McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Freedman

• Decision Date: 27 February 1931
• Citation: 274 Mass. 558,175 N.E. 55
• Parties: McCLINTIC-MARSHALL CO. v. FREEDMAN.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

274 Mass. 558

175 N.E. 55

McCLINTIC-MARSHALL CO.

v.FREEDMAN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Feb. 27, 1931.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Hampden County; Stanley E. Qua, Judge.

Action by the McClintic-Marshall Company against Albert Freedman. Verdict for plaintiff. On defendant's exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

John P. Kirby, of Springfield, for plaintiff.

Arthur A. Tyler, of Springfield, for defendant.

RUGG, C. J.

This is an action to recover the balance due upon a contract to furnish and erect certain structural and other steel on a building. The contract price was $20,800 upon which $6,000 has been paid. Claims were made for extras by the plaintiff and for a small sum in recoupment by the defendant, which are not now in controversy. The contract appears to have been in part at least in writing, and was in the form of a proposal by the plaintiff accepted by the defendant. It was a proposal to ‘furnish and erect the structural steel work, iron stairs and iron fire escape for’ the proposed building of the defendant. The ‘Layout of steel’ was to be approved by the architect and ‘Steel framing plans [were] to be approved by’ the building inspector of Springfield, ‘Building to be six stories with plan measurements same as shown on Architect's plans.’ The case was referred to an auditor whose findings of fact were to be final. At the hearing before the auditor it was found that the contract was made in February, 1926, and it was agreed that, if all the material thereby called for was furnished and erected, the fair value of the same would be the contract price and ‘the auditor found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the sum of $14,800, the unpaid balance,’ which finding is not now disputed by the defendant. The plans for the building were filed with the building commissioner late in 1925. As originally drawn they showed three sets of stairs running up through the building, one of these was in the rear leading upward from a Turkish bath room in the basement; it was but in only from the basement to the first floor and all above were omitted; plans put in evidence by the defendant showed that changes were made in the rear and a room added on each floor in place of these stairs. These exceptions relate chiefly to the omitted stairs. At the hearing before the auditor the defendant contended that he should be allowed in recoupment for these stairs and testified that they were included in the original plans, and that it was not until the April or May after the contract was signed that he decided to omit the stairs and so informed the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended and offered evidence tending to prove that prior to the signing of the contract the plaintiff was informedby the defendant that the stairs were to be eliminated, and that consequently the figures for the contract price and the contract as signed did not include those stairs. On objection by the defendant, this testimony was excluded on the ground that it would vary the terms of the written contract. To this ruling the plaintiff objected and the objection and ruling were stated in the report of the auditor. The auditor found that the stairs were included in the contract and made finding of amount due accordingly.

Upon the filing of the auditor's report the plaintiff moved to recommit the report to the auditor. This motion was granted on the ground that the ruling of law just stated was regarded by the court as erroneous.

This procedure was correct. The agreement that the findings made by the auditor were to be final related only to the facts found. It did not relate to his rulings of law. He was not made referee or arbitrator and his views about law were not above review. Cases like Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373, 389,Hanley v. AEtna Ins. Co., 215 Mass. 425, 428, 429, 102 N. E. 641, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 53,Clark v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 229 Mass. 1, 10, 118 N. E. 348, and Charlton v. Library Bureau, 260 Mass. 1, 7, 156 N. E. 705, are not relevant. The auditor was appointed under G. L. c. 221, § 56, which makes explicit provision for review and correction of his erroneous rulings of law. The practice on this branch of the case was in precise conformity to that established by the decisions. Fisher v. Doe, 204 Mass. 34, 39, 90 N. E. 592;Lunn & Sweet Co. v. Wolfman, 268 Mass. 345, 349, 167 N. E. 641.

It subsequently appeared that the auditor was unable to proceed with any hearings and the order to recommit was vacated after hearing and the case directed to stand for hearing before the court on the single issue, whether the defendant was entitled to recover in recoupment the amount found by the auditor because the stairs were included in the contract. This too was correct practice. The report of the auditor was accepted in every part except that vitiated by what was regarded by the trial judge as an erroneous ruling of law. It was his duty to correct that. Jones v. Stevens, 5 Metc. 373, 377;Fisher v. Doe, 204 Mass. 34, 39, 90 N. E. 592;...