Mcclellan v. State ex rel. Fornshell
| Citation | 101 N.E. 387,54 Ind.App. 144 |
| Decision Date | 02 April 1913 |
| Docket Number | No. 7,893.,7,893. |
| Parties | McCLELLAN v. STATE ex rel. FORNSHELL. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wells County; Chas. E. Sturgis, Judge.
Bastardy proceeding by the State, on the relation of Ellen Fornshell, against William H. McClellan. From an adverse judgment, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Eichhorn & Vaughn, of Bluffton, for appellant. L. L. Simons, of Warren, J. B. Merriman and Chas. G. Dailey, both of Bluffton, and E. W. Secrest, Pros. Atty., of Hartford City, for appellee.
A jury found that appellant was the father of a bastard child born to the relatrix. The court overruled appellant's motion for a new trial and rendered judgment against him for $600. The overruling of said motion is assigned as error.
The only question argued is that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
The relatrix swore positively to every fact essential to the verdict returned, and was corroborated to some extent by other witnesses as to acquaintance and dates. The appellant squarely contradicted the relatrix, and was corroborated by some circumstances and seeming inconsistencies in the testimony of the relatrix.
Appellant insists that, notwithstanding the well-established rule that this court will not weigh the evidence where there is some evidence tending to support every material fact essential to the judgment rendered by the trial court, we should reverse the judgment in this case and order a new trial, on the theory that the evidence is inconsistent, contradictory, and unworthy of belief.
The question presented to this court was decided by the trial court, who saw the witnesses and had a better opportunity to determine their credibility than this court can have from the record.
If, as appellant contends, the evidence tending to support the judgment is so inconsistent, contradictory, and unbelievable that it does not fairly and reasonably support the verdict, and substantial justice has not been done between the parties, it was the duty of the trial court to grant a new trial. We must presume that the trial court did its duty, and that in passing on the motion for a new trial it rightly decided that the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.
This court might disregard a mere scintilla of evidence if a fact material to the judgment depended wholly upon it, and it appeared from the record that substantial justice had not been done between the...
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