McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1931
• Docket Number: No. 132.,132.
• Citation: McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 254 Mich. 305, 236 N.W. 792 (Mich. 1931)
• Parties: McCLINTIC-MARSHALL CO. v. FORD MOTOR CO. et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

254 Mich. 305

236 N.W. 792

McCLINTIC-MARSHALL CO.

v.FORD MOTOR CO. et al.

No. 132.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 1, 1931.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery; Ira W. Jayne, Judge.

Suit by the McClintic-Marshall Company against the Ford Motor Company and others, in which various defendants filed cross-bills. From a decree for plaintiff and cross-complainants, named defendant appeals.

Reversed, and bill and cross-bills dismissed.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except BUTZEL, C. J.Longley & Middleton, of Detroit, for appellant.

Wilkinson, Lowther & O'Connell, of Detroit, for appellees McClintic-Marshall Co. and Otis Cement Const. Co.

Griffin, Heal & Emery, of Detroit, for appellee Kalman Steel Co.

Payne & Payne, of Detroit, for appellee H. H. Dickinson Co.

Bryant, Lincoln, Miller & Bevan, of Detroit, for appellee Ray Sand & Gravel Co.

Colby, Berns & Costello, of Detroit, for appellee P. F. Wynne Cartage Co.

Angell, Turner, Dyer & Meek, of Detroit, for appellee James B. Clow & Sons.

Abraham J. Levin, of Detroit, amicus curiae.

POTTER, J.

The Ford Motor Company, a corporation, engaged in manufacturing in Fordson, in 1925 desired a grade separation at Eagle avenue-to construct an underpass 121 feet wide, under the yard of the Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit Railroad, the tracks of the Pere Marquette Railroad; and the land of the city of Detroit, department of street railways-to enable its employees and others to reach its plant more easily, quickly, and safely. It entered into contracts in writing with the Pere Marquette Railroad Company, the Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit Railroad Company, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company operating the Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit Railroad, and with the city of Detroit, department of street railways, for the acquirisition of the right to make this grade separation; and subsequently entered into a contract in writing with John L. Blair, doing business as the Blair Construction Company, to build this underpass and grade separation. Blair entered upon the work, making many contracts for material, but, before the job was completed, disputes arose between Blair and the Ford Motor Company, and the Ford Motor Company rescinded the contract and took over the work. A large number of claims for lien were filed by subcontractors and materialmen, including plaintiff; about 60 suits were commenced against Blair in the circuit court for Wayne county, in which the Ford Motor Company was garnished; several cases were commenced in justice's court against Blair in which the Ford Motor Company was named as garnishee defendant, and other litigation ensued. A bill was filed by plaintiff to declare and enforce its lien; various other lien claimants named in the bill as defendants filed answers and cross-bills to establish, declare, and enforce claims of lien filed by themselves. The Ford Motor Company filed motions to dismiss these bills and cross-bills upon the ground the property upon which a lien was claimed was not lienable and answered the bill of complaint and the several cross-bills filed. An arbitration agreement between Blair and the Ford Motor Company was entered into, a hearing had, and an award filed by the arbitrators awarding Blair $437,294.77. This case was brought on for hearing, referred to William C. Marckley, a circuit court commissioner, who, September 30, 1930, filed findings herein to which exceptions were taken, and subsequently heard before the circuit court and a final decree entered sustaining the liens. The Ford Motor Company appeals.

The bill of complaint describes three parcels of land: Parcel No. 1 being owned by the Ford Motor Company a corporation; parcel No. 2 being owned by the Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit Railroad Company; and parcel No. 3 owned by the city of Detroit, department of street railways (described in the bill of complaint as the Detroit United Railroad, a Michigan corporation). The lands, and the interests of the Ford Motor Company therein, occupied by the right of way and structures incident to the Eagle avenue grade separation, are described in different ways by claimants. Though there is no uniformity in description, they all attempt to describe, in different ways, the interest of the Ford Motor Company in the right of way and the grade separation incident thereto. The bill of complaint alleges: ‘The owners of said property being desirous of making a separation of grades of the railroad crossings through said property, did enter into a contract with John M. Blair doing business as Blair Construction Company for the separation of said grades and the erecting of viaducts and crossings thereunder.’ No contract, such as alleged in the bill of complaint, was entered into by the owners of the lands upon which this grade separation was made. The grade separation affects the lands of the Pere Marquette Railroad Company, the Pennsylvania, Ohio & Detroit Railroad Company, the city of Detroit, department of street railways, and the operating rights of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. None of these parties entered into contract with Blair for the construction of this grade separation. They assumed no responsibility for damages resulting from its building, maintenance, and operation. On the other hand, the railroad companies above named, owners of the lands crossed by the grade separation, granted to the Ford Motor Company the right to construct the same at its own expense; the Ford Motor Company agreeing to keep, save, and bear harmless the owners of the lands from any loss or damage resulting from the building, maintenance, and operation of such grade separation.

The Mechanics' Lien Law is framed upon the theory that those who perform work or furnish material which enters into and enhances the value of improvements on real estate are entitled to a preferred claim against and a lien upon the specific property presumably bettered by the performance of such labor and the furnishing of such materials; the security of attaching creditors and mortgagees being so enhanced in value thereby that they are not prejudiced.

The statute, section 13101, Comp. Laws 1929, under which a lien is claimed, provides: ‘Every person who shall, in pursuance of any contract, express or implied, written or unwritten, existing between himself as contractor, and the owner, part owner or lessee of any interest in real estate, build, alter, improve, repair, erect, ornament or put in, or who shall furnish any labor or materials in or for building, altering, improving, repairing, erecting, ornamenting or putting in any house, building, machinery, wharf or structure, or who shall excavate, or build in whole, or in part, any foundation, cellar or basement for any such house, building, structure or wharf, or shall build or repair any sidewalks or wells or shall furnish any materials therefor, and every person who shall be subcontractor, laborer, or material man, perform any labor or furnish materials to such original or principal contractor, or any subcontractor, in carrying forward or completing any such contract, shall have a lien therefor upon such house, building, machinery, wharf, walk or walks, wells, foundation, cellar or basement, and other structures, and its appurtenances, and also upon the entire interest of such owner, part owner or lessee in and to the lot or piece of land, not exceeding one-quarter (1/4) section of land, or if in any incorporated city or village, not exceeding the lot or lots upon or around or in front of which such improvement is made, to the extent of the right, title and interest of such owner, part owner or lessee at the time work was commenced or materials were begun to be furnished by the contractor under the original contract, or by the subcontractor who furnishes or is furnished with any labor or material in the performance or execution of such subcontract and also the extent of any subsequent acquired interest of any such owner, part owner or lessee.’ This statute came before the Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, Judges Taft, Lurton, and Severens, in Pennsylvania Steel Company v. J. E. Potts Salt & Lumber Co., 63 F. 11, 15. The court placed its decision upon the construction of the statute. It said:

‘In most of the statutes of the several states, the subject of the lien is localized within restricted limits; in others, it is of an extended character; and in some, railroads are expressly mentioned. We are not disposed to question the proposition that such statutes, though they are in contravention of the common law, should be fairly and liberally construed; but we cannot extend them beyond the bounds of the purpose of the legislature, as gathered from the words employed. Upon general principles of construction, we do not think that the words ‘other structure,’ following, as they do, in the Michigan statute, such limited and localizing words as ‘house, building, machinery, wharf,’ can reasonably be held to include a railroad. This conclusion appears to us to be strongly fortified by the restriction of the lien in the latter part of the section to ‘the lot or piece of land not exceeding one quarter section of land, or if in a village not exceeding the lot or lots' on which the improvement is made. Giving all these considerations their just weight, it seems clear to us that the complainant has no lien, and therefore that his suit must fail.

‘It is suggested by counsel for complainant that the statute gives an independent lien upon the ‘structure,’ and a further one upon the land upon which it is built. We do not find it necessary to decide this point, or whether, if it is well taken, the statement of lien which was filed would support the claim of a lien upon the material composing the structure; for we are of the opinion that the structure for which the complainant furnished the material is not such a one as the statute contemplates, and it is only for material furnished for such a purpose that a lien is afforded.'

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