McClancy v. Bank of Am., N.A.
Decision Date | 12 September 2017 |
Docket Number | (AC 38568). |
Citation | 168 A.3d 658,176 Conn.App. 408 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Christopher P. MCCLANCY, et al. v. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., et al. |
Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Pierre–Yves Kolakowski, for the appellee (named defendant).
DiPentima, C.J., and Alvord and Bear, Js.
In this litigation arising from an attempt to modify the payment terms of a promissory note and mortgage, the plaintiffs, Christopher P. McClancy and Loretta Giannone, appeal from the summary judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendant, Bank of America, N.A.1 On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the court erred (1) in rendering summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to their breach of contract claim; (2) in failing to determine that the plaintiffs' contract claim fell within an exception to the statute of frauds, General Statutes § 52–550 ; (3) in rendering summary judgment when genuine issues of material fact remained with respect to their negligent and reckless misrepresentation claims; and (4) in determining that no genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to the plaintiffs' claim of a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, General Statutes § 42–110a et seq. (CUTPA). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following uncontested facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On May 8, 2007, the plaintiffs executed a note to the defendant and a mortgage to secure that note in favor of the defendant on property in Darien.2 The defendant serviced this home loan. In the summer and fall of 2011, the plaintiffs and the defendant communicated with respect to the possible modification of the plaintiffs' loan. After the plaintiffs, in November, 2011, had submitted a completed application for modification, on December 1, 2011, the defendant transferred its servicing rights to Bayview. In November, 2011, the defendant had given prior notice to the plaintiffs that this would occur and that Bayview would be responsible for continuing the modification discussions. Neither Bayview nor the defendant entered into a modification with the plaintiffs.
On June 26, 2013, the plaintiffs commenced this action against the defendant and its predecessor in interest for actions purportedly taken and promises allegedly made while the plaintiffs were attempting to modify their loan. In the operative complaint filed June 24, 2014, the plaintiffs alleged claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, reckless misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation—fraud, violation of CUTPA, and civil conspiracy against the defendant and its predecessor in interest.3
On May 20, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims against it and its successor in interest. In support of its motion, the defendant submitted the adjustable rate note dated May 3, 2007, made and signed by the plaintiffs, to the defendant; a mortgage deed dated May 3, 2007, recorded May 4, 2007, and signed by the plaintiffs in favor of the defendant;4 a sworn affidavit of Tiffany Barnfield, assistant vice president, senior operations manager for the defendant; excerpts from the March 9, 2015 deposition of McClancy; and excerpts from the March 9, 2015 deposition of Giannone.
The plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In support of the memorandum in opposition, the plaintiffs submitted an affidavit of McClancy, attached to which were a letter from the plaintiffs to the defendant's predecessor in interest dated June 16, 2011, authorizing an attorney to negotiate a modification of the loan on their behalf; letters from the defendant to the plaintiffs dated November 2, November 10, November 21, and two from November 25, 2011; and an assignment of the mortgage on the plaintiffs' property from the defendant to E*Trade. The November 10, 2011 letter informed the plaintiffs that the servicing rights to their loan would be transferred to Bayview effective December 1, 2011. The court rendered summary judgment on October 30, 2015. This appeal followed.
We start by setting forth the applicable standard of review. 5 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America , 310 Conn. 304, 312–13, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
The plaintiffs claim that the court erred in granting summary judgment on their breach of contract claims when genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to the existence of a contract.6 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to present evidence that there was a contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant with respect to a modification of any of the terms of the note or mortgage, or as an independent agreement. Additionally, the court reasoned the defendant had the express right under the loan documents to transfer the note and mortgage at any time without notice to the plaintiffs and, therefore, it was not a breach of contract when it transferred its servicing rights.
We conclude that the plaintiffs' claim that there were genuine issues of material fact on their contract claim is inadequately briefed. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grasso v. Connecticut Hospice, Inc. , 138 Conn.App. 759, 768, 54 A.3d 221 (2012).
The section of the plaintiffs' brief devoted to breach of contract is a single paragraph, contains no case citations, and fails to provide an analysis demonstrating why the court's conclusions were incorrect. Other than to state in a conclusory manner that facts were in dispute, the plaintiffs failed to cite evidence in the record supporting their claim on appeal that genuine issues of material fact existed as to the court's determination that they failed to put forth evidence of a contract.
The plaintiffs' reply brief fares no better. Although they cite some evidence in the record and the statute of limitations for oral contracts, they still fail to analyze their claim by applying contract law to the evidence in the record. Consequently, based upon this inadequate briefing, we do not review this claim.
The plaintiffs also claim that the court erred in failing to find that their claims fell within an exception to the statute of frauds; specifically, promissory estoppel.
We first note that our courts have not established a promissory estoppel exception to the statute of frauds. See Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc. , 274 Conn. 33, 89–90 n.38, 873 A.2d 929 (2005) ( ) The doctrine of equitable estoppel accompanied by the doctrine of part performance on the contract, however, bars the assertion of the statute of frauds as a defense. Id., at 60–63, 873 A.2d 929. We do not decide whether promissory estoppel bars the defense of statute of frauds because, even if it did, the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence of the promise claimed to have been made.
(Citation omitted; internal...
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