McClelland v. Whiteley

Decision Date01 January 1883
Citation15 F. 322
PartiesMcCLELLAND, Receiver, etc., v. WHITELEY.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

Jenkins Elliott & Winkler, for plaintiff.

Fish &amp Dodge, for defendant.

DYER J.

The plaintiff in this action sues to recover upon an alleged subscription by the defendant of $2,000 to the capital stock of a corporation now dissolved, known as the Chicago Publishing Company, incorporated and organized in 1877, under the laws of Illinois. One O. A. Willard, since deceased, was the largest stockholder, and the president and business manager of the company.

In July, 1878, the Rock River Paper Company, a creditor of said corporation, filed its bill against the publishing company and all alleged stock subscribers of that company, in the superior court of Cook county, Illinois, to wind up the affairs of the company, and to compel the payment of all subscriptions to stock, for the benefit of creditors. The defendant herein was made a party to that bill. As he was a resident of Wisconsin, no personal service of process could be made upon him, but jurisdiction of him was attempted to be obtained by publication in a manner said to be authorized by the laws of Illinois. In that suit the plaintiff herein was appointed receiver of the property and effects of the publishing company, and subsequently a decree was entered by which it was, among other things, decreed that all of the solvent stockholders or subscribers to the capital stock of said corporation, including the defendant herein, pay, or cause to be paid, to the plaintiff receiver, the several sums of money alleged to be due from them respectively on account of their subscriptions to the stock of the company. Subsequently, the Illinois court made a further order authorizing and directing the receiver to prosecute suit against the defendant herein to recover the amount of his alleged subscription, and it is understood that the various proceedings in the Illinois case were in accordance with the statutes of that state authorizing the same.

The case at bar was submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, and upon the argument it was contended by the counsel for the defendant that the right or capacity of the receiver to sue was limited to the jurisdiction of the court that appointed him, and that he could not come into this jurisdiction and, as receiver, prosecute this suit against the defendant. Further, that the receiver cannot maintain this action, because he shows no judgment of the court appointing him, which is conclusive against the defendant. In the view which the court takes of the merits of the case, it is unnecessary to pass upon these questions.

Since the superior court of Cook county did not get jurisdiction of the defendant by personal service of process upon him, and as, therefore, its decree was not conclusive as to him, it cannot be denied, and indeed it is admitted, that he may make here the same defense upon the merits that he could have made in the Illinois suit had he appeared therein and contested the question of liability.

The material question for determination then is, did the defendant, upon the facts here shown, incur liability as a stock subscriber of the publishing company? If he did, then he ought to contribute with other stockholders to the payment of the debts of the corporation. The stock subscription-book is in evidence, and the name of the defendant appears therein as representing a subscription for 20 shares, amounting to $2,000. It is satisfactorily shown, however, and this was conceded by counsel for the plaintiff after the proofs were in, that the defendant's signature on the stock-book was not in his handwriting, and was not his genuine signature. That it was written in imitation of his signature is apparent.

Enough is disclosed by the evidence to show that in January, 1878 Willard, who had authority to solicit stock subscriptions, came to Racine, where the defendant resided, and requested him to become a subscriber. The defendant told him he was not in a situation to engage in a joint-stock enterprise. This is shown by the testimony of the plaintiff, who testifies to statements made to him by the defendant concerning the defendant's interview with Willard. Further conversation on the subject was had between Willard and the defendant, but precisely what was said is not directly proven, for the reason that Willard is deceased, and therefore, under the statute, the defendant was not a competent witness to testify to conversations between the parties. The answer alleges that, as the result of the negotiations, the defendant told Willard that if he could secure the appointment of United States consul at Bradford, England, he would be able to take and pay for stock to the amount of $2,000. But, notwithstanding this hiatus in the proofs, enough appears to be quite clearly indicate that the defendant was not then prepared to make a subscription, but that in certain contingencies he would be willing to do so. Thereupon Willard presented to the defendant a memorandum-book, and the defendant wrote therein, 'Simeon Whiteley-- 2,000-- 20;' the figures evidently meaning $2,000-- 20 shares. It is satisfactorily shown that this book was Willard's personal memorandum-book and not the stock-book of the company. There was one other signature on the page which the defendant thus wrote his name, but nothing was written on the pages which preceded these signatures. The fact is not clearly proven, but the whole evidence and the circumstances of the transaction, I think, warrant the inference that the defendant wrote his signature in the manner stated, not as a present subscription, but as indicative of what he would be willing to subscribe in a certain event; for it is clearly demonstrated that he never subscribed for stock in the subscription-book of the company, and he has testified unqualifiedly that he never authorized Willard or any other person to subscribe for him, or to place his...

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5 cases
  • Rubel v. Willey
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 25 Junio 1895
    ...1 Am. & Eng. Enc. L., 339; Searing v. Butler, 69 Ill. 575; Hurd v. Marple, 2 Bradw., 297; Stockbridge v. Same, 14 Mass. 257; McClelland v. Whiteley, 15 F. 322; U. S. Co. v. Rawson, 106 Ind. 215. E. E. Lonabaugh, for defendants in error, contended that the judgment should be affirmed on the ......
  • McGlassen v. Tyrrell
    • United States
    • Arizona Supreme Court
    • 4 Mayo 1896
    ...v. Morrow, 7 Cal. 171, 68 Am. Dec. 235; Karns v. Olney, 80 Cal. 100, 22 P. 57; Lumber Co. v. Krug, 89 Cal. 237, 26 P. 902; McClelland v. Whiteley, 15 F. 322; 1 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 431. The evidence in this case would have authorized the court below in holding that Chandler was the real p......
  • Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • 5 Agosto 1889
    ...v. Insurance Co., 105 U.S. 360; Bloomfield v. Bank, 121 U.S. 135, 7 S.Ct. 865; Rolling-Mill v. Railway Co., 5 Fed.Rep. 852; McClelland v. Whiteley, 15 F. 322; Dickinson Conway, 12 Allen, 491. The defendant, asserting such ratification, was therefore bound to show that it was made by the pla......
  • Holm v. Bennett
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • 6 Febrero 1895
    ...v. Fisherdick, 37 Neb. 207, 55 N.W. 643; Vermont State Baptist Convention v. Ladd, 4 A. 634; Jackson v. Badger, 26 N.W. 908; McClelland v. Whiteley, 15 F. 322; Craighead Peterson, 72 N.Y. 279.) To estop Bennett here on the ground that by accepting the proceeds of the sale of his real estate......
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