McClanahan v. Commissioner of Social Security

• Decision Date: 22 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-6649.,05-6649.
• Citation: 474 F.3d 830
• Parties: Tommy J. McCLANAHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

474 F.3d 830

Tommy J. McCLANAHAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 05-6649.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: July 26, 2006.

Decided and Filed: August 22, 2006.^*

ARGUED: Kenneth A. Miller, Miller & Lefebvre, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Charles R. Goldstein, Social Security Administration, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Kenneth A. Miller, Miller & Lefebvre, Knoxville, Tennessee,

for Appellant. Charles R. Goldstein, Social Security Administration, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellee.

Before BATCHELDER and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; ACKERMAN, District Judge.^**

OPINION

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Tommy J. McClanahan appeals the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment and the grant of the Defendant-Appellee Commissioner of Social Security's motion for summary judgment affirming the Commissioner's decision and dismissing the case. McClanahan claims that the district court erred when it upheld the Commissioner's determination of the date of onset of his disability. For the reasons that follow, the ruling of the district court is affirmed.

I. Background

McClanahan first applied for disability benefits and supplemental social security income in December of 1997, claiming that he was unable to work beginning February 28, 1997, due to degenerative disc disease. His initial application was denied, and he requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following the hearing, the ALJ issued a decision on September 20, 1999, denying McClanahan's disability claim. The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on September 28, 2000, when the Appeals Council denied McClanahan's request for review.

McClanahan filed his first complaint in federal district court seeking review of the ALJ's decision on October 27, 2000. The parties filed cross-motions, each asking the district court to reverse the ALJ's decision and enter an order to remand the case for further fact-finding. The magistrate issued a report and recommendation, recommending that the motions be granted and that judgment be entered. On March 22, 2001, the district court entered an order accepting the magistrate's recommendation in its entirety. As a result of the order, the claimant underwent neuropsychological evaluation and a supplemental hearing was conducted.

Following the additional development of the record, McClanahan appeared represented by counsel on February 20, 2002, before a different ALJ, who found that McClanahan was disabled as of July 27, 2001, due to organic brain dysfunction, but not prior to that date. The ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision on July 7, 2004, when the Appeals Council found no reason to assume jurisdiction.

On August 9, 2004, McClanahan filed a second complaint in federal district court seeking judicial review of the ALJ's February 20, 2002, determination. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending the entry of judgment for the Commissioner. After overruling McClanahan's objections to the report, the district court entered an order granting the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment. This timely appeal followed.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The district court exercised jurisdiction over the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). This court has jurisdiction over the final ruling of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

This court must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions unless the Commissioner failed to apply the correct legal standard or made findings of fact that are unsupported by substantial evidence. Branham v. Gardner, 383 F.2d 614, 626-27 (6th Cir.1967). "The findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Besaw v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 966 F.2d 1028, 1030 (6th Cir.1992). "The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. . . . This is so because there is a `zone of choice' within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear of court interference." Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir.2001) (citations omitted). This Court reviews questions of law de novo. Smith-Wilkins v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 880 F.2d 864, 866 (6th Cir.1989).

III. Analysis

McClanahan brings two issues on appeal. First, he claims that the ALJ committed error because he applied the wrong legal standard when he determined the onset date of McClanahan's disability. Second, he claims that the ALJ erred in finding that July 27, 2001, was the date of onset for his disability.

A. Disability Determination

An ALJ engages in a five-step sequential evaluation when deciding whether a claimant is entitled to social security disability benefits pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The evaluation proceeds as follows: 1) the claimant's work activity is considered. If he is performing substantial gainful activity, he will be found to be not disabled; 2) the severity of the claimant's alleged impairments is considered, including the duration; 3) the severity of the alleged impairment is considered compared to the disability listings, and if the impairment meets one of the listings, the claimant is found to be disabled; 4) if the claimant's impairment does not prevent him from doing past relevant work, a finding of not disabled will be made; 5) finally, even if the impairment does prevent him from doing past relevant work, the claimant's age, education, and work experience are considered along with the residual functional capacity to determine whether the claimant could adjust to other work. Id.

During the sequential evaluation, if the claimant is found to be conclusively disabled or not disabled, the disability determination is made, and the inquiry is ended. Id. ("If we can find that you are disabled or not disabled at a step, we do not go on to the next step.").

B. Wrong Legal Standard

McClanahan first claims that the ALJ erred when he did not mention Social Security Ruling 83-20 to establish the onset date of disability, and when he did not employ the correct legal standard in his disability determination.

Social Security Ruling 83-20 governs the determination of disability onset date. Once a finding of disability is made, the ALJ must determine the onset date of the disability. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir.1997). The ruling states, in relevant part:

Factors relevant to the determination of disability onset include the individual's allegation, the work history, and the medical evidence. These factors are often evaluated together to arrive at the onset date. However, the individual's allegation or the date of work stoppage is significant in determining onset only if it is consistent with the severity of the condition(s) shown by the medical evidence.

SSR 83-20 at 1 (emphasis added). Further, the ruling states that "the medical evidence serves as the primary element in the onset determination." Id. at 2.

McClanahan claims that the ALJ "did not mention or apply the proper legal standard in determining the onset date of disability. Once he found claimant disabled at Step 3 of the sequential evaluation process, he should have established the onset date using the legal standard set forth in Social Security Ruling 83-20." Appellant's Br. at 14. In particular, McClanahan urges that an earlier disability onset date should be identified, because the ruling states:

Particularly in the case of slowly progressive impairments, it is not necessary for an impairment to have reached listing severity (i.e. be decided on medical grounds alone) before onset can be established .... In some cases, it may be possible, based on the medical evidence, to reasonably infer that the onset of a disabling impairment occurred some time prior to the date of the first recorded medical examination, e.g. the date the claimant stopped working.

SSR 83-20 at 2.

McClanahan argues that the ALJ's decision requires this court to remand the case "so the ALJ can create a record which forms a basis for the onset date" because the opinion fails to mention SSR 83-20, fails to explain the legal standard used to establish the onset date, and fails to offer any rationale for the onset date the ALJ identified. Appellant's Br. at 25.

1. ALJ not required to specifically mention SSR 83-20

McClanahan advances no legal authority for his theory that the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard when he failed to mention SSR 83-20 during the disability determination. He cites to Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1122 n. 9 (6th Cir. 1989), wherein this court stated that Social Security Rulings are binding on all components of the Social Security Administration. These rulings represent "precedent final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations that [the Social Security Administration] ha[s] adopted." 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1) (internal citations omitted). While we agree with this assertion, we do not find that it stands for the proposition that an ALJ must refer with specificity to Social Security Rulings when making disability determinations. Because the ALJ conducted the analysis required by the Ruling, his failure to mention it by name is not fatal to the decision. See Pugh v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 1271, 1274 (7th Cir.1989).

2. The ALJ followed the dictates of SSR 83-20

We find that the ALJ did follow the requirements of SSR 83-20 when rendering the disability determination, even though the ruling was not specifically mentioned. Contrary to McClanahan's...