McClanahan v. Wilson

• Decision Date: 31 July 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1720-JWD-RLB
• Parties: MICHAEL McCLANAHAN, ET AL. v. SCOTT WILSON, ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana

MICHAEL McCLANAHAN, ET AL. v. SCOTT WILSON, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 17-1720-JWD-RLB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

July 31, 2019

RULING AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Strike Defendants' Jury Demand (Doc. 32) filed by Plaintiffs Michael McClanahan, Gary Chambers, and Eugene Collins (collectively, "Plaintiffs"). Defendants City of Baton Rouge and Scott Wilson ("Wilson") (collectively, "Defendants") oppose the motion. (Doc. 35.) Plaintiffs have filed a reply. (Doc. 36.) The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of the parties and, for oral reasons assigned at the July 25, 2019, pretrial conference, granted Plaintiff's motion. The Court now assigns these written reasons.

I. Relevant Background

This suit arises from a Baton Rouge Metro Council meeting which took place on May 10, 2017. (First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶¶ 2-11, Doc. 2.) Plaintiffs are leaders in the African-American community. (Id. ¶ 5.) Scott Wilson was the Mayor Pro-Tempore of the Metro Council who was in charge of running council meetings. (Id. ¶ 19.)

Plaintiffs allege that they attempted to speak at this council meeting about the Alton Sterling shooting and their criticism of the Baton Rouge Police Department. (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.) However, as soon as Plaintiffs and others "said the words 'Alton Sterling,' 'Chief Dabadie,' or 'police department' - or gave any indication that's what they were there to talk about," Wilson ordered that the police remove them. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs claim that this contrasted with Wilson's treatment of other speakers who were allowed to finish their time, regardless of whether they stayed on topic or discussed agenda items. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Plaintiffs claim that Defendants violated their First Amendment rights by silencing their speech. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert:

For these reasons, Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this Court that Scott Wilson's behavior of silencing the Plaintiffs based in the viewpoint expressed violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Louisiana State Constitution. To enforce these rights afforded by the United States Constitution, Plaintiffs bring this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for declaratory relief against Scott Wilson's viewpoint discrimination. Plaintiffs also seek to recover all their attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in this action and any other relief that this Court may order. They are not seeking money damages.

(FAC ¶ 12, Doc. 2 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs also seek no damages in their prayer for relief:

VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

THEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court enter the following relief:

A. Enter a declaratory judgment, specifying Defendants' constitutional violations and declaring the rights of the Plaintiffs;

B. Enter a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201, declaring that Scott Wilson's removal of Plaintiffs was unconstitutional and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

C. Award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 28 C.F.R. § 35.175, and 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b);

D. Order such other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled.

(FAC, Doc. 2 at 23.)

The Uniform Pretrial Order ("PTO") captures the heart of the instant motion. Specifically, the PTO contains the following statement from the parties:

This matter is designated as a jury trial. Plaintiffs contest this designation, as they did not request a jury trial, nor do Defendants have any right to a jury trial. Defendants requested a jury trial, to which they have a right.

(PTO, Doc. 11 at 15.)

II. Parties' Arguments

Plaintiffs move to strike the demand for a jury trial which was made by Defendants in their pretrial order. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have no right to a trial by jury. Plaintiffs identify a two-part test to determine if a jury right attaches, the second prong of which requires the Court to "examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature." (Doc. 32-1 at 3 (citing Chauffers, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990)).) According to Plaintiffs, "a remedy is legal if it is for monetary damages, and not otherwise." (Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).) If the remedy is equitable and not legal, there is no right to a jury trial. Here, Plaintiffs specifically state in their operative complaint that they are not seeking monetary damages, so there is no right to a trial by jury arising from Plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief.

Defendants respond first by essentially repeating the two-part test cited by Plaintiffs. However, Defendants focus their efforts on City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999), where the Supreme Court allegedly held that the right to trial by jury attaches to § 1983 actions and analogized these cases to tort suits. Defendants maintain that this case requires the resolution of factual and legal issues. Further, Plaintiffs specifically reserved their right to other relief available "at law or in equity" to which they may be justly entitled. Intent is critical here, and that requires the resolution of credibility and facts which are more appropriate for a jury. Equally important, Defendants have asserted qualified immunity, and that must be determined by the jury. The fact that Plaintiffs asserted a claim for declaratory relief is irrelevant,as declaratory actions are neither equitable nor legal. Defendants close by attempting to distinguish Plaintiffs' cases and by arguing that they told Plaintiffs that they would seek a jury.

Plaintiffs reply: "Defendants get the right-to-a-jury analysis completely wrong." (Doc. 36-1.) Plaintiffs point to the text of the Seventh Amendment and argue that they seek no monetary relief at all. Thus, there is no right to trial by jury. Further, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants point to no case which stands for the proposition that there is a right to trial by jury in a § 1983 declaratory relief case. Plaintiffs close by saying that Defendants argue non-sequiturs: (1) credibility and factual disputes are not controlling; the nature of the relief sought is; and (2) qualified immunity is immunity from damages, not declaratory relief.

III. Analysis

A. Right to Jury Trial Generally

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 provides in relevant part: "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution--or as provided by a federal statute--is preserved to the parties inviolate." Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a). Rule 39 then states:

When a jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38, the action must be designated on the docket as a jury action. The trial on all issues so demanded must be by jury unless:

(1) the parties or their attorneys file a stipulation to a nonjury trial or so stipulate on the record; or

(2) the court, on motion or on its own, finds that on some or all of those issues there is no federal right to a jury trial.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a) (emphasis added).

Here, Defendants allege a federal right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, which provides: "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. Const. amend. VII.

"The Seventh Amendment provides for the right to a jury trial in cases that are legal in nature, but not for those which are equitable in nature." City of El Paso, Tex. v. El Paso Entm't, Inc., 464 F. App'x 366, 370 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 533 (1970)). "If a statute does not expressly grant the right to a jury trial, then a court 'must examine both the nature of the action and of the remedy sought. First, [it must] compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. . . . Second, [it must] examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.' " Id. (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-18 (1987)).

B. Right to Jury Trials for Actions Seeking Declaratory Relief

" '[A]n action for declaratory relief can be either legal or equitable, depending upon whether the action is simply an inverted lawsuit for legal relief or the counterpart of a suit in equity.' " City of El Paso, 464 F. App'x at 370 (citing Terrell v. DeConna, 877 F.2d 1267, 1273 (5th Cir. 1989)). As one treatise explained:

A declaratory judgment is neither a legal nor an equitable remedy. [9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2313 (1995).] Whether a right to trial by jury exists when a declaratory judgment is sought in federal court depends on whether the claim asserted is a counterpart to a suit in equity or to an action at law.[(citations omitted).] As a leading authority states:

If there would have been a right to jury trial on the issue if it had arisen in an action other than for a declaratory judgment, it must be tried to a jury in the declaratory action. There is no right to trial by jury if, absent the declaratory procedure, the issue would have arisen in an equitable proceeding. [Wright and Miller, supra, § 2313 at 110 (footnotes omitted).]

In Northgate Homes Inc. v. City of Dayton, [126 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir.1997)] the Eighth Circuit in a § 1983 action provided a valuable analysis of the right to a jury trial when declaratory relief is sought. The court stated:

Although the declaratory judgment procedure largely originated in equity, declaratory relief per se is neither legal nor equitable. The fact that a declaratory judgment is sought neither restricts nor enlarges any right to a jury trial that would exist if the issue were to

...