McClanahan v. McClanahan, 2100960.

• Decision Date: 10 August 2012
• Docket Number: 2100960.
• Citation: 101 So.3d 1239
• Parties: Richard McCLANAHAN v. Elizabeth McCLANAHAN.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

101 So.3d 1239

Richard McCLANAHAN

v.Elizabeth McCLANAHAN.

2100960.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

Aug. 10, 2012.

Eddie Beason of McDowell, Beason & Hamilton, P.C., Russellville, for appellant.

Elizabeth Gonce Messer of Gonce & Messer, Attorneys at Law, Florence, for appellee.

PITTMAN, Judge.

Richard McClanahan (“the former husband”) appeals from a judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court finding him to be in contempt of a provision of a 2003 judgment of that court that divorced him from Elizabeth McClanahan (“the former wife”), which provision had directed the former husband to pay the former wife $30,000 within 90 days. Because we conclude that the contempt judgment erroneously determinedthe postjudgment interest owed by the former husband, we reverse and remand.

The parties were divorced by the trial court in a judgment of divorce entered on April 10, 2003.¹ That judgment provided, among other things, that the former husband was to pay the former wife $30,000 within 90 days of the date of that judgment and that the former wife was to convey to the former husband all of her interests in a particular parcel of real property via a quitclaim deed. In June 2010, the former wife filed an action seeking contempt sanctions, alleging that the former husband had not paid $24,365.76 of the amount he had been required to pay under the divorce judgment, and she sought a judgment for that amount, interest, and attorney fees. The former husband subsequently asserted a counterclaim for contempt sanctions against the former wife, asserting that the former wife had failed to comply with the quitclaim-deed requirement in the divorce judgment.

After an ore tenus proceeding, during which an evidentiary exhibit outlining the former wife's interest calculations (which included annually compounded interest on unpaid portions of the $30,000 principal amount) was admitted into evidence over the objection of counsel for the former husband, the trial court entered a judgment in March 2011 granting relief to the former wife and denying relief to the former husband on his counterclaim. As to the former wife's claim, the trial court noted that funds of $5,634.24 had previously been obtained by the former wife through garnishment and that postjudgment interest at a rate of 12 percent had been accruing on the judgment; the judgment, after referring to the garnishment and the applicable rate of interest, contained the following pertinent provision: “The Court finds that as of April, 2011, the judgment will be in the amount of $68,628.47 after interest is added in.” No costs, damages, or attorney fees were awarded to either party. The former husband filed a postjudgment motion directed to the trial court's ruling on his counterclaim; the trial court thereafter allowed the former husband a $3,000 offset against the moneys he had been declared in the contempt judgment to owe the former wife so as to account for damages flowing from the former wife's having failed to comply with the quitclaim-deed provision of the divorce judgment.

The former husband, on appeal, raises one issue: whether the trial court erred in determining the amount of interest accruing on the former husband's monetary obligation set forth in the April 2003 divorce judgment. Among other things, he contends that, under the postjudgment-interest provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 8–8–10, that were in effect at the time of the divorce judgment, only simple interest at 12 percent, not compound interest, accrued upon the $30,000 amount payable under the April 2003 divorce judgment. The legal principle invoked by the former husband is correct, as we noted in Campbell v. Campbell, 827 So.2d 111 (Ala.Civ.App.2002), which was decided when the 12–percent–interest provision was in effect: “While Alabama law does permit the assessment of 12 percent interest on unpaid judgments ..., it does not permit the assessment of compound interest on judgments.” 827 So.2d at 115 (footnote omitted;citing Burlington N.R.R. v. Whitt, 611 So.2d 219, 223–24...