occupants had expended many thousands of dollars in permanent improvements on the premises.

One of the distinct defenses of the company, as shown by both answers filed by it, rests upon the claim that its possession under Waid and Terry was adverse and hostile from the beginning and in no way connected with Rorer. In the petition upon which this appeal was granted it is said that, "the lands in the possession of the said railway company * * * were shown to be * * * the property of said Rorer. * * * The said railway company was in possession of the lot conveyed to Rorer by Trout, claiming title thereto by adverse possession * * *" The report of Commissioner Ellett, according to a statement in the petition for appeal, verified by the record, shows "that Rorer's title to the half interest in the lot was good, that he had never conveyed that interest to any one, and that the Norfolk and Western Railway Company was in possession without any title." The report of Commissioner Stuart shows that "counsel for the judgment creditors request your commissioner to report especially as to Norfolk and Western office lot that there was no sale of the property by Rorer & Son, or by the said F. Rorer." The decree of the circuit court from which the present appeal was granted contains the following paragraph: "As to the liability of the property conveyed by John Trout and wife to F. Rorer & Son, by deed dated the fifth of May, 1874, and now held and claimed by the defendant, the Norfolk and Western Railway Company, Commissioner Stuart reports that there was no sale or conveyance by F. Rorer of his interest or estate in said property, and that there was no sale or conveyance of said property by F. Rorer, or by F. Rorer & Son, or by F. Rorer and P. H. Rorer, and there being no exception to this finding in said report, said report is in respect thereto confirmed; and the court, now proceeding to pass upon the several defenses of the said Norfolk and Western Railway Company, as presented by its answer and several exceptions to said report, is of opinion that said railway company has held said property for more than fifteen years prior to the institution of this suit adversely to said F. Rorer and those claiming under, by or through him." In the agreed statement of facts it appears that the Roanoke Land and Improvement Company and its successors in title, similarly claiming under the deed from Waid and Terry, continued in the actual, uninterrupted, open, notorious and exclusive possession of said land, claiming complete title thereto up to the present time, etc. The fact being conclusively shown that Rorer never parted with his title, this provision in the agreed statement of facts necessarily means that the railway company and its predecessors in title claimed a good and complete title as against Rorer. The cause has been proceeded in from the beginning by the creditors upon the claim and theory that Rorer owned the property and never sold it. This theory was sustained by the commissioners, and their finding, without any exception thereto, was confirmed by a solemn adjudication of the court. No error in this respect is or could be assigned by the appellants.

To set out in detail the facts as to the possession of the property and its extensive improvement by the occupants would uselessly prolong this opinion. Suffice it to say that the possession of the railway company, and of those under whom it claims, began before the recovery of the judgments, and that long before this suit was brought it had acquired, by all the tests recognized in the law, as perfect and complete title as it is ever possible to acquire by a true and typical adverse possession.

The important question for decision, therefore, is, What sort of title does adverse possession, in its true legal sense, confer? We think the answer of both reason and authority is that the title thus conferred is good against the world.

The soundness of this conclusion depends, of course, upon the construction and application of section 2915 of the Code. That section, so far as material here, is as follows: "No person shall make an entry on, or bring an action to recover, any land lying east of the Alleghany mountains, but within fifteen years * * * next after the time at which the right to make such entry or bring such action shall have first accrued to himself or to some person through whom he claims."

This statute in Virginia, and statutes of substantially the same tenor and effect in the other States, constitute the foundation for all title by adverse possession in this country. The ruling purpose and policy of these statutes, which must be looked to in determining their true meaning and effect, is to give stability to land titles.

"The acquisition of title to land by adverse user is referable to and predicated upon the statutes of limitations in force in the several States, which, in effect, provide that an uninterrupted occupancy of lands by a person who has in fact no title thereto, for a certain number of years, shall operate to extinguish the title of the true owner thereto, and vest a right to the premises absolutely in the occupier. The object of these statutes is to quiet the titles to land, and prevent that confusion relative thereto which would necessarily exist if no period was limited within which an entry upon lands could be made; and they are believed to be of even more importance to the interests of society than those relating to personal actions." 2 Wood on Limitations (4th ed.), section 254, page 1219.

"The best interests of society require that causes of action should not be deferred an unreasonable time. This remark is peculiarly applicable to land titles. Nothing so much retards the growth and prosperity of a country as insecurity of titles to real estate." Lewis v. Marshall (U. S.), 5 Peters 470, 477, 8 L. Ed. 195, 197.

It is not surprising, therefore, that we should find, as we do find, that, carrying into practical meaning and usefulness, this wise and settled policy and object of the statutes prescribing a limitation to actions for the recovery of lands, the authorities are practically unanimous in ascribing to them the effect of vesting in an adverse occupant who comes within their terms a new, independent and indefeasible title -- one paramount to and good against that of all other persons, no matter how or when such other title may have been derived or in what form or forum it may be asserted or sought to be made effective. Less than this would not accomplish the purpose of the legislation.

The adverse occupant who has held for the statutory period does not stand in the position of a grantee from the former true owner, but his occupancy has, by authority of the State speaking through the statute, extinguished all other titles, and has vested in him an absolute and exclusive right to the possession. His title is not in any sense in privity with that of the former owner, and cannot be questioned either by such former owner or by any one claiming through him. Some expressions are to be found in the text books and decisions on this subject which, standing alone, might seem to indicate that the adverse occupant merely takes over the title of the former owner. It will usually, if not always, be found, however, that such expressions occur only in a connection which assumes a perfect title in the former owner, and are used only as a means of conveying the idea that adverse possession confers a title complete and perfect for all purposes. For example, if the instant case presented no question of liens, but a controversy directly between Rorer and the railway company, it would be quite natural and appropriate to say that the company's title was as perfect and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
26 cases
  • Mcclanahan's Adm'r v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • January 24, 1918
  • Sav. &. Loan Corp. v. Bear
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • September 12, 1930
    ...Floyd, Trustee, v. Harding, 28 Grat. (69 Va.) 407; Coldiron v. Ashe-ville Shoe Co., 93 Va. 364, 25 S. E. 238; Mc-Clanahan v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 122 Va. 705, 101 S. E. 453; Van Nostrand & Co. v. Va. Zinc, etc., Corp., 126 Va. 131, 101 S. E. 65; Harney v. First Nat. Bank, 52 N. J. Eq. 697......
  • Savings and Loan Corp. v. Bear
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • September 12, 1930
    ...Va.) 433; Floyd, Trustee, Harding, 28 Gratt. (69 Va.) 407; Coldiron Asheville Shoe Co., 93 Va. 364, 25 S.E. 238; McClanahan Norfolk, etc. R. Co., 122 Va. 705, 101 S.E. 453; Van Nostrand & Co. Va. Zinc, etc., Corp., 126 Va. 131, 101 S.E. 65, Harney First Nat. Bank, 52 N.J.Eq. 697, 29 Atl. Wh......
  • Stryker v. Rasch
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • April 22, 1941
    ... ... Rogers, 30 Cal. 229, 89 Amer. Dec. 88; McClanahan's ... Adm'r. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 96 S.E. 456 ... BLUME, ... Justice. RINER, Ch. J., and KIMBALL, J., ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT