McClintock v. City of Great Falls
| Decision Date | 01 February 1917 |
| Docket Number | 3968. |
| Citation | 163 P. 99,53 Mont. 221 |
| Parties | MCCLINTOCK v. CITY OF GREAT FALLS ET AL. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Cascade County; J. B. Leslie, Judge.
Action by Joseph McClintock against the City of Great Falls and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Judgment affirmed.
F. A Ewald, of Great Falls, for appellant.
Cooper Stephenson & Hoover, of Great Falls, for respondents.
In 1898 the city of Great Falls issued its bonds in the sum of $376,000, and from the proceeds procured a water system for supplying the city and its inhabitants. In 1915 the city council, reciting that the city's only available means of water supply--the Missouri river--had become polluted to such extent that the water was no longer fit for use and was dangerous to health, that it was necessary to provide a filtration plant for purifying the water, and that such plant could be installed for $150,000, submitted to the qualified electors the question whether the indebtedness of the municipality should be increased further beyond the constitutional limit of 3 per cent. by an issue of bonds in the sum named to procure funds necessary for the purpose indicated. Pursuant to the authority conferred by a favorable vote, the city caused the bonds to be issued and sold and the proceeds deposited in the city treasury. It then entered into three contracts for the installation of a filtration plant at a cost exceeding $187,000, and plaintiff, a taxpayer of the city, commenced this action to enjoin the payment of the contract price or the expenditure of any money in the further execution of the plan. The trial court after a hearing denied plaintiff any relief, and he appealed from the judgment entered in favor of the defendants.
1. There is not any merit in the contention that plaintiff has not sufficient interest to authorize him to prosecute this action. The full faith and credit of the city are pledged to the redemption of the bonds issued (Carlson v. City of Helena, 39 Mont. 82, 102 P. 39, 17 Ann. Cas. 1233), and the interest of the taxpayer is sufficient to give him standing in court if the city is threatening to make unlawful use of its public funds (Milligan v. Miles City, 51 Mont. 374, 153 P. 276, L. R. A. 1916C, 395).
2. Whether the city in entering upon the contracts for the filtration plant incurred an indebtedness depends upon the state of its finances. If the city has on hand funds available for the purpose in amount sufficient to discharge its obligations under the contracts as they mature, then no indebtedness whatever was contracted. It is a cash transaction. Field v. Stroube, 103 Ky. 114, 44 S.W 363.
3. Upon the trial it was made to appear that from the revenues derived from its water plant the city has paid the interest on its bonded indebtedness, the running expenses of the plant, including the cost of repairs, extensions, and betterments; has paid into its sinking fund for the redemption of its outstanding bonds $113,000, and has accumulated a surplus of $50,000. It appeared also that the revenues from the water plant will provide ample funds for interest, maintenance, and the discharge of its water bonds as they mature, including the present issue of $150,000, and that it is the purpose of the city to expend for the filtration plant the surplus fund of $50,000 in addition to the $150,000 received from the sale of bonds.
Though the evidence is not very clear, we shall assume that the city has reached the 3 per cent. limit of indebtedness, and that the entire expense incident to the completion of the filtration plant ready for successful operation will not exceed $200,000. It is the contention of appellant that the city has no funds whatever available to meet and discharge its obligations arising from the contracts; in other words, that the city cannot lawfully expend, for the purpose intended, either the $150,000 derived from the sale of bonds or the $50,000 surplus. Whether this contention should or should not be upheld depends upon the proper construction of the language of section 6, art. 13, of the Constitution. That section declares that a city shall not incur any indebtedness for any purpose to an amount, including outstanding indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding 3 per cent. of the value of the taxable property therein, except to construct a sewerage system or to procure a supply of water. Since the purpose to which the city desires to devote this money is not related in any manner to the construction of a sewerage system, the question presented is narrowed to the inquiry: May the expenditure of these funds be justified as one "to procure a supply of water"?
It is impressed upon our attention that the city has already a water supply sufficient in quantity to meet its requirements, and it is the contention of appellant that an expenditure for the purification of the water cannot be justified as one to procure a supply of water. Appellant's premise must be conceded, viz. that, unless the installation of a filtration plant can be justified as within the meaning of the language of section 6 above, it cannot be justified in this instance at all. To arrive at the meaning of any provision of our Constitution, two considerations must be kept in mind, the character of the Constitution itself, and the particular subject-matter under review. Speaking generally, our Constitution is not a grant of powers, but a limitation upon the powers which may be exercised by the various branches of the state government. State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392. Except in so far as it is restricted by the Constitution, the Legislature has all the lawmaking power possessed by any sovereign state. State v. Dodd, 51 Mont. 100, 149 P. 481.
A city of this state is a creature of statute. Independently of legislation it cannot exist--cannot exercise any functions whatever. In the absence of...
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